People v. Silverstein, Cr. 5033
| Decision Date | 05 November 1953 |
| Docket Number | Cr. 5033 |
| Citation | 262 P.2d 656,121 Cal.App.2d 140 |
| Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
| Parties | PEOPLE v. SILVERSTEIN. |
Umann & Bubrick, Los Angeles, for appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Atty. Gen., and William E. James, Deputy Atty. Gen., for respondent.
In 1951 defendant, Irving Silverstein, burglarized a dwelling house in the nighttime. He was apprehended, charged under Subdivision m of Section 700 of the Welfare & Institutions Code with being a person who had violated the law of this state, made a ward of the Juvenile Court, and committed to the California Youth Authority.
He was confined in Preston School of Industry and in the institution at Lancaster for fifteen months, and then released. Upon his release he was certified back to the Juvenile Court and then certified to the Superior Court for further proceedings.
On December 30, 1952 an information was filed in the Superior Court by the District Attorney, charging defendant with the same burglary, and with a prior felony conviction for which he had served time in the penitentiary in the State of Idaho.
Brought to trial on this charge, defendant waived a jury, and was found guilty of first-degree burglary by the trial judge. He was also found to have suffered the prior felony conviction and punishment.
Motion for a new trial was denied; probation was denied; and defendant was sentenced to the state prison for the term prescribed by law. Execution of judgment was suspended and defendant referred to the California Youth Authority. California Youth Authority rejected him. Then he was committed to the state prison in accordance with the judgment.
Defendant urges but one ground of appeal: That the trial in the Superior Court, the finding of guilty as charged in the information, and the sentence of defendant constitute a second punishment and a second trial for the same offense. This the State may not do. Ex parte Lange, 18 Wall. 163, 175, 85 U.S. 163, 21 L.Ed. 872; State of Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 67 S.C.t. 374, 91 L.Ed. 422; People v. Bechtel, 41 Cal.2d 441, 260 P.2d 31.
Appellant argues: That the Juvenile and the Superior Court are one and the same, and therefore defendant was dealt with twice by the same court for the same crime. That when the Juvenile Court made him its ward and committed him to the Youth Authority he had been 'punished.' That when the proceedings were subsequently commenced in the Superior Court constitutional rules of double jeopardy applied to defendant, and he should have been discharged by the Superior Court.
The Attorney General contends that Juvenile Court proceedings are civil, not criminal in nature; that commitments ordered by the Juvenile Court are not 'punishments'; and that therefore double jeopardy, which applies only to criminal cases, is not applicable to the facts in this case.
The problem is not difficult of solution if the purposes of our Juvenile Court law be kept in mind.
One of these purposes is to save minors from the rigors of the criminal law. Subd. m, § 700, Welf. & Inst. Code; and Cf. People v. Kehoe, 123 Cal. 224, 55 P. 911.
Having regard for the lack of judgment of some boys and girls who commit felonies, knowing that in such cases want of training is largely responsible for their crimes, our juvenile court law attempts first to save them from the harsh consequences of their folly--from the degradation of confinement in a penitentiary, from the infamous associations incident to such confinement, and from bearing all the rest of their lives the stigma of ex-convict.
Then our law attempts to provide through its Youth Authority the training which it hopes will enable the minor to learn to distinguish between right and wrong, to make right conduct the guiding principle of his life, and thus to become an honorable, upright, and useful citizen.
Most wards of the Juvenile Court respond to training; most of them give promise of becoming good citizens. In such cases they may be honorably discharged by the Juvenile Court or by the Youth Authority, and that...
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State v. Naylor
...of double jeopardy, subsequent prosecution of the juvenile in an ordinary criminal court involving the same acts. People v. Silverstein, 121 Cal.App.2d 140, 262 P.2d 656 (1953); In re Santillanes, 47 N.M. 140, 138 P.2d 503, 510 (1943); Moquin v. State, 216 Md. 524, 140 A.2d 914, 918 (1958).......
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Fain v. Duff
...Moquin v. State, 216 Md. 524, 140 A.2d 914 (1958); In re Santillanes, 47 N.M. 140, 138 P.2d 503, 510-511 (1943); People v. Silverstein, 121 Cal.App.2d 140, 262 P.2d 656 (1953); In re Smith, 114 N.Y.S.2d 673 (Dom.Rel.Ct.1952). See also In re Holmes, 379 Pa. 599, 109 A.2d 523 (1954), cert. de......
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People v. McFarland
...partially added.) In this exceptionally well reasoned opinion, the court expressed its doubt as to the vitality of People v. Silverstein, 121 Cal.App.2d 140, 262 P.2d 656, which had held that the double jeopardy provisions did not apply to the civil proceedings held pursuant to juvenile cou......
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State v. Gibbs
...e. g., In re McDonald, 153 A.2d 651 (D.C.Mun.Ct.App.1959); Moquin v. State, 216 Md. 524, 140 A.2d 914 (1958); People v. Silverstein, 121 Cal.App.2d 140, 262 P.2d 656 (1953); In re Santillanes, 47 N.M. 140, 138 P.2d 503 (1943).8 Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 Harv.L.Rev. 104, 120 (1909).9 In r......