People v. Skinner

• Decision Date: 16 September 1985
• Citation: 704 P.2d 752,217 Cal.Rptr. 685,39 Cal.3d 765
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: , 704 P.2d 752, 54 USLW 2187 The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Jesse SKINNER, Defendant and Appellant. Crim. 23783.

Page 685

217 Cal.Rptr. 685

39 Cal.3d 765, 704 P.2d 752, 54 USLW 2187

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Jesse SKINNER, Defendant and Appellant.

Crim. 23783.

Supreme Court of California.

Sept. 16, 1985.

Charles M. Sevilla, Cleary & Sevilla, San Diego, for defendant and appellant.

John K. Van de Kamp, Atty. Gen., Beverly K. Falk, Norman H. Sokolow and Howard J. Schwab, Deputy Attys. Gen., for plaintiff and respondent.

Christopher N. Heard, San Jose, and Terry L. White, Sacramento, as amici curiae on behalf of plaintiff and respondent.

GRODIN, Justice.

For over a century prior to the decision in People v. Drew (1978) 22 Cal.3d 333, 149 Cal.Rptr. 275, 583 P.2d 1318, California courts framed this state's definition of insanity, as a defense in criminal cases, upon the two-pronged test adopted by the House of Lords in M'Naghten's Case (1843) 10 Clark & Fin. 200, 210 : "[T]o establish a defence on the ground of insanity, it must be clearly proved that, at the time of the committing the act, the party accused was labouring under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing; or, if he did know it, that he did not know he was doing what was wrong." (Emphasis added; see People v. Coffman (1864) 24 Cal. 230, 235.)

Over the years the M'Naghten test became subject to considerable criticism and was abandoned in a number of jurisdictions. In Drew this court followed suit, adopting the test for mental incapacity proposed by the American Law Institute: "A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality [wrongfulness] of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law." (Drew, supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 345, 149 Cal.Rptr. 275, 583 P.2d 1318.)

In June 1982 the California electorate adopted an initiative measure, popularly known as Proposition 8, which (among other things) for the first time in this state established a statutory definition of insanity: "In any criminal proceeding ... in which a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity is entered, this defense shall be found by the trier of fact only when the accused person proves by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she was incapable of knowing or understanding the nature and quality of his or her act and of distinguishing right from wrong at the time of the commission of the offense." (Pen.Code, § 25, subd. (b) [hereafter section 25(b) ], emphasis added.) ¹

It is apparent from the language of section 25(b) that it was designed to eliminate the Drew test and to reinstate the prongs of the M'Naghten test. However, the section uses the conjunctive "and" instead of the disjunctive "or" to connect the two prongs. Read literally, therefore, section 25(b) would do more than reinstate the M'Naghten test. It would strip the insanity defense from an accused who, by reason of mental disease, is incapable of knowing that the act he was doing was wrong. That is, in fact, the interpretation adopted by the trial court in this case.

Defendant claims that the purpose of the electorate in adopting section 25(b) was to restore the M'Naghten test as it existed in California prior to this court's decision in People v. Drew, supra, 22 Cal.3d 333, 149 Cal.Rptr. 275, 583 P.2d 1318. If read literally, he argues, section 25(b) would violate both the state and federal Constitutions by imposing criminal responsibility and sanctions on persons who lack the mens rea essential to criminal culpability.

The People do not dispute the proposition that the intent of the electorate was to reinstate the pre-Drew test of legal insanity. They argue, however, that section 25(b), "amplifies" and "clarifies" the M'Naghten test. Amicus curiae, the Criminal Justice Legal Foundation, agrees that the intent was not to adopt a stricter test than that applicable prior to Drew, but suggest that in fact there is no difference between the two prongs of the M'Naghten test--ability to distinguish between right and wrong, and knowledge of the nature and quality of the particular criminal act.

Mindful of the serious constitutional questions that might arise were we to accept a literal construction of the statutory language, and of our obligation wherever possible both to carry out the intent of the electorate and to construe statutes so as to preserve their constitutionality (Amador Valley Joint Union High Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of Equalization (1978) 22 Cal.3d 208, 245, 149 Cal.Rptr. 239, 583 P.2d 1281; Associated Home Builders etc., Inc. v. City of Livermore (1976) 18 Cal.3d 582, 598, 135 Cal.Rptr. 41, 557 P.2d 473; People v. Amor (1974) 12 Cal.3d 20, 30, 114 Cal.Rptr. 765, 523 P.2d 1173), we shall conclude that section 25(b) was intended to, and does, restore the M'Naghten test as it existed in this state before Drew. We shall also conclude that under that test there exist two distinct and independent bases upon which a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity might be returned.

I

Defendant appeals from a judgment of conviction of second degree murder ( §§ 187, 189) entered upon his pleas of nolo contendere and not guilty by reason of insanity ( § 1016, subds. 3, 6), and a finding by the court, after a jury was waived, that he was sane at the time of the offense.( § 1026, subd. (a).) In finding the defendant sane, the judge acknowledged that it was more likely than not that defendant suffered from a mental disease, paranoid schizophrenia, which played a significant part in the killing. The judge stated that under the Drew test of legal insanity defendant would qualify as insane, and also found that "under the right-wrong prong of section 25(b), the defendant would qualify as legally insane; but under the other prong, he clearly does not." Concluding that by the use of the conjunctive "and" in section 25(b), the electorate demonstrated an intent to establish a stricter test of legal insanity than the M'Naghten test, and to "virtually eliminate" insanity as a defense, the judge found that defendant had not established that he was legally insane.

Probation was denied and defendant was sentenced to a term of 15 years to life in the state prison.

Defendant strangled his wife while he was on a day pass from the Camarillo State Hospital at which he was a patient. Evidence offered at the trial on his plea of not guilty by reason of insanity included the opinion of a clinical and forensic psychologist that defendant suffered from either classical paranoic schizophrenia, or schizo-affective illness with significant paranoid features. A delusional product of this illness was a belief held by defendant that the marriage vow "till death do us part" bestows on a marital partner a God-given right to kill the other partner who has violated or was inclined to violate the marital vows, and that because the vows reflect the direct wishes of God, the killing is with complete moral and criminal impunity. The act is not wrongful because it is sanctified by the will and desire of God.

Although there was also evidence that would have supported a finding that defendant was sane, it was apparently the evidence summarized above upon which the trial judge based his finding that defendant met one, but not both, prongs of the M'Naghten test. Defendant knew the nature and quality of his act. He knew that his act was homicidal. He was unable to distinguish right and wrong, however, in that he did not know that this particular killing was wrongful or criminal.

In this context we must determine whether the trial court's conclusion that section 25(b), requires that a defendant meet both prongs of the M'Naghten test to establish legal insanity was correct, and if not, whether the court's finding that defendant met the "right-wrong" aspect of the test requires reversal with directions to enter a judgment of not guilty by reason of insanity.

II The Insanity Defense in California

"It is fundamental to our system of jurisprudence that a person cannot be convicted for acts performed while insane. (People v. Nash (1959) 52 Cal.2d 36, 50-51 ; ...)" (People v. Kelly (1973) 10 Cal.3d 565, 574, 111 Cal.Rptr. 171, 516 P.2d 875.) This rule is one aspect of the equally well established and no less fundamental principle that wrongful intent is an essential element of crime, a principle reflected in the first statutory criminal law scheme adopted by our Legislature in 1850. The Act Concerning Crimes and Punishments (Stats.1850, ch. 99, p. 229) set forth this principle and its applicability to the insane as the first three sections of the law:

" § 1. In every crime or public offence there must be a union or joint operation of act and intention, or criminal negligence.

" § 2. Intention is manifested by the circumstances connected with the perpetration of the offence, and the sound mind and discretion of the person accused.

" § 3. A person shall be considered of sound mind who is neither an idiot, nor lunatic, nor affected with insanity, and who hath arrived at the age of fourteen years; or before that age, if such person knew the distinction between good and evil." ²

The principle that wrongful intent or criminal mens rea is an essential element of crime was carried over into the Penal Code of 1872 which incorporated section 1 of the Act Concerning Crimes and Punishments as section 20 of the code, and expanded the classes of persons deemed incapable of committing crime. Section 26, as adopted in 1872, provided that "[a]ll persons are capable of committing crimes, except those belonging to the following classes:

"1. Children under the age of fourteen years, in the absence of clear proof that at the time of committing the act charged against them, they knew of its wrongfulness;

"2. Idiots;

"3. Lunatics and insane persons;

"4. Persons who committed the act or made the omission charged, under an ignorance or...