People v. Sleboda

Citation166 Ill.App.3d 42,519 N.E.2d 512
Decision Date22 February 1988
Docket NumberNo. 2-86-0689,2-86-0689
Parties, 116 Ill.Dec. 620 The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Gregory SLEBODA, Defendant-Appellant.
CourtUnited States Appellate Court of Illinois

G. Joseph Weller, Deputy Defender, Kerry Evan Saltzman, Robert C. Cooper, Office of the State Appellate Defender, Elgin, Komessar & Wintroub, Chicago, for Gregory Sleboda.

James E. Ryan, DuPage County State's Atty., Wheaton, William L. Browers, Deputy Director State's Attys. Appellate Prosecutor, Virginia M. Ashley, Staff Atty. State's Attys. Appellate Prosecutor, Elgin, for plaintiff-appellee.

Justice INGLIS delivered the opinion of the court:

Defendant was indicted on three counts of leaving the scene of an accident involving death and three counts of reckless homicide. Two trials were held. In the first, the jury found defendant guilty of the three counts of leaving the scene of an accident involving death, but the jury was unable to reach a verdict on the reckless homicide counts. At the second trial, defendant was found guilty of the reckless homicide charges. Defendant was sentenced to concurrent sentences of 364 days on each conviction for leaving the scene and four years on each conviction for reckless homicide.

At sometime in the early morning of December 8, 1982, defendant was involved in an accident involving defendant's car and two other automobiles. The occupants of the two other cars, three in all, all died as a result of the accident. After the accident, defendant walked to his home in Hillside and once there attempted to cut his wrists. Both policemen and firemen from Hillside went to defendant's house in response to a call from defendant's sister. From there, the police officers took defendant to the Hillside police department. Later that morning, defendant was transferred to the Oak Brook police department and taken to a hospital for a blood test.

Motion to Suppress Statements

Prior to trial, defendant made a motion to suppress statements claiming that at the time he made the statements he was intoxicated to such an extent that he could not knowingly waive his rights under Miranda v. Arizona (1966), 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694.

Various police officers from the Hillside and Oak Brook police departments testified as to defendant's condition on the morning of December 8, 1982. While the officers testified that defendant had the odor of alcohol on his breath and staggered or swayed on occasion, they also testified that he was able to stand and walk on his own power, was able to follow directions, and was responsive to questions. In particular, Officer D'Alessandro testified that before leaving defendant's house, defendant assured his sister he would be all right and likewise told his father not to worry and that he would be okay. Officers D'Alessandro and Artl further testified that defendant was read his Miranda rights and after each right asked if he understood to which defendant responded that he did.

Several times during that morning defendant inquired about the people involved in the accident, at times asking if they were all right and at other times asking if they were dead.

Officer Artl, who took defendant from the Hillside police department to the Oak Brook police department, testified as to statements made during that trip. Defendant stated, "There's no way I could have caused the accident. I didn't go over the median strip." Defendant also stated that he had been challenged to a drag race at the intersection of Buck and Roosevelt Roads, that he traveled westbound on Roosevelt Road from Buck, and that the cars were going too fast.

On several occasions, defendant was asked if he desired medical treatment. He declined until he was informed that he could receive treatment without insurance, at which point he said he would go along with that.

On the way to the hospital, defendant again described a drag race and the other vehicle involved.

Evidence at the hearing was also presented that defendant submitted to a breathalyzer test which resulted in a reading of .22.

Defendant testified that between 6:15 and 7 a.m. on December 8, 1982, he was in the outer room of his bedroom drinking beer. Defendant said he drank eight beers "or more or less." He said that the next thing he remembered was talking to his attorney on the phone at the hospital.

Yoerge Pirl, assistant chief toxicologist for the State of Illinois Department of Public Health, testified on defendant's behalf. Pirl testified that at a blood level of .22, an individual would suffer severe perception and motor impairment. He added that whether an individual understands a given question is a matter of degree and that a person may or may not understand the short-term effects of that question. He stated that "frequently," at levels of .25, long-term consequences are not realized. He stated that such a person may or may not understand communication and that it is a difficult subject matter to judge. When given a hypothetical question concerning a person's ability to understand and waive his Miranda rights, Pirl stated that he could not state with certainty whether the individual could or could not comprehend the statements. According to Pirl, alcohol and its effects differ from person to person.

Dr. Edward Senay also testified on defendant's behalf. Senay testified that, based on reports which had been submitted to him, defendant's ability to make judgments was impaired at least to a mild degree, more probably to a moderate or severe degree.

At the close of the hearing, the trial court denied defendant's motion to suppress statements.

Hearing on Motion to Dismiss the Indictment

Defendant made a motion to dismiss the indictment on the ground that automobiles involved in the accident had been destroyed before an expert for defendant could view them. At the hearing on this motion, the parties stipulated that if Albert Ceren were called to testify he would state that he was the chief of the Oak Brook police on the relevant dates. He would testify that certified letters were sent over his signature on January 31, 1983, notifying the families of John Czernia and Roberta Jackson that if storage and towing fees were not paid and the cars not picked up within 10 days, they would be disposed of. He would further testify that the Cordoba belonging to John Czernia and the Duster belonging to Roberta Jackson were released to the Diehl-Nuemier Scrapyard Company on February 16, 1983. The parties further stipulated that the cars were not available.

Charles Roberts, Jr., testified that he performs accident reconstruction and failure analysis as a consulting engineer and was first contacted by the defense in March 1983. Roberts said that he could not perform a failure analysis from available photographs of the vehicle. According to Roberts, he could have conducted a failure analysis on the vehicles despite the extent of damage and that, if he had done so, he had a 70% to 80% chance of finding a failed part, if one did exist.

Mark Komessar, one of defendant's attorneys, testified that an order for reciprocal discovery was entered on January 10, 1983, that he had received materials from the State dated January 31, 1983, that the discovery materials indicated that tangibles could be viewed at the State's Attorney's office and that he correlated that to mean he could view the vehicles referred to in the police reports. Komessar further stated that on February 7, 1983, he appeared before the court for status on discovery and at that time had an off-the-record discussion with State's Attorney Schillerstrom in which he made a request to view the vehicles.

Edward Merkel testified that he was five car lengths in front of the Cordoba, in the center lane, when he saw the left front of the Cordoba go down. Merkel stated that the other three corners went up and he noticed some sparks underneath the left front. Merkel said that the Cordoba went out of control, hit the center median and flew up in the air about two feet off the street. Thirty seconds later, Merkel heard an impact. Merkel indicated that he did not see anything come off the Cordoba when he saw it drop down.

At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court denied defendant's motion to dismiss.

Defendant's Second Trial

Oak Brook police officer Allen Pisarek testified that he investigated the accident scene by measuring the location and final resting position of the automobiles along with various markings on the road which he plotted on a scaled diagram which was shown to the jury.

Oak Brook police officer Vincent Artl testified that on the morning of December 8, 1982, he took defendant from the Hillside police station to the Oak Brook police station. While on the way, Artl noticed a strong odor of alcohol. Artl asked defendant if he had had any food or alcohol since the time of the accident to which defendant responded that he had not. As the officers drove on Buck Road, defendant asked whether there were really three people killed. When Artl said yes, defendant stated it could not have been him because his vehicle did not cross over the median strip. Defendant also related that while stopped at a red light at Buck and Roosevelt Roads he was challenged to a drag race, that he started to drag race in a westerly direction on Roosevelt Road, that he was going very fast and hit something, and that he walked home.

When questioned at the Oak Brook police station, defendant said he had had a lot of beer to drink the night before. Defendant said he started drinking at his girlfriend's house in the early afternoon, that he went to Bobby's Bar at 9 p.m. and drank there until midnight, that he went to the D & S Bar and drank until 2 a.m., that he then went to Fay's Place and was drinking there until he left to go to his girlfriend's house.

On the way to the hospital where defendant was taken for a...

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    ...showing that the evidence has exculpatory value in order to establish a due process violation. (See People v. Sleboda (1988), 166 Ill.App.3d 42, 53, 116 Ill.Dec. 620, 519 N.E.2d 512.) If the State proceeds to destroy the evidence, appropriate sanctions may be imposed even if the destruction......
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