People v. Smith

• Decision Date: 22 January 2010
• Docket Number: No. 108297.,108297.
• Citation: 923 N.E.2d 259,236 Ill.2d 162,337 Ill. Dec. 700
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. Miles SMITH, Appellant.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

923 N.E.2d 259 236 Ill.2d 162 337 Ill. Dec. 700 The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee,
v.
Miles SMITH, Appellant. No. 108297. Supreme Court of Illinois. January 22, 2010.

[923 N.E.2d 260]

Michael J. Pelletier, State Appellate Defender, Patricia Unsinn, Deputy Defender, and Caroline Ellis Bourland, Assistant Appellate Defender, Office of the State Appellate Defender, Chicago, for appellant.

Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, Springfield, Anita Alvarez, State's Attorney, Chicago (James E. Fitzgerald, Mary Needham and Janet C. Mahoney, Assistant State's Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.

OPINION

Justice THOMAS delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

At issue is whether a State's Attorney may recover a statutory preliminary examination fee (55 ILCS 5/4-2002.1(a) (West 2008)) when a defendant receives a bail hearing but not a hearing to determine probable cause. We hold that the preliminary examination fee is available only

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when there has been a probable cause hearing.

BACKGROUND

The State charged defendant, Miles Smith, with possession of a controlled substance (cocaine) with the intent to deliver (720 ILCS 570/401(c)(2) (West 2006)). Following a bench trial, the circuit court of Cook County convicted defendant and sentenced him to four years' imprisonment. The court also assessed various fines and fees against defendant, including a $20 "preliminary hearing" State's Attorney fee pursuant to section 4-2002.1(a) of the Counties Code (55 ILCS 5/4-2002.1(a) (West 2006)).

Defendant appealed, arguing, inter alia, that he could not be assessed the $20 fee because no preliminary examination was held. According to defendant, it is well settled that a "preliminary examination" is a probable cause hearing, and no such hearing was held in this case because he was indicted by a grand jury.

The Appellate Court, First District, Fifth Division, held that the fee was properly assessed because there had been a bail hearing. No. 1-07-0282 (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). The court noted a split of authority on this issue in the First District. In People v. Ellison, 383 Ill.App.3d 146, 321 Ill.Dec. 896, 890 N.E.2d 618 (2008), the Fourth Division held that the preliminary examination fee is properly assessed for bail hearings rather than for probable cause hearings. The relevant statute provides that the fee is assessed for "preliminary examinations for each defendant held to bail or recognizance." 55 ILCS 5/4-2002.1(a) (West 2006). The Ellison court determined that, if the statute were read as applying to probable cause hearings, that would render the language "bail or recognizance" superfluous. Thus, Ellison concluded that "as used in section 4-2002.1(a), a `preliminary examination' means the proceedings at which a trial court examines relevant factors for the purpose of determining whether or not to hold defendant on bail or recognizance." Ellison, 383 Ill.App.3d at 147, 321 Ill.Dec. 896, 890 N.E.2d 618. The Ellison court found irrelevant the definition of "preliminary examination" in the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/100-1 et seq. (West 2006)), because section 4-2002.1(a) of the Counties Code did not refer to that definition. Ellison, 383 Ill.App.3d at 147-48, 321 Ill.Dec. 896, 890 N.E.2d 618.

In People v. Brown, 388 Ill.App.3d 104, 112-14, 328 Ill.Dec. 377, 904 N.E.2d 139 (2009), the Third Division rejected Ellison's holding. The Brown court held that the plain meaning of "preliminary examination" is a hearing to determine whether there is sufficient evidence to prosecute the accused. The court noted that the term is defined that way both in Black's Law Dictionary (Black's Law Dictionary 1199 (7th ed. 1999)) and in the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/109-3 (West 2006)). Brown, 388 Ill.App.3d at 113, 328 Ill.Dec. 377, 904 N.E.2d 139. The court further rejected Ellison's conclusion that it is improper to look to the Code of Criminal Procedure to define the term because the relevant section of the Counties Code provides a schedule of fees for State's Attorneys for various criminal procedures. The court thus found that "any explanation of the fees due for `preliminary examinations' necessarily requires us to examine the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963, which is the relevant statute from which those proceedings are specifically derived." Brown, 388 Ill.App.3d at 113, 328 Ill.Dec. 377, 904 N.E.2d 139. Because the defendant in Brown was indicted by a grand jury, no preliminary examination

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within the meaning of the Code of Criminal Procedure was held. Accordingly, the court vacated the preliminary examination fee. Brown, 388 Ill.App.3d at 114, 328 Ill.Dec. 377, 904 N.E.2d 139.

Here, the Fifth Division considered the reasoning of both Ellison and Brown and found Ellison more persuasive. The court believed that Brown was improperly ignoring the language referring to "bail or recognizance." Accordingly, the court held that defendant was properly assessed the fee, as it was undisputed that he had received a bail hearing. The court also addressed other issues not presented here.

We allowed defendant's petition for leave to appeal to resolve this conflict between the various divisions of the First District. 210 Ill.2d R. 315.

ANALYSIS

The issue is one of statutory construction. Thus, our primary goal is to ascertain and give effect to the drafters' intention, and the most reliable indicator of intent is the language used, which must be given its plain and ordinary meaning. People v. Davison, 233 Ill.2d 30, 40, 329 Ill.Dec. 347, 906 N.E.2d 545 (2009). In determining the plain meaning of a statute's terms, we consider the statute in its entirety, keeping in mind the subject it addresses and the apparent intent of the legislature in enacting the statute. People v. Perry, 224 Ill.2d 312, 323, 309 Ill.Dec. 330, 864 N.E.2d 196 (2007). When statutory terms are undefined, we presume that the legislature intended the terms to have their popularly understood meaning. People v. Maggette, 195 Ill.2d 336, 349, 254 Ill.Dec. 299, 747 N.E.2d 339 (2001). Moreover, if a term has a settled legal meaning, the courts will normally infer that the legislature intended to incorporate the established meaning. People v. Bailey, 232 Ill.2d 285, 290, 328 Ill.Dec. 22, 903 N.E.2d 409 (2009) (holding that the term "search" has a settled meaning in the realm of criminal procedure). Statutes such as this, which are in derogation of the common law, must be strictly construed. People v. Williams, 235 Ill.2d 286, 297, 336 Ill.Dec. 470, 920 N.E.2d 1060 (2009), citing People v. Nicholls, 71 Ill.2d 166, 173, 15 Ill.Dec. 759, 374 N.E.2d 194 (1978). The construction of a statute is a question of law that is reviewed de novo. Davison, 233 Ill.2d at 40, 329 Ill.Dec. 347, 906 N.E.2d 545.

Defendant argues that this court should follow Brown. Defendant points out that "preliminary examination" is a legal term of art that means a hearing to determine whether there is sufficient evidence to prosecute an accused person. Defendant cites treatises and both Illinois and out-of-state decisions. Defendant points out that every state to use the term "preliminary examination" or "preliminary hearing" uses it to describe a probable cause hearing. Ellison, by contrast, cited no authority defining "preliminary examination" as a bail hearing. Defendant agrees with Brown's conclusion that, because the fee schedule in the Counties Code relates to criminal proceedings, a court should necessarily look to the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963. Section 109-3 of the Code is entitled "Preliminary Examination" and describes a probable cause hearing. See 725 ILCS 5/109-3 (West 2006).¹

Although the State argues that the Ellison court's reasoning was correct, it does

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not, in fact, rely on Ellison's reasoning. As we noted above, Ellison held that looking to the Code of Criminal Procedure to define "preliminary examination" was improper. Moreover, the Ellison court determined that the $20 fee could not be awarded for a probable cause hearing because that would render the "bail or recognizance" language superfluous. By contrast, the State has come up with an argument that not only requires looking at the Code of Criminal Procedure, but also would allow the fee to be imposed for both bail hearings and probable cause hearings. The State points out that the Code of Criminal Procedure uses the term "preliminary examination" twice: first, as an article header for article 109, and then again for section 109-3, a specific section of article 109. There are five sections under article 109. One of them,...