People v. Smith, 27326

• Decision Date: 11 July 1977
• Docket Number: No. 27326,27326
• Citation: 566 P.2d 364,193 Colo. 357
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Jerry Roger SMITH a/k/a Roger Don Yates, Gary Lee Williams, Donald L. Shirer, and James Lincoln Crall a/k/a Lincoln Fredrick Black, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: Colorado Supreme Court

Page 364

566 P.2d 364

193 Colo. 357

The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Jerry Roger SMITH a/k/a Roger Don Yates, Gary Lee Williams Donald L. Shirer, and James Lincoln Crall a/k/a Lincoln Fredrick Black, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 27326.

Supreme Court of Colorado, En Banc.

July 11, 1977.

R. Dale Tooley, Dist. Atty., Brooke Wunnicke, Chief Appellate Deputy Dist. Atty., Thomas P. Casey, Deputy Dist. Atty., Denver, for plaintiff-appellant.

Douglas John Traeger, Kenneth L. Keene, Jr., Denver, for defendant-appellee Gary Lee Williams.

J. D. MacFarlane, Atty. Gen., Jean E. Dubofsky, Deputy Atty. Gen., Edward G. Donovan, Sol. Gen., David K. Rees, Asst. Atty. Gen., Denver, for intervenor.

GROVES, Justice.

Defendants were charged in an eight-count indictment. Three of these charges were under section 42-5-102, C.R.S.1973. The district court declared this statute to be unconstitutional. We reverse.

Section 102 provides:

"Stolen auto parts buying, selling. Any person who buys, sells, exchanges, trades, receives, conceals, or alters the appearance of an automobile, or any automobile part, equipment, attachment, accessory, or appurtenance, which is the property of another, or any person who aids or abets in the commission or attempted commission of any such act, knowing or having reasonable cause to know and believe that such automobile or automobile part, equipment, attachment, accessory, or appurtenance is stolen property, is guilty of a felony and, upon conviction thereof, shall be punished by a fine of not more than one thousand dollars or by imprisonment in the state penitentiary for not less than one year nor more than ten years."

One defendant was charged under this section with feloniously altering an automobile engine which was the property of another. All three defendants were charged with feloniously selling automobile parts from automobiles which were the property of others.

Without amplifying upon its reasons, the district court ruled that section 102 be "declared unconstitutional as a denial of equal protection of the Law."

The defendant Williams was the only appellee to file a brief. His principal argument in support of the district court's ruling reads as follows:

"At present a district attorney has the discretion to charge a person under either the Sale of Automobile Parts Statute, Theft of Automobile Parts Statute, or the General Theft Statute. A person accused of selling auto parts worth five dollars can be charged with a felony under C.R.S.1973, 42-5-102 or with a class 1 petty offense under the General Theft Statute, C.R.S.1973, § 18-4-401(3.1) (1975 Supp.) Thus, at the district attorney's discretion, he faces a possible penalty of either imprisonment in the state penitentiary for a period of not less than one nor more than ten years, C.R.S.1973, § 42-5-102, or imprisonment for not more than six months other than in the state penitentiary, C.R.S.1973, § 18-1-107. The value threshold for the dealing in stolen automobile parts is so disproportionate to the General Theft Statute as to render its literal enforcement as absurd and does indeed deprive the defendant of equal protection of the laws."

With one exception which will be mentioned later, the constitutional issues are identical with those addressed by us in People v. Czajkowski, et al, Colo., 568 P.2d 23, announced contemporaneously with this opinion. For the reasons there...