People v. Smocum
| Decision Date | 25 February 2003 |
| Citation | 786 N.E.2d 1275,99 N.Y.2d 418,757 N.Y.S.2d 239 |
| Parties | THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, Respondent, v. JOHN SMOCUM, Appellant. |
| Court | New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
Alan S. Axelrod, New York City, and Andrew C. Fine for appellant.
Charles J. Hynes, District Attorney, Brooklyn (Jacqueline M. Linares and Leonard Joblove of counsel), for respondent.
This appeal spotlights the three-step test for determining whether peremptory challenges have been used to exclude potential jurors on account of race (see Batson v Kentucky, 476 US 79, 94-98 [1986]
). As a first step, the moving party bears the burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination in the exercise of peremptory challenges. Second, the nonmoving party must give a race-neutral reason for each potential juror challenged. In step three, the court determines whether the reason given is merely a pretext for discrimination. Against this background we evaluate the challenged voir dire in the present case, in which defendant's conviction for criminal possession of stolen property—an automobile—was affirmed by the Appellate Division.
During the first round of jury selection, the prosecutor exercised peremptory challenges to three of the first 12 prospective jurors. After the prosecutor removed one Hispanic and two African-American women, defense counsel stated, "I am wondering if we are having a Batson issue here." Although the prosecutor maintained that the defense had failed to make a prima facie case, and thus no race-neutral reasons were yet required, the court responded, The prosecutor replied that two, Torres and Gordon, were challenged for family involvement with police officers, and the third, Mapp, because her son had died and the prosecutor "didn't think it was appropriate to go into it." The following colloquy ensued:
Before us, defendant maintains that the court improperly revisited step one—the prima facie case—after the prosecutor had given his reasons for the challenged strikes; that any possible ruling on pretext as to prospective juror Mapp is unsupported by the record; and that inadequacies in the record were chargeable to the court's impatience in conducting the inquiry. Although we agree that the trial court's analysis was less than ideal, because we conclude that defendant—who bore the ultimate burden of persuasion—failed at the time to raise his present claims, we affirm.
In furtherance of the United States Supreme Court's "unceasing efforts to eradicate racial discrimination" in the jury selection process, the Court in Batson v Kentucky (476 US at 85, 94-98) prescribed a now-familiar three-step test for determining whether peremptory challenges are based on invidious discrimination. That test is drawn from "disparate treatment" cases under title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (id. at 94 n 18).
Under Batson and its progeny, the party claiming discriminatory use of peremptories must first make out a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination by showing that the facts and circumstances of the voir dire raise an inference that the other party excused one or more jurors for an impermissible reason. "There are no fixed rules for determining what evidence will * * * establish a prima facie case of discrimination" (People v Bolling, 79 NY2d 317, 323-324 [1992]). Although as part of their prima facie case parties often rely on numbers to show a pattern of strikes against a particular group of jurors, a prima facie case may be made based on the peremptory challenge of a single juror that gives rise to an inference of discrimination.
Once a prima facie showing of discrimination is made, the nonmovant must come forward with a race-neutral explanation for each challenged peremptory—step two. If the nonmovant cannot meet this burden, an equal protection violation is established. However, once race-neutral reasons are given, the inference of discrimination is overcome. At this second stage the reasons need be only facially permissible.
The third step of the Batson inquiry requires the trial court to make an ultimate determination on the issue of discriminatory intent based on all of the facts and circumstances presented. Unlike step two, this determination is a question of fact, focused on the credibility of the race-neutral reasons. Courts may determine that the proffered reasons are pretextual without further arguments by the moving party, but the moving party has the ultimate burden of persuading the court that the reasons are merely a pretext for intentional discrimination (People v Payne, 88 NY2d 172, 183-184 [1996]). It is therefore the moving party's burden to make a record that would support a finding of pretext.
As should be clear from this summary, the Batson procedure effectuates its purpose only if the steps are followed in sequence. It makes no sense, for example, to revisit the issue of whether a prima facie case has been made once the prosecutor has come forward with race-neutral reasons. At that point, the presumption of discrimination raised by the movant's initial prima facie case has been rebutted, and to revisit the adequacy of the step one showing "unnecessarily evade[s] the ultimate question of discrimination" (Durant v Strack, 151 F Supp 2d 226, 236 [ED NY 2001...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
People v. Taylor
...of peremptory challenges (see People v. Bridgeforth, 28 N.Y.3d 567, 573, 46 N.Y.S.3d 824, 69 N.E.3d 611 ; People v. Smocum, 99 N.Y.2d 418, 421–422, 757 N.Y.S.2d 239, 786 N.E.2d 1275 ). The second step shifts the burden to the nonmoving party to provide race-neutral reasons for peremptorily ......
-
People v. Hecker
...burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination in the exercise of peremptory challenges" ( People v. Smocum, 99 N.Y.2d 418, 420, 757 N.Y.S.2d 239, 786 N.E.2d 1275 [2003] ). Once a prima facie case of discrimination has been established, the burden shifts, at step two, to the no......
-
People v. Fermin
...9 A.D.3d 333, 334, 780 N.Y.S.2d 143 ; see Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 ; People v. Smocum, 99 N.Y.2d 418, 421–422, 757 N.Y.S.2d 239, 786 N.E.2d 1275 ; People v. Allen, 86 N.Y.2d 101, 104, 629 N.Y.S.2d 1003, 653 N.E.2d 1173 ). Thus, a party asserting a Batso......
-
People v. Malloy
...proffered by the prosecutor, which need not be persuasive or plausible but only "facially permissible" ( People v. Smocum, 99 N.Y.2d 418, 422, 757 N.Y.S.2d 239, 786 N.E.2d 1275 [2003] ; see Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 768, 115 S.Ct. 1769, 131 L.Ed.2d 834 [1995] ), was race-neutral and th......
-
Jury selection
...that the reason given is pretextual. If the court finds the reason is pretextual, the challenged juror must be seated. People v. Smocum, 99 N.Y.2d 418, 757 N.Y.S.2d 239 (2003); People v. Allen , 86 N.Y.2d 101, 629 N.Y.S.2d 1003 (1995); People v. Hall, 53 A.D.3d 552, 861 N.Y.S.2d 411 (2d Dep......
-
Table of cases
...Smith , 16 N.Y.3d 786, 920 N.Y.S.2d 284 (2011), § 19:60 People v. Smith, 22 N.Y.3d 462, 982 N.Y.S.2d 809 (2013), §5:130 People v. Smocum, 99 N.Y.2d 418, 757 N.Y.S.2d 239 (2003), § 2:270 People v. Sorrentini , 26 A.D.2d 827, 273 N.Y.S.2d 981 (2d Dept. 1966), § 14:140 People v. Soto, 113 A.D.......
-
Jury selection
...that the reason given is pretextual. If the court finds the reason is pretextual, the challenged juror must be seated. People v. Smocum, 99 N.Y.2d 418, 757 N.Y.S.2d 239 (2003); People v. Allen , 86 N.Y.2d 101, 629 N.Y.S.2d 1003 (1995); People v. Hall, 53 A.D.3d 552, 861 N.Y.S.2d 411 (2d Dep......
-
Jury selection
...that the reason given is pretextual. If the court inds the reason is pretextual, the challenged juror must be seated. People v. Smocum, 99 N.Y.2d 418, 757 N.Y.S.2d 239 (2003); People v. Allen , 86 N.Y.2d 101, 629 N.Y.S.2d 1003 (1995); People v. Hall, 53 A.D.3d 552, 861 N.Y.S.2d 411 (2d Dept......