People v. Socrates

• Decision Date: 17 July 2003
• Citation: 762 N.Y.S.2d 293,307 A.D.2d 546
• Parties: THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, Respondent,<BR>v.<BR>CONIL SOCRATES, Also Known as DE JESUS SOCRATES, Appellant.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

307 A.D.2d 546

762 N.Y.S.2d 293

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, Respondent,

v.CONIL SOCRATES, Also Known as DE JESUS SOCRATES, Appellant.

Mugglin, J.

Decided July 17, 2003.

Cardona, P.J., Spain, Carpinello and Kane, JJ., concur.

Mugglin, J.

On May 24, 2001, a police-controlled confidential informant allegedly purchased cocaine from defendant at his residence. Based thereon, the police applied for and received a no-knock search warrant, the execution of which resulted in the seizure of 27 individually wrapped packages of cocaine, a loaded .22 caliber rifle and a sum of money. Defendant was indicted on a variety of drug possession charges and criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree, to which he pleaded not guilty. County Court set August 20, 2001 for motions but, after changing attorneys and following a pretrial conference on August 16, 2001, defendant entered a plea of guilty to one count each of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third and fourth degrees in full satisfaction of the charges against him with the understanding that he would be sentenced to two concurrent prison terms of 1½ to 4½ years. Defendant was sentenced as agreed and now appeals from the judgment of conviction.

Defendant's principal argument on appeal, ineffective assistance of counsel, is premised on the failure of defense counsel to move to suppress the physical evidence seized pursuant to the search warrant. Defendant asserts that the affidavit submitted in support of the search warrant application sets forth no facts or circumstances showing either that the confidential informant was reliable or that he or she had a basis of knowledge for the information furnished. Hence, defendant argues that the physical evidence would have been suppressed and the indictment dismissed.

Regardless of the merit of this argument, the entry of a guilty plea constitutes an affirmative waiver of all unresolved suppression issues (see People v White, 300 AD2d 830, 832 [2002], lv denied 99 NY2d 586 [2003]). Notably, defendant's appellate counsel does not argue that the ineffective assistance of counsel affected the voluntariness of defendant's plea of guilty. If we were to infer such an argument from the totality of the brief, we would nevertheless remain unpersuaded. First, the plea colloquy demonstrates that defendant voluntarily entered a plea of guilty. Second, defendant affirmatively expressed his satisfaction with the services of trial counsel. Third, defense ...