People v. Solomon
| Decision Date | 21 October 2021 |
| Docket Number | 349015 |
| Parties | PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MARTIN SOLOMON, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US |
UNPUBLISHED
Wayne Circuit Court LC No. 17-004867-01-FC
Before: Murray, C.J., and Jansen and Riordan, JJ.
Defendant appeals as of right his jury trial convictions of two counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct (CSC-I), MCL 750.520b(1)(c), two counts of second-degree criminal sexual conduct (CSC-II), MCL 750.520c(1)(c), and one count of kidnapping, MCL 750.349. The trial court sentenced defendant as a fourth-offense habitual offender, MCL 769.12, to prison terms of 45 to 80 years for each CSC-I conviction, parolable life imprisonment for kidnapping, and 12 to 30 years for each CSC-II conviction, to be served concurrently. We affirm.
Defendant was convicted of sexually assaulting JB inside JB's jail cell at the Wayne County Jail on August 24, 2016. The two men were both inmates. According to witnesses, defendant is much larger in stature than JB. JB testified that he was inside his jail cell, discussing his criminal case with defendant who was outside the cell. The unit had not been locked down for the night, so inmates were free to move about the common areas, and JB's cell door was unsecured. According to JB he went to get something inside his cell and, when he turned around, defendant had entered the cell, blocked the doorway to prevent JB from leaving, forced JB onto the bed, threatened him, and then sexually assaulted him. JB admitted that he ejaculated during the sexual assault, and said that defendant ejaculated on JB's thigh.
JB reported the sexual assault to a jail deputy the next day. After JB reported the assault, defendant accused JB of having sexually assaulted him. Both men were interviewed, and both were examined the next day by a sexual assault nurse examiner (SANE). Samples were collected from both men and submitted for forensic testing and DNA analysis. DNA consistent with each man's DNA profile was found in samples collected from the other. At trial, the court permitted the prosecution to introduce evidence of defendant's prior sexual assaults against other persons under MCL 768.27b.
Defendant testified at trial and denied sexually assaulting JB. He claimed that he was smoking a cigarette with JB inside JB's cell when JB suddenly punched him in the head, knocking him unconscious. When he awoke, JB was sexually assaulting him while threatening him with sharp pencils. Defendant claimed that, during the assault, JB made defendant masturbate, which caused defendant to ejaculate, and semen ended up on JB's leg.
On appeal, defendant raises issues in both a brief filed by appointed appellate counsel and an additional pro se brief filed under Supreme Court Administrative Order No. 2004-6, Standard 4 ("Standard 4 brief).
Defendant first argues that the trial court erred by denying his requests to represent himself at trial. We disagree.
When reviewing a trial court's decision regarding a defendant's waiver of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, this Court reviews the record de novo, but reviews the trial court's factual findings and any determinations of credibility for clear error. People v Williams, 470 Mich. 634, 640; 683 N.W.2d 597 (2004). A trial court's findings of fact are clearly erroneous if this Court, after reviewing the entire record, is left with the definite and firm conviction that the trial court made a mistake. People v Carlson, 332 Mich.App. 663, 666; 958 N.W.2d 278 (2020).
In People v Anderson, 398 Mich. 361, 366; 247 N.W.2d 857 (1976), our Supreme Court recognized that a defendant's right to represent himself at trial is protected by both the Michigan and United States Constitutions, but nonetheless held that a defendant does not have "an absolute right to proceed to trial without counsel." Several distinct requirements must be met before a trial court can grant a defendant's request to dismiss trial counsel and allow the defendant to proceed in propria persona. Id. at 367-368. Initially, a defendant's request for self-representation must be "unequivocal." Id. at 367. If a request is unequivocal, the trial court must then decide whether the defendant "is asserting his right knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily." Id. at 368. Finally, the trial court must decide whether allowing the defendant to represent himself "will . . . disrupt, unduly inconvenience and burden the court and the administration of the court's business." Id. at 368. As observed in Anderson, it is "imperative that criminal adjudications must proceed in an orderly fashion and result in trustworthy guilt determinations." Id. For a defendant's waiver of the right to counsel to be valid, the trial court must "substantially comply" with the Anderson factors and MCR 6.005. People v Willing, 267 Mich.App. 208, 220; 704 N.W.2d 472 (2005).
Consistent with the requirements of Anderson, MCR 6.005(D)(1) outlines the procedure a trial court must follow to determine whether a defendant has made a valid waiver of the right to counsel. MCR 6.005(D)(1) provides:
Defendant's primary challenge to the trial court's decision is that the court failed to engage in a "methodical assessment" of determining whether allowing him to represent himself would be a wise decision upon consideration of the Anderson factors and MCR 6.005(D). While the trial court did not expressly state on the record whether it found defendant's request to be unequivocal, or whether any waiver of counsel was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, it is apparent that the court found it unnecessary to decide these matters because, even if they were resolved in defendant's favor, self-representation would not be appropriate because it would unduly disrupt the court proceedings. The trial court's finding that allowing defendant to represent himself would be unduly disruptive to the court proceedings is not clearly erroneous.
The record discloses that defendant had a history of argumentative and disruptive conduct. Indeed, even after the trial court ruled on defendant's request for self-representation, defendant refused to accept the trial court's decision, questioned the trial court's jurisdiction over his criminal case, threatened to report the matter to news stations, and continued to argue with the trial court after the court repeatedly urged defendant to present his request for self-representation and other concerns in a written motion. Under these circumstances, the trial court did not clearly err by finding that allowing defendant to represent himself would be disruptive, unduly inconvenient, and highly burdensome to the court's ability to try the case and administer justice. Anderson, 398 Mich. at 368. Although the trial court did not weigh or consider the other factors set forth in MCR 6.005(D), it was not necessary to do so given its conclusion that self-representation would be highly disruptive and undermine the efficiency of the lower court proceedings. Accordingly, the court did not err by denying defendant's request for self-representation.
Defendant next argues that reversal is required because of the introduction of JB's hearsay statements to two nurses who examined him after the sexual assault. We disagree.
"To preserve an evidentiary issue for review, a party opposing the admission of evidence must object at trial and specify the same ground for objection that it asserts on appeal." People v Aldrich, 246 Mich.App. 101, 113; 631 N.W.2d 67 (2001). Defendant concedes that there was no objection to the challenged statements at trial, leaving this issue unpreserved. This Court reviews a defendant's unpreserved claim of evidentiary error for plain error affecting the defendant's substantial rights. People v Benton, 294 Mich.App. 191, 202; 817 N.W.2d 599 (2011). In People v Carines, 460 Mich. 750, 763-764; 597 N.W.2d 130 (1999), our Supreme Court explained the requirements of the plain-error rule: 3
To avoid forfeiture under the plain error rule, three requirements must be met: 1) error must have occurred, 2) the error was plain, i.e., clear or obvious, 3) and the plain error affected substantial rights. [United States v Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 731-734; 113 S.Ct. 1770; 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993)]. The third requirement generally requires a showing of prejudice, i.e., that the error affected the outcome of the lower court proceedings. Id., p 734. "It is the defendant rather than the Government who bears the burden of persuasion with respect to prejudice." Id. Finally, once a defendant satisfies these three requirements, an appellate court must exercise its discretion in deciding whether to reverse. Reversal is warranted only when the plain, forfeited error resulted in the conviction of an actually innocent defendant or when an error" 'seriously affect[ed] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings' independent of the defendant's innocence." Id., pp 736-737. [(Footnote omitted).]
At trial, testimony was...
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