People v. Steadman

• Decision Date: 12 October 1993
• Parties: , 623 N.E.2d 509 The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Gary STEADMAN, Appellant. The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Raymond BLAIR, Appellant.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 382

603 N.Y.S.2d 382

82 N.Y.2d 1, 623 N.E.2d 509

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Gary STEADMAN, Appellant.

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Raymond BLAIR, Appellant.

Court of Appeals of New York.

Oct. 12, 1993.

[623 N.E.2d 510] [82 N.Y.2d 2] Sally Wasserman, New York City, for appellant in the first above-entitled action.

[82 N.Y.2d 3] Richard A. Brown, Dist. Atty. of Queens County, Kew Gardens (Elizabeth M. Fox and Steven J. Chananie, of counsel), for respondent in the first above-entitled action.

Randall D. Unger, Forest Hills, for appellant in the second above-entitled action.

[82 N.Y.2d 4] Richard A. Brown, Dist. Atty. of Queens County, Kew Gardens (Elizabeth M. Fox and Steven J. Chananie, of counsel), for respondent in the second above-entitled action.

OPINION OF THE COURT

SIMONS, Judge.

Defendants have been convicted of manslaughter, second degree, and criminal possession of a weapon, second degree, charges resulting from the death of Maxine Peterson on May 28, 1988. The prosecution's principal witness against defendants, and the only one identifying them, was Tony Malloy. Malloy admittedly had been a drug user and had two prior felony convictions. At the time of trial, he was on probation for one of the prior convictions and three open felony charges were pending against him.

Defendants sought pretrial disclosure of any promise of leniency made to Malloy in exchange for his favorable testimony against them. Although the prosecution revealed some arrangements made with Malloy, it failed to advise defendants that Assistant District Attorney Dan McCarthy, the trial assistants' superior, had in fact agreed with Malloy's attorney that Malloy would not be required to go to prison on the pending charges if he testified against defendants. Defendants assert that McCarthy's agreement with Malloy's counsel was Brady material and that the prosecution's failure to disclose it requires a new trial. We agree and therefore reverse the orders of the Appellate Division.

I

In response to the pretrial request for Brady material, the prosecution acknowledged that a few days after Malloy's Grand Jury appearance it purchased airplane tickets to Virginia for Malloy and his girlfriend and paid their first month's rent there. It also paid Malloy a total of $1,500 in cash before he returned to New York for the trial about a year later. The pending charges against him were adjourned until after defendant's trial.

Malloy testified at trial that he was told by the District Attorney's office at the time he returned that he would be relocated in the future, but asserted that no promises of leniency had been made with respect to his pending charges. Inasmuch as a conviction on any of the open charges would render Malloy a persistent felony offender, subject to a lengthy mandatory sentence of imprisonment, defense attorneys asked him how he could be assured of relocation unless the District Attorney contemplated a dismissal of the pending charges. Notwithstanding this apparent inconsistency, Malloy insisted no promises had been made. He acknowledged, however, that while in Virginia he had talked with McCarthy at least 25 times on the telephone and had met with him on other occasions after his return to New York and before he testified.

During the trial, the defense learned that McCarthy had promised Malloy's attorney, Jonathan Latimer, that Malloy could avoid incarceration if he testified truthfully against defendants. Defendants subpoenaed Latimer who testified that he and McCarthy had negotiated such an agreement following Malloy's Grand Jury testimony. It was his "understanding", Latimer said, that no promises were made directly to Malloy, and he believed no details of the agreement were communicated to the two trial assistants. Citing the attorney-client privilege, Latimer refused to disclose what, if anything, he told Malloy about the agreement. He also stated that he met with the trial assistants and Malloy when they prepared Malloy's trial testimony. Latimer testified that at these meetings the trial assistants instructed Malloy that if asked about promises of leniency he was to answer that none had been made to him.

Defendants moved to dismiss the indictment or for a new trial on the ground that there was an agreement with Malloy for leniency and that it constituted Brady material that should have been disclosed before trial (People v. Novoa, 70 N.Y.2d 490, 522 N.Y.S.2d 504, 517 N.E.2d 219; People v. Cwikla, 46 N.Y.2d 434, 414 N.Y.S.2d 102, 386 N.E.2d 1070; People v. Savvides, 1 N.Y.2d 554, 154 N.Y.S.2d 885, 136 N.E.2d 853). The trial court ruled that a Brady violation had occurred, but determined that defendants were not deprived of a fair trial as a result. The court reasoned that disclosure had been made during trial and that the manner of disclosure likely aided the defense by casting doubts on Malloy's credibility. The Appellate Division affirmed, 186 A.D.2d 665, 588 N.Y.S.2d 593 and 186 A.D.2d 693, 588 N.Y.S.2d 591.

On this appeal, the People contend that Malloy was never informed of the agreement and, thus, it could not have influenced his testimony or affected his credibility. Alternatively, they argue that since defense counsel learned of the agreement through third parties during trial, defendants had "a meaningful opportunity" to use it, and thus the People's failure to disclose the agreement is not grounds for reversal (see, People v. Cortijo, 70 N.Y.2d 868, 523 N.Y.S.2d 463, 517 N.E.2d 1349; People v. Brown, 67 N.Y.2d 555, 505 N.Y.S.2d 574, 496 N.E.2d 663, cert. denied 479 U.S. 1093, 107 S.Ct. 1307, 94 L.Ed.2d 161; People v. Smith, 63 N.Y.2d 41, 479 N.Y.S.2d 706, 468 N.E.2d 879).

It is worth noting at the outset that no prosecutor with knowledge of the negotiations with Malloy or his counsel or the details of the agreement has yet made a full disclosure to any court. Thus, the People's argument that Malloy's credibility was not affected by the agreement requires that we accept the assertions of Malloy and the trial assistants that they did not know of McCarthy's promises. Even if Malloy were ignorant of the agreement or its details, however, the scheme employed by the District Attorney's office undermines the purposes of the Brady and Savvides rules. It cannot be condoned.

II

Prosecutors occupy a dual role as advocates and as public officers and, as such, they are charged with the duty not only to seek convictions but also to see that justice is done. In their role as public officers, they must deal fairly with the accused and be candid with the courts (see, People v. Pelchat, 62 N.Y.2d 97, 105, 476 N.Y.S.2d 79, 464 N.E.2d 447; see also, People v. Vilardi, 76 N.Y.2d 67, 76, 556 N.Y.S.2d 518, 555 N.E.2d 915; People v. Simmons, 36 N.Y.2d 126, 131-132, 365 N.Y.S.2d 812, 325 N.E.2d 139). This rule of fairness, rooted in the concept of constitutional due process, has been given substance by the Brady decision which imposes on the People the duty to disclose to the defense evidence in its possession that is favorable to the accused (Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215; see also, People v. Novoa, 70 N.Y.2d 490, 522 N.Y.S.2d 504, 517 N.E.2d 219, supra; People v. Cwikla, 46 N.Y.2d 434, 414 N.Y.S.2d 102, 386 N.E.2d 1070, supra ). The prosecutor's duty is not lessened because Brady material may affect only the credibility of a government witness. Indeed, we have held explicitly that the duty includes promises of leniency given to the witness in exchange for favorable testimony against an accused (People v. Novoa, supra; People v. Cwikla, supra; People v. Savvides, supra ). Moreover, the prosecutor's duty extends to correcting mistakes or falsehoods by a witness whose testimony on the subject is inaccurate (People v. Savvides, 1 N.Y.2d 554, 154 N.Y.S.2d 885, 136 N.E.2d 853, supra ).

Even the most casual reading of the record in this case shows a determined...