People v. Strauss

• Decision Date: 22 November 2017
• Citation: 64 N.Y.S.3d 771,155 A.D.3d 1317
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Charles D. STRAUSS, Appellant.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

155 A.D.3d 1317
64 N.Y.S.3d 771

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent,
v.
Charles D. STRAUSS, Appellant.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Department, New York.

Nov. 22, 2017.

64 N.Y.S.3d 773

Rosemarie Richards, Gilbertsville, for appellant, and appellant pro se.

William G. Gabor, District Attorney, Wampsville (J. Scott Porter of counsel), for respondent.

Before: McCARTHY, J.P., LYNCH, ROSE, CLARK and PRITZKER, JJ.

McCARTHY, J.P.

155 A.D.3d 1318

Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of Madison County (McDermott, J.), rendered November 5, 2015, upon a verdict convicting defendant of the crimes of burglary in the second degree (two counts) and petit larceny.

In connection with two home invasions, defendant was charged with two counts of burglary in the second degree and one count of petit larceny under an accomplice liability theory. After a jury trial, during which defendant's accomplice, Benjamin Phetteplace, testified against him, defendant was convicted as charged and was sentenced, as a persistent violent felony offender, to 16 years to life in prison for each count of burglary in the second degree, to be served consecutively, and one concurrent year in jail for the petit larceny conviction. Defendant appeals.

The evidence presented at trial was legally sufficient to support the convictions and the verdict is not against the weight of the evidence. A person commits burglary in the second degree by knowingly entering a dwelling with the intent to commit a crime therein (see Penal Law § 140.25[2] ; People v. Furman, 152 A.D.3d 870, 871, 59 N.Y.S.3d 165 [2017] ). Petit larceny involves knowingly stealing property (see Penal Law § 155.25 ). Regarding accessorial liability, as is relevant here, "[w]hen one person engages in conduct which constitutes an offense, another person is criminally liable for such conduct when, acting with the mental culpability required for the commission thereof, he [or she] ... intentionally aids such person to engage in such conduct" ( Penal Law § 20.00 ; see People v. Spencer, 152 A.D.3d 863, 864, 59 N.Y.S.3d 499 [2017] ).

It is undisputed that Phetteplace broke into two residences with the intent to steal items from both, and he took jewelry from one of the residences, all without permission of the owners. The only question was whether defendant was Phetteplace's accomplice in these crimes. Phetteplace testified that he and defendant discussed and agreed to commit burglaries, defendant drove the vehicle, helped pick out potential target houses, dropped Phetteplace off, and would listen to a scanner and alert Phetteplace if police were coming, and Phetteplace called defendant when he was done so that defendant could pick him up. Nevertheless, "[a] defendant

64 N.Y.S.3d 774

may not be convicted of any offense upon the testimony of an accomplice unsupported by corroborative evidence tending to connect the defendant

155 A.D.3d 1319

with the commission of such offense" ( CPL 60.22[1] ; see People v. Leduc, 140 A.D.3d 1305, 1306, 34 N.Y.S.3d 208 [2016], lv. denied 28 N.Y.3d 932, 40 N.Y.S.3d 360, 63 N.E.3d 80 [2016] ). "The corroborating evidence, however, need not prove that the defendant committed the charged crime; rather it is enough if it tends to connect the defendant with the commission of the crime in such a way as may reasonably satisfy the [jury] that the accomplice is telling the truth" ( People v. Slaughter, 150 A.D.3d 1415, 1416, 55 N.Y.S.3d 473 [2017] [internal quotation marks, brackets and citations omitted]; see People v. Furman, 152 A.D.3d at 873, 59 N.Y.S.3d 165 ).

Other evidence corroborated Phetteplace's testimony. Defendant's girlfriend testified that, on the night in question, the two men left together and defendant said they were going out to make money. The arresting police officer saw defendant's vehicle stuck in a snowbank a mile from the location of a burglar alarm call. Defendant was in the driver's seat and stated that he had been forced off the road, but no other vehicle tracks were present in the newly fallen snow to substantiate his story. Fresh footprints in the snow led from the location of the second burgled residence (the location of the burglar alarm call) to the vehicle. When the same officer returned by tracking the footprints, he noticed jewelry thrown in the snow near defendant's vehicle. That jewelry was later identified by its owner as having been stolen from the first burgled residence. When defendant was asked for the whereabouts of his "partner," defendant answered that he was in the woods. Police tracked footprints that led away from defendant's vehicle into the woods, eventually capturing Phetteplace. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the People, this corroborating evidence, along with Phetteplace's testimony, provided legally sufficient evidence to satisfy every element of the crimes with which defendant was charged (see People v. Garcia, 131 A.D.3d 732, 733, 14 N.Y.S.3d 809 [2015], lv. denied 27 N.Y.3d 997, 38 N.Y.S.3d 107, 59 N.E.3d 1219 [2016] ; People v. Brown, 62 A.D.3d 1089, 1090, 878 N.Y.S.2d 515 [2009], lv. denied 13 N.Y.3d 742, 886 N.Y.S.2d 96, 914 N.E.2d 1014 [2009] ). Considering the evidence in a neutral light, and according deference to the jury's credibility determinations, defendant's convictions for burglary in the second degree and petit larceny under a theory of accomplice liability are supported by the weight of the credible evidence (see People v. Furman, 152 A.D.3d at 875, 59 N.Y.S.3d 165 ; People v. Ruiz, 148 A.D.3d 1212, 1215, 47 N.Y.S.3d 806 [2017] ; People v. Anderson, 118 A.D.3d 1138, 1142, 987 N.Y.S.2d 681 [2014], lv. denied 24 N.Y.3d 1117, 3 N.Y.S.3d 759, 27 N.E.3d 473 [2015] ).

County Court did not err in finding that probable cause existed to support defendant's arrest. The determination of a suppression motion by a hearing court is accorded great weight

155 A.D.3d 1320

and will generally not be disturbed unless the record demonstrates that the court's legal conclusion or resolution of credibility issues was clearly erroneous (see People v. Williams, 25 A.D.3d 927, 928, 807 N.Y.S.2d 470 [2006], lv. denied 6 N.Y.3d 840, 814 N.Y.S.2d 88, 847 N.E.2d 385 [2006] ). "Probable cause ... ‘does not require proof sufficient to warrant a conviction beyond a reasonable doubt but merely information sufficient to support a reasonable belief that an offense has been or is being committed’ " ( People v. Guthrie, 25 N.Y.3d 130, 133, 8 N.Y.S.3d 237, 30 N.E.3d 880 [2015] [emphasis omitted], quoting

64 N.Y.S.3d...