People v. Stroud

• Decision Date: 03 June 1969
• Docket Number: Cr. 585
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of California, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. William Stephen STROUD, Defendant and Appellant.

Page 270

78 Cal.Rptr. 270

273 Cal.App.2d 670

PEOPLE of the State of California, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. William Stephen STROUD, Defendant and Appellant.

Cr. 585.

Court of Appeal, Fifth District, California.

June 3, 1969.

Hearing Denied July 30, 1969.

Chain & Younger, Morris B. Chain and Timothy Lemucchi, Bakersfield, for appellant.

Thomas C. Lynch, Atty. Gen., Edsel W. Haws and Charles P. Just, Deputy Attys. Gen., Sacramento, for respondent.

STONE, Associate Justice.

Defendant was charged by an information with 'wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and with malice aforethought' murdering his wife. A jury found him guilty of voluntary manslaughter, and this appeal followed. Defendant contends the shooting was accidental. He testified that he threatened to commit suicide, using his rifle, that his wife sought to dissuade him, a struggle ensued and the gun discharged, killing her.

The victim was shot three times, twice in the front and once in the back. A few minutes after the shooting, defendant called Deputy Sheriff Ben Austin at 6 p.m., who arrived very shortly. Defendant gave Austin a version of the shooting which differed from that given at the trial. Approximately two hours after the shooting, while being interrogated by law officers and an investigator from the district attorney's office, defendant's statements were consistent with those made to Austin, namely, that he shot his wife because she was so drunk she could not put a sheet on the bed.

Before he talked with Deputy Sheriff Austin and also before he made a taped statement, defendant was advised of his rights in accordance with the Miranda requirements (Miranda v. State of Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, 10 A.L.R.3d 974). Each time he acknowledged that he understood the admonitions, and waived his right not to talk to the officers. Nevertheless, defendant now contends the court erred by admitting the taped statement in evidence, not because the confession was the result of coercive interrogation but upon the sole ground that he did not understand his rights as explained to him. He asserts that his alcohol blood content made cognition impossible and consequently he could not knowingly, intelligently and understandingly waive his constitutional rights.

Briefly, the circumstances surrounding the making of the taped statement are these: Tehachapi, where defendant lived and the shooting occurred, is a remote area in Eastern Kern County. Almost immediately after he shot his wife in the bedroom of their home, defendant called Ben Austin, the resident deputy sheriff and a personal friend, stating that he killed his wife. The call was made at 6 p.m. and Austin arrived within 15 minutes. He went directly to the bedroom where the body of Mrs. Stroud lay on the bed, bleeding; he felt for the pulse, could find none, and called Dr. Vincent Troy. While waiting for the doctor, Austin sat down at the kitchen table with defendant, who wanted to tell Austin 'all about it.' The officer interrupted him to tell him that he would have to advise him of his rights, to which defendant replied: 'I know them as well as you do. I know that you're not going to take advantage of me.' The officer replied: 'I will still have to advise you of your rights'; which he did. Defendant waived his right not to talk, and related the events surrounding the shooting. Subsequently, a sheriff's lieutenant, an investigator from the district attorney's office, and an employee of the county crime laboratory arrived. A tape recorder was set up and at 8:30 the sheriff's lieutenant read the Miranda admonitions to defendant, who waived his rights and freely made statements, some narrative and some pursuant to interrogation. Defendant was taken from his home in Tehachapi to the Kern County General Hospital in Bakersfield, where a blood sample was taken at 10 p.m. A laboratory analysis revealed an alcohol content of .229 milligrams.

Defendant moved to suppress the statements that were tape recorded during the interrogation that took place approximately 8:35 p.m. Interestingly enough, no motion to suppress was directed at the statements made during the conversation with Austin between 6:15 and 6:30 p.m. The hearing on motion to suppress lasted three days and, although defendant did not testify, his attorney contended that defendant's alcohol blood content prevented a reasoned and intelligent waiver of his rights. In addition to the witnesses who were present shortly after the shooting and during the time defendant was interrogated, doctors testified as expert witnesses. They hypothesized as to defendant's mental capabilities at the time of the interrogation and formulated their opinions after considering defendant's alcohol blood content at 10 p.m., his tape-recorded remarks made at 8:30 p.m., his case history, their interviews with him, and the reports of psychiatrists who examined him in the course of the criminal proceedings.

Before analyzing the evidence, we are met with defendant's several questions concerning the rules governing a review of this character. First, he admonishes that this court must 'view the totality of the circumstances' in determining whether he knowingly and intelligently waived his right under the Fifth Amendment to remain silent. This guideline is correctly stated. (Greenwald v. Wisconsin, 390 U.S. 519, 88 S.Ct. 1152, 20 L.Ed.2d 77; Clewis v. Texas, 386 U.S. 707 (87 S.Ct. 1338, 18 L.Ed.2d 423); Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191, 197, 77 S.Ct. 281, 1 L.Ed.2d 246; People v. Sanchez, 70 A.C. 598, 608, 75 Cal.Rptr. 642, 451 P.2d 74; In re Cameron, 68 Cal.2d 487, 498, 67 Cal.Rptr. 529, 439 P.2d 633; People v. Lara, 67 Cal.2d 365, 383, 62 Cal.Rptr. 586, 432 P.2d 202.) Second, defendant advises that in looking at the totality of the circumstances it is the duty of a reviewing court to make 'an independent examination of the whole record.' We agree that this, too, is correct. (Clewis v. Texas, Supra; Davis v. North Carolina, 384 U.S. 737, 741--742, 86 S.Ct. 1761, 16 L.Ed.2d 895; Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 80 S.Ct. 274, 4 L.Ed.2d 242; People v. Sanchez, Supra; People v. Lara, Supra.)

From these two rather broad guidelines, defendant appears to conclude that the reviewing court's examination of the record is a fact-finding process, that is, in making an independent examination of the whole record the reviewing court is free to reweigh the evidence in determining the totality of the circumstances. We find no authority for this proposition in any of the cases. The United States Supreme Court, in making an independent review of the record to ascertain the totality of circumstances surrounding the making of a confession, has consistently refrained from overturning a trial court's resolution of conflicting facts. For example, in Fikes v. Alabama, Supra (1957) 352 U.S. 191, 77 S.Ct. 281, the court relied upon the state's evidence, standing alone, in holding the confessions were not voluntary. In Payne v. Arkansas (1958) 356 U.S. 560, 78 S.Ct. 844, 2 L.Ed.2d 975 a finding that the confession was coerced is based upon 'the admitted facts, set out above.' In Davis v. North Carolina, Supra (1966) 384 U.S. 737, 86 S.Ct. 176, Clewis v. Texas, Supra, and Greenwald v. Wisconsin, Supra, the court concluded from the record 'wholly apart from the disputed facts' that each confession was coerced. In Brooks v. Florida (1968) 389 U.S. 413, 88 S.Ct. 541, 19 L.Ed.2d 643 we find the explicit statement:

'Brooks says that he was brutally beaten by one officer while the other was taking his statement. However, we do not consider this claim because the officer denied it and the judge disbelieved Brooks' testimony.'

These cases make it clear that the United States Supreme Court has grounded its determination of voluntariness upon evidence other than disputed testimony. The landmark case, Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 84 S.Ct. 1774, 12 L.Ed.2d 908, although primarily treating with the procedure governing the admission of a disputed confession in a jury trial, points out the forum in which conflicting evidence of voluntariness is to be resolved. The court said, 84 S.Ct. at page 1789:

'This is not a case where the facts concerning the circumstances surrounding the confession are undisputed and the task is only to judge the voluntariness of the confession based upon the clearly established facts and in accordance with proper constitutional standards. Here there are substantial facts in dispute: * * * Whether Jackson is entitled to relief depends upon how these facts are resolved, for if the State is to be believed we cannot say that Jackson's confession was involuntary, whereas if Jackson's version of the facts is accepted the confession was involuntary and inadmissible. * * * It is New York, therefore, not the federal habeas corpus court, which should first provide Jackson with that which he has not yet had and to which he is constitutionally entitled--an adequate evidentiary hearing productive of reliable results concerning the voluntariness of his confession.'

The California Supreme Court has formulated similar guidelines. (People v. Sanchez, Supra; People v. Lara, Supra, 67 Cal.2d at p. 392, 62 Cal.Rptr. 586, 432 P.2d 202; People v. Underwood, 61 Cal.2d 113, 121, 37 Cal.Rptr. 313, 389 P.2d 937; People v. Berve, 51 Cal.2d 286, 332 P.2d 97.) Thus an appellate court viewing the totality of circumstances to ascertain whether a defendant's statements were voluntary and the product of a rational intellect, must accept the resolution of conflicting evidence by the trier of fact where the evidence upon which the lower court relied is not so improbable as to be entirely unworthy of belief. (People v. Aikens, 70 A.C. 383, 392, 74 Cal.Rptr. 882, 450 P.2d 258; People v. Massie, 66 Cal.2d 899, 914, 59 Cal.Rptr. 733, 428 P.2d 869; People v. Wein, 50 Cal.2d 383, 399, 326 P.2d 457; People v. Lyons, 47 Cal.2d 311, 319, 303 P.2d 329.)

Guided by the rules discussed above, we...