People v. Superior Court of Alameda County
| Decision Date | 23 December 1980 |
| Citation | 170 Cal.Rptr. 667,113 Cal.App.3d 846 |
| Parties | The PEOPLE, Petitioner, v. The SUPERIOR COURT OF the COUNTY OF ALAMEDA, Respondent; Juan Vallejo CORONA, Real Party in Interest. Civ. 47216. |
| Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
George Deukmejian, Atty. Gen., Robert H. Philibosian, Chief Asst. Atty. Gen., Arnold O. Overoye, Asst. Atty. Gen., Arthur G. Scotland, J. Robert Jibson, Deputy Attys. Gen., Sacramento, H. Ted Hansen, Sutter County Dist. Atty., Ron W. Fahey, Roger W. Pierucci, Sp. Prosecutors, Mark L. Musto, Alameda, for petitioner.
Terence K. Hallinan, Michael A. Mendelson, Isaiah B. Roter, San Francisco, Roy J Van Den Heuvel, Yuba City, for real party in interest.
After the trial court denied and granted in part defendant Corona's motion to suppress certain evidence, both defendant and the People, claiming error, petitioned for relief through mandamus. We denied Corona's petition, but proceeded to hear the People's petition pursuant to directive from the Supreme Court. We initially decided that the People's petition should likewise be denied, but granted the People's petition for rehearing and, after additional briefing and oral argument focusing upon specific areas of our concern, have concluded that the People's petition for mandamus should be granted in part, for the reasons which follow.
Procedural Background. On January 18, 1973, defendant was found guilty and convicted of 25 counts of first degree murder. On May 8, 1978, Division Two of this court set the conviction aside because of inadequate legal representation and conflict of interest on the part of defendant's original trial counsel. (People v. Corona (1978) 80 Cal.App.3d 684, 145 Cal.Rptr. 894.) The factual background of the case is fully set forth in that opinion (id., at pp. 693-701, 145 Cal.Rptr. 894), and need not be repeated here. The court, in a unanimous opinion authored by Justice Kane, found that "trial counsel in gross neglect of his basic duty, failed to conduct the requisite factual and legal investigation in an effort to develop fundamental defenses available for his client and as a result of his neglect, crucial defenses were withdrawn from the case" (id., at p. 706, 145 Cal.Rptr. 894), thus warranting reversal on the basis of the then-prevailing standard of incompetency (People v. Ibarra (1963) 60 Cal.2d 460, 464, 34 Cal.Rptr. 863, 386 P.2d 487). In addition, and as independent grounds for reversal, the court determined that Corona's trial counsel, by obtaining and exploiting literary and dramatic rights to Corona's life story (80 Cal.App.3d at p. 720, 145 Cal.Rptr. 894.) Without deciding whether such a conflict of interest was sufficient in itself to demonstrate denial of the right to effective representation as a matter of law, or whether a showing of actual prejudice was required, the court held that the case met both criteria, and that trial counsel's conduct "constituted not only an outrageous abrogation of the standards which the legal profession has set for itself and upon which clients have a right to rely, but also rendered the trial a farce and mockery calling for reversal of the conviction and requiring a new trial." (Id., at p. 727, 145 Cal.Rptr. 894.)
The court concluded its opinion by considering several issues relating to the new trial which was to take place. Of these, only one is relevant here. In a proceeding under Penal Code section 1538.5 to suppress certain evidence, the trial court had refused to permit defendant's counsel to call witnesses for the purpose of challenging the accuracy of information contained in affidavits supporting various search warrants. Justice Kane's opinion found this to be error under Theodor v. Superior Court (1972) 8 Cal.3d 77, 100-101, 104 Cal.Rptr. 226, 501 P.2d 234, but due to the unavailability of a transcript of the suppression hearing it could not be determined whether the error was prejudicial. The opinion states: "If, on retrial, appellant offers evidence to challenge the factual allegations of the affidavits supporting the search warrants, the court should proceed in accordance with the precepts enunciated in Theodor and as expressed herein." (80 Cal.App.3d at p. 729, 145 Cal.Rptr. 894.)
On March 28, 1979, Corona's present attorneys noticed a motion to suppress all evidence seized under six search warrants. Petitioner opposed the motion on the ground that the court had no jurisdiction to entertain a second Penal Code section 1538.5 motion, but only to hear a Theodor motion as mandated by Justice Kane's opinion. Corona's attorneys countered that certain significant arguments had not been made at the original 1538.5 motion, and that prior counsel's incompetency and conflict of interest had prevented full determination at that time.
Judge Patton, a distinguished and experienced jurist who tried the original case, presided at the new hearings which began April 25, 1979. At first, he expressed doubt about the propriety of hearing the issues sought to be presented by Corona's attorneys, but reserved judgment on that question and insisted on hearing the mandated Theodor aspects first. After doing so, however, he decided that the hearing would encompass all issues raised.
Almost 9 court days were required to hear the matter, in the course of which 25 witnesses were sworn and testified. At the conclusion of the hearing the court issued a 44-page written opinion suppressing part of the evidence seized under the first warrant on the ground that the affidavit did not establish probable cause to search a specific building, and all of the evidence seized under the second warrant on the ground that the warrant was overly broad. The People stipulated that no evidence seized under the third through sixth warrants would be used. Consequently the validity of those warrants was not considered, and is not an issue here.
Petitioner contends that in view of the earlier (1972) proceedings the trial court lacked jurisdiction to hear a full-blown 1538.5 motion on the validity of the warrants. Petitioner relies on People v. Brooks (1980) 26 Cal.3d 471, 162 Cal.Rptr. 177, 605 P.2d 1306, Madril v. Superior Court (1975) 15 Cal.3d 73, 123 Cal.Rptr. 465, 539 P.2d 33; People v. Williams (1979) 93 Cal.App.3d 40, 155 Cal.Rptr. 414; and People v. Superior Court (Green) (1970) 10 Cal.App.3d 477, 89 Cal.Rptr. 223.
In Brooks, the court held that a trial court has jurisdiction to hear a second 1538.5 motion on the grounds presented in the first motion but not reached by the trial court when it granted the motion on other grounds. (26 Cal.3d at p. 474, 162 Cal.Rptr. 177, 605 P.2d 1306.) It based its decision on defendant's lack of opportunity for a "full determination" of the merits of his motion as originally made and noticed. In Madril, the court held that section 1538.5 does not confer jurisdiction upon a trial court, having once granted a defendant's suppression motion, to reconsider it prior to trial. (15 Cal.3d at p. 75, 123 Cal.Rptr. 465, 539 P.2d 33.) Green was to the same effect, and its reasoning was approved in Madril. (Id., at p. 77, 123 Cal.Rptr. 465, 539 P.2d 33.) Brooks distinguished both Madril and Green as presenting situations "in which a party ... sought review or reconsideration of an adverse ruling rendered after a complete hearing on the search and seizure issues." (26 Cal.3d at p. 478, 162 Cal.Rptr. 177, 605 P.2d 1306.) In both cases, the court noted, "the second hearings were properly characterized as relitigation of matters that the parties had opportunity to fully air in the first hearings." (Ibid.)
None of the cases cited by either party involved a trial court's jurisdiction to entertain a second suppression hearing after a conviction is reversed on grounds of constitutional denial of effective counsel. (Cf. People v. Dorsey (1973) 34 Cal.App.3d 70, 73, 109 Cal.Rptr. 712 (overruled on other grounds, Bunnell v. Superior Court (1975) 13 Cal.3d 592, 602, 119 Cal.Rptr. 302, 531 P.2d 1086).) It seems obvious, however, that if the ineffectiveness of counsel infected the first suppression hearing, the defendant cannot be said to have had opportunity for "full determination" within the meaning of Brooks.
As Justice Kane's opinion noted (People v. Corona, supra, 80 Cal.App.3d at p. 720, 145 Cal.Rptr. 894), the constitutional right to effective counsel And, as that opinion observed, "some cases take the view that a conflict of interest is so inherently conducive to divided loyalties as to amount to a denial of the right to effective representation as a matter of law." (Ibid.) By that view the conflict of interest found to exist on the part of Corona's original counsel necessarily involved denial of the right to effective representation in all of the original proceedings, not just the trial itself, and by itself would warrant the determination that Corona should be entitled to assert anew his constitutional rights under section 1538.5.
Justice Kane's opinion also noted an alternative view, that the defendant "must affirmatively establish that he has suffered some actual prejudice" resulting from the conflict (ibid.), but refrained from deciding which view was correct. Rather, the opinion stated that the case met both criteria (ibid.), and went on to discuss specific examples of prejudice as demonstrated by the record. While trial counsel's...
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