People v. Superior Court

Decision Date13 May 2005
Docket NumberNo. F045226.,F045226.
Citation129 Cal.App.4th 434,28 Cal.Rptr.3d 529
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
PartiesThe PEOPLE, Petitioner, v. The SUPERIOR COURT of Tulare County, Respondent; Jorge Junior Vidal, Real Party in Interest.

Phillip J. Cline, Tulare County District Attorney, and Barbara J. Greaver, Deputy, for Petitioner.

No appearance for Respondent.

Michael Shetzer, Tulare County Public Defender, and Berry Robinson, Deputy, for Real Party in Interest.

John T. Philipsborn, San Francisco, for California Attorneys for Criminal Justice, on behalf of Real Party in Interest.

OPINION

ARDAIZ, P.J.

In Atkins v. Virginia (2002) 536 U.S. 304, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (Atkins), the United States Supreme Court held that the execution of mentally retarded criminals violates the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. (Id. at p. 321, 122 S.Ct. 2242.) The court reasoned that "clinical definitions of mental retardation require not only subaverage intellectual functioning, but also significant limitations in adaptive skills such as communication, self-care, and self-direction that became manifest before age 18. Mentally retarded persons frequently know the difference between right and wrong and are competent to stand trial. Because of their impairments, however, by definition they have diminished capacities to understand and process information, to communicate, to abstract from mistakes and learn from experience, to engage in logical reasoning, to control impulses, and to understand the reactions of others. There is no evidence that they are more likely to engage in criminal conduct than others, but there is abundant evidence that they often act on impulse rather than pursuant to a premeditated plan, and that in group settings they are followers rather than leaders. Their deficiencies do not warrant an exemption from criminal sanctions, but they do diminish their personal culpability." (Id. at p. 318, 122 S.Ct. 2242, fns. omitted.)

The court recognized that "[t]o the extent there is serious disagreement about the execution of mentally retarded offenders, it is in determining which offenders are in fact retarded. . . . Not all people who claim to be mentally retarded will be so impaired as to fall within the range of mentally retarded offenders about whom there is a national consensus. As was our approach ... with regard to insanity, `we leave to the State[s] the task of developing appropriate ways to enforce the constitutional restriction upon [their] execution of sentences.' [Citation.]" (Atkins, supra, 536 U.S. at p. 317, 122 S.Ct. 2242, fn. omitted.)

The California Legislature responded by enacting Penal Code section 1376, which defines "mentally retarded," sets forth procedures for determining whether an accused is mentally retarded, and, if so, precludes imposition of the death penalty.1 In this case of first impression we address various issues arising under this statute, which applies to cases pending in the trial court at the time of its enactment. (Centeno v. Superior Court (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 30, 38, fn. 1, 11 Cal.Rptr.3d 533; see, e.g., In re Holladay (11th Cir.2003) 331 F.3d 1169, 1172 [applying Atkins retroactively]; Bell v. Cockrell (5th Cir.2002) 310 F.3d 330, 332 [same].)

PROCEDURAL HISTORY2

[ ]

On January 24, 2001, Eric Jones was shot and killed outside Delano, California, in rural Tulare County. On January 27, 2001, [real party in interest] Jorge Vidal, Jr. [Vidal] and two others were arrested for his murder. Four additional suspects remained at large.

A preliminary hearing was held October 4-5, 2001 and October 11, 2001. At its conclusion, Vidal was held to answer on all charges. On October 24, 2001, the district attorney filed an information charging Vidal and others with capital murder.[3] At his November 2, 2001, arraignment in Superior Court, Vidal entered pleas of not guilty to all charges and denied all the special circumstance and enhancement allegations. On December 6, 2001, the district attorney announced his intent to seek the death penalty.

On October 1-3, 2003, October 14-15, 2003, October 23-24, 2003, October 28, 2003 and March 8-10, 2004, the Court held an evidentiary hearing on several pretrial motions filed by Vidal. This hearing encompassed the following motions/issues raised by Vidal: a motion to preclude the imposition of the death penalty pursuant to [section 1376] and Atkins [ ]; a motion to preclude the imposition of the death penalty based on a violation of the Vienna Convention on Consular [Relations] and [ ] section 834c; and a motion to suppress all of Vidal's statements made to law enforcement after his arrest based on violations of the United States Constitution, Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 [Miranda], the Vienna Convention on Consular [Relations] and [ ] section 834c. After both sides rested on March 10, 2004, the Court set the matter for argument on March 15, 2004.

On March 15, 2004, after the argument of counsel, the Court ruled from the bench that Vidal had met his burden of proof by preponderance of the evidence and Vidal was found mentally retarded pursuant to [section 1376, subdivision (a)] and precluded the prosecution from seeking the death penalty.4 In it's [sic] ruling, the Court denied Vidal's motion to preclude death based on a violation of the Vienna Convention on Consular [Relations] and [ ] section 834c. The admissibility of Vidal's post arrest statements was taken under submission. At that time, Vidal then attempted to plead guilty to all the charges, special circumstances and special allegations and accept a sentence of life in prison without the possibility of parole. The Court refused to accept Vidal's plea and set the matter for further proceedings on March 24, 2004.

On March 24, 2004, the Court denied Vidal's motion to suppress his post-arrest statements on all grounds. Again, Vidal attempted to plead guilty to all the charges, special circumstances and special allegations and accept a sentence of life in prison without the possibility of parole. Again, the Court refused to accept Vidal's plea.

In a dueling battle of petitions seeking pretrial appellate review, Vidal filed his petition for writ of mandate5 with this Court on March 26, 2004, asking this Court to order the trial court to accept his guilty plea, and on April 1, 2004, the People filed the instant petition asking for review of the trial court's ruling on mental retardation. On April 2, 2004, this Court issued an order to show cause and stayed all trial court proceedings until further notice.6

On April 6, 2004, we directed the parties to brief the following issues:

• What constitutes mental retardation for purposes of section 1376?

• What constitutes adaptive behavior for purposes of said statute?

• By what standard does a trial court determine whether a defendant is mentally retarded within the meaning of said statute?

• Did the trial court apply the correct standard in this case?

• By what standard does an appellate court review a trial court's determination of mental retardation under said statute?

• Should this court uphold the trial court's determination that Vidal is mentally retarded within the meaning of said statute?

The parties additionally addressed whether the People are entitled to pretrial review of a trial court's ruling under section 1376.

In our original opinion, we held that (1) the People are entitled to seek pretrial review of a trial court's ruling under section 1376, and (2) the trial court here applied the wrong measure of general intellectual functioning in determining that real party in interest Jorge Vidal, Jr. (Vidal) is mentally retarded. Accordingly, we directed the trial court to vacate its order and to reconsider the matter in light of our opinion.

After our opinion was filed, the California Supreme Court issued its decision in In re Hawthorne (2005) 35 Cal.4th 40, 24 Cal.Rptr.3d 189, 105 P.3d 552 (Hawthorne). It subsequently granted review in the present case and transferred the matter back to us with directions to vacate our decision and reconsider the cause in light of Hawthorne. Having reviewed the case in the context of that opinion, we again conclude that the People have the right to seek pretrial review and that the trial court erred.7

FACTS

The circumstances of the alleged offenses are not germane to the issues currently before this court. Accordingly, we recite the evidence adduced with respect to the issue of mental retardation.

Vidal was born October 23, 1969. Spanish was his first language. Beginning about fourth grade, in which Vidal was held back in school, it became apparent to his younger sister that he was not very smart and could not read or write like other children his age. Despite extensive help with his homework, he could not understand his schoolwork. By ninth grade, Vidal had improved somewhat in the way he spoke, but still was unable to use correct grammar. He had trouble in both English and Spanish, never learned to read anything but small words, and never really learned to write. He also had difficulty remembering things such as his chores and household rules.

At some point, Vidal married and moved out of his mother's home and into a small house in Delano, where he lived with his wife and children. He performed seasonal labor in the fields, was loving and caring toward his children, and took care of them from time to time.

Eugene Couture, a licensed psychologist with specialty training in neuropsychology who frequently evaluated people for mental retardation, began seeing Vidal in May 2001. He administered tests, reviewed school records, spoke with Vidal's sisters, reviewed the records from Vidal's two and one-half years in pretrial custody as well as the police reports concerning the offense, and reviewed the videotape and transcript of the statement Vidal gave to police.

Vidal's school records revealed concerns,...

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