People v. Superior Court

• Decision Date: 25 May 2000
• Docket Number: No. D034139.,D034139.
• Parties: The PEOPLE, Petitioner, v. The SUPERIOR COURT of Imperial County, Respondent; Joseph A. Barrett, Real Party in Interest.
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

96 Cal.Rptr.2d 264

80 Cal.App.4th 1305

The PEOPLE, Petitioner, v. The SUPERIOR COURT of Imperial County, Respondent;

Joseph A. Barrett, Real Party in Interest.

No. D034139.

Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Division 1.

May 25, 2000.

Gilbert G. Otero, District Attorney, and Ann M. Meyer for Petitioner.

No appearance for Respondent.

Eric Beaudikofer and Edward C. Sada for Real Party in Interest.

HALLER, J.

This proceeding concerns the scope of the prosecution's discovery obligation in a criminal case. In this capital murder prosecution the People of the State of California, through the Office of the District Attorney of Imperial County (District Attorney), petition for a writ of prohibition after the trial court ordered the District Attorney to produce California Department of Corrections (CDC") documents for an in camera review to determine relevance.

We stayed the proceedings, issued an order to show cause and now grant the petition.¹

PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Joseph A. Barrett is charged with the April 9, 1996 murder of his cellmate in the Administrative Segregation Unit at Calipatria State Prison. Barrett, who at the time was serving a life sentence for murder, is charged with the capital offense of murder while serving a life sentence for a previous murder.

Barrett requested pretrial discovery of 73 categories of documents. At issue are 17 categories of documents that involve records maintained by CDC, including:

• Logs from the Administrative Segregation Unit, "A" Yard central control, and "A" Yard watch officer from September 1995 through April 1996 and incident logs from all yards from January 1992 through April 1996.

• Memos, documents and/or manuals regarding the change in the prison's Administrative Segregation Unit from single-inmate to double-inmate cells and the criteria for cell assignments from January 1, 1992 through April 1996.

• Compilations of assaults, weapons or weapon stock, and acts of violence between prison inmates and between inmates and guards from January 1, 1992 through April 1996.

• Central files, including confidential sections, and movement sheets for Barrett and six inmates housed in the Administrative Segregation Unit at the time of the homicide.

• Movement sheets for 27 specified inmates from September 1995 through April 1996.

• Medical and psychological files on Barrett and two other specified inmates housed in the Administrative Segregation Unit at the time of the homicide.

• Policy and procedure manuals for the Administrative Segregation Unit in effect from September 1995 through April 1996.

• Records identifying weapons manufactured by inmates and weapon stock found at the prison from January 1992 through April 1996.

• Compilations identifying the number of assaults, including those resulting in death, by lifers at the prison from January 1992 to present.

• Compilations establishing the number or percentage of lifers at the prison from January 1992 through April 1996.

• Documents regarding the "Tier Yard" policy—inmates of different races and gang affiliations placed together in the Administrative Segregation Unit exercise yard—from September 1995 through April 1996.

• Security and investigation crime packages, photos and videos of cell extractions, yard incidents and staff assaults from September 1995 through April 1996.

• Notes of interviews with Administrative Segregation Unit staff and inmates regarding the murder investigation.

In ordering the District Attorney to produce these materials subject to a finding they are relevant, the trial court noted the District Attorney may be relying on some of the materials in the case, and CDC, as an investigating agency in the case, has been cooperative in providing People with access to the materials. The court opined it would "simply be unfair" to require the defense to subpoena the same materials from CDC when the District Attorney has access. The court also stated it was ordering production under the state's statutory scheme for criminal discovery and observed its order would be more in keeping with the reciprocal nature of the statutory scheme, and it would be more efficient for the District Attorney to produce the requested material than to require Barrett to pursue the material from CDC with a subpoena duces tecum.

The court also ruled it would review the documents at an in camera hearing with defense counsel present to make an offer of proof as to why each item is relevant. The court excluded the People from the in camera hearing.

DISCUSSION

The District Attorney contends it has no obligation to produce the material under either the state's criminal discovery statutes or under constitutional mandate. Further, the District Attorney maintains that excluding the People from a hearing to determine relevance of the material violates the prosecution's due process rights.

California's Criminal Discovery Statutory Scheme

California's criminal discovery statutory scheme, which was enacted as part of Proposition 115 and is found at Penal Code² section 1054 et seq., sets forth an almost exclusive procedure for discovery in criminal cases. This was not always so.

Until the passage of Proposition 115, a decade ago, the development of criminal discovery rules in California had largely been a judicially driven engine following the path of the common law. (See Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531, 535, 113 Cal.Rptr. 897, 522 P.2d 305 ["Unlike the statutory development of civil discovery in California, the right of an accused to seek discovery in the course of preparing his defense to a criminal prosecution is a judicially created doctrine evolving in the absence of guiding legislation."].) Before 1975, there was no criminal discovery statute, and, in 1990, when the voters adopted Proposition 115, there were only a handful of criminal discovery statutes on the books.³

By adding Chapter 10 to Title 6 of the Penal Code (§ 1054 et seq.), Proposition 115 instituted a comprehensive and very nearly exclusive system of discovery in criminal trials that was aimed toward "promot[ing] the ascertainment of truth," and "sav[ing] court time" "by requiring timely pretrial discovery," as well as "protect[ing] victims and witnesses from danger, harassment, and undue delay of the proceedings." (§ 1054.) Perhaps most significantly, the initiative added constitutional (see Cal. Const, art. I, § 30, subd. (c)) and statutory (see Pen.Code, § 1054 et seq.) language authorizing reciprocal discovery in criminal trials.

Under the statutory scheme, both the defendant and the prosecutor must begin discovery efforts with an informal request directed to the opposing party. (§ 1054.5, subd. (b).) Either party may seek a court order enforcing discovery if the opposing party does not comply with the request within 15 days, and either party may claim specified privileges to protect certain materials from discovery. (See Izazaga v. Superior Court (1991) 54 Cal.3d 356, 374-375, 285 Cal.Rptr. 231, 815 P.2d 304; §§ 1054.5, subd. (b), 1054.6.)⁴

Under section 1054.1, the prosecutor is required to disclose the following materials, if they are in the prosecutor's possession or the prosecutor knows them to be in the possession of the investigating agencies:

• The names and address of persons the prosecutor intends to call as witnesses at trial. (§ 1054.1, subd. (a).)

• Statements of all defendants. (§ 1054.1, subd. (b).)

• All relevant real evidence seized or obtained as a part of the investigation of the offenses charged. (§ 1054.1, subd. (c).)

• The existence of a felony conviction of any material witness whose credibility is likely to be critical to the outcome of the trial. (§ 1054.1, subd. (d).)

• Any exculpatory evidence. (§ 1054.1, subd. (e).)

• Relevant written or recorded statements of witnesses or reports of the statements of witnesses whom the prosecutor intends to call at the trial, including any reports or statements of experts made in conjunction with the case, including the results of physical or mental examinations, scientific tests, experiments, or comparisons which the prosecutor intends to offer in evidence at the trial. (§ 1054.1, subd. (f).)

The procedural mechanisms of the discovery statutory scheme (§ 1054 et seq.) are exclusive—that is, the parties to a criminal proceeding may not employ discovery procedures other than those authorized by Chapter 10. (§ 1054.5, subd. (a).)⁵ However, the statutory scheme expressly permits discovery outside its terms, "as provided by ... other express statutory provisions, or as mandated by the Constitution of the United States." (§ 1054, subd. (e).) Thus, a defendant maintains his or her right to discovery of material exculpatory evidence under the Due Process Clause (see discussion, post) and continues to have the right to use statutory discovery procedures not expressly repealed by Proposition 115 (see discussion, post). When a discovery request asks for disclosure of materials specifically covered by other statutes, the procedural mechanisms provided in the other statutes prevail. (Albritton v. Superior Court (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 961, 275 Cal. Rptr. 314.)

Chapter 10 also controls the substance of criminal discovery in California except for discovery that is mandated by the United States Constitution and discovery that is expressly provided in other statutes. Thus, unless a requested item is authorized by other statutes or is constitutionally required, the parties to a criminal proceeding are entitled to obtain disclosure of only those items listed in sections 1054.1 and 1054.3.

The requirements and procedural mechanisms of Chapter 10 apply only to the parties in a criminal case—that is, the prosecution and the defendant(s). This is highlighted in the statutory statement of purpose: "To save court time by requiring that discovery be conducted informally between and among the parties before judicial enforcement is requested." (§ 1054, subd. (b), italics...