People v. Swamynathan

• Decision Date: 15 September 2008
• Docket Number: No. 2-07-0239.,2-07-0239.
• Citation: 385 Ill. App. 3d 434,895 N.E.2d 669
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Ramesh K. SWAMYNATHAN, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

895 N.E.2d 669

385 Ill. App. 3d 434

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Ramesh K. SWAMYNATHAN, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 2-07-0239.

Appellate Court of Illinois, Second District.

September 15, 2008.

Thomas A. Lilien, Deputy Defender, Barbara R. Paschen, Office of State Appellate Defender, Elgin, IL, for Appellant.

Michael J. Waller, Lake County State's Attorney, Waukegan, Lawrence M. Bauer, Deputy Director State's Attorney Appellate Prosecutor, Cynthia N. Schneider, State's Attorney Appellate Prosecutor, Elgin, IL, for Appellee.

Justice HUTCHINSON delivered the opinion of the court:

Defendant, Ramesh K. Swamynathan, appeals from the trial court's order dismissing his pro se petition for relief pursuant to the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (the Act) (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 2006)) as frivolous and patently without merit. Defendant's petition attacked his conviction of first-degree murder (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a) (West 2002)), which was entered after he pleaded guilty but mentally ill. In his petition, defendant alleged that he was not mentally fit at the time he entered his guilty plea and that, therefore, his plea was involuntary. On appeal, defendant contends that the trial court erred in dismissing his petition, because it alleged the gist of a constitutional claim. We affirm.

On October 9, 2002, defendant was charged by indictment with the September 6, 2002, murder of the victim, Ramarao Chittiprolu. The indictment alleged that defendant killed the victim by stabbing him with a knife and vegetable peeler.

After defendant was taken into custody, the trial court found a bona fide doubt as to defendant's mental fitness and ordered that he undergo a fitness evaluation. On October 15, 2002, a report of the fitness evaluation was filed in the trial court and reflected that defendant suffered from a "Schizoaffective Disorder or Schizophrenic Disorder that * * * include[d] delusion[al] thinking." Also on October 17, 2002, the trial court found defendant unfit to enter a plea or stand trial and remanded him to the Illinois Department of Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities (DMH) for treatment.

In a written report filed in the trial court on April 15, 2003, the DMH reported that defendant had been restored to fitness. The report indicated that, at the time of his initial admission, defendant was acutely psychotic and was preoccupied with auditory hallucinations. Defendant was also "hyper-vigilant" and anxious and was unable to calm down. Defendant exhibited symptoms of depression, including difficulty sleeping, poor appetite, feelings of hopelessness, and suicidal ideations. The report indicated that, upon treatment with Prozac and risperidone, defendant's psychiatric symptoms and depressive symptoms had subsided, and his sleep and appetite improved. The report concluded that defendant was fit to stand trial provided that he continued taking his medications. The report stated that defendant had an understanding of the charges against him and the function of the legal system, including the roles of the judge, jury, prosecuting attorney, defense attorney, and witnesses. Further, defendant could communicate logically and assist in his own defense. The report stated that defendant's medications would not affect defendant's ability to participate at trial. The report suggested that, because defendant was a native of India and his first language was Tamil, he would benefit from the presence of a Tamil interpreter in any future evaluations. The report stated that, while defendant understood and could speak some English, he was "more expressive and fluent in Tamil."

On July 2, 2003, the parties stipulated to the DMH's finding of fitness and the trial court entered an order finding defendant fit to stand trial. The trial court also entered an order requiring the presence of a Tamil interpreter to assist defendant in all court proceedings. Due to some difficulties in locating an interpreter, though, defendant was without an interpreter during some of the initial proceedings, including a portion of the hearing on defendant's motion to suppress.

On April 29, 2004, defendant, assisted by counsel and a Tamil interpreter, appeared before the trial court to enter a plea of guilty but mentally ill to the charge of first-degree murder. The trial court summarized the factual basis for the plea and admonished defendant of the charges against him, the consequences of pleading guilty, and the potential sentences. Defendant stated that he understood the trial court's admonishments. In response to questioning by the trial court, defendant provided his name and age and stated that he was a citizen of India. Defendant stated that he was not under the influence of illegal drugs or alcohol and indicated that he had taken his prescribed medications. Defendant stated that his prescription medication did not affect his ability to understand the proceedings and that he was not having any difficulty concentrating. The trial court noted the presence of the interpreter and encouraged defendant to let the interpreter know if he did not understand anything being said. Defendant confirmed that he wished to plead guilty but mentally ill to the charge of first-degree murder. Defendant confirmed that he had spoken to his lawyers about his case and that he was satisfied with their representation. Defendant stated that he had not been threatened and had not received any promises in return for his guilty plea.

Following the trial court's colloquy with defendant, the trial court stated:

"The Court finds a knowing, voluntary and intelligent waiver of trial by judge or jury. The defendant persists in his plea. An adequate factual basis is presented through [defendant's] confession * * *.

* * *

The Court also finds the defendant—I have no bona fide doubt as to the fitness of the defendant today. He seems lucid. He understands what we are talking about. He converses with us in English. He clearly understands what the interpreter is telling him. * * *

* * *

I, therefore, conditionally accept the plea and enter a finding of guilty on this charge.

I will order a Pre-Sentence Investigation and set the case for sentencing * * *."

On May 27, 2004, after conducting a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced defendant to 20 years' imprisonment.

On April 13, 2006, defendant filed a pro se motion to withdraw his guilty plea and to vacate his sentence. Defendant alleged that, prior to entering his plea, he was admitted to a psychiatric hospital as "a pretrial detainee." Defendant alleged that, "due to [his] mental state of mind, [his] plea was not knowing, nor intelligent." Defendant further alleged that he "was not mentally competent to enter a plea" or to understand the constitutional rights he was waiving as a result of his plea. In support of his motion, defendant supplied his own affidavit, in which he averred that he was "not of sound mind" when he entered his guilty plea. Defendant averred that his "mental state of mind was such as to that of a complete mental breakdown" and that he was still suffering from severe mental illness at the time he pleaded guilty. Defendant averred that he did not understand the constitutional rights he was giving up by pleading guilty and that he was "totally ignorant of the law and the legal proceedings in the United States when [he] pled."

On July 13, 2006, during a status hearing on defendant's motion, the trial court noted that the motion to withdraw the guilty plea was untimely and determined that the motion should be recharacterized as a postconviction petition in accordance with the procedure established in People v. Shellstrom, 216 Ill.2d 45, 295 Ill.Dec. 657, 833 N.E.2d 863 (2005). The trial court continued the case so that defendant, who was not present in court, could be admonished accordingly. On July 27, 2006, defendant was present in open court and the trial court informed him that it was going to recharacterize his motion as a postconviction petition. Defendant indicated that he would accept the recharacterization; however, no Tamil interpreter was present during the hearing. Defendant told the trial court he understood English "a little bit."

On November 2, 2006, the trial court returned defendant to court for additional admonishments. On this date, a Tamil interpreter was available to assist defendant. The trial court explained to defendant that it had recalled the case so that he could be admonished through an interpreter to make sure he understood the proceedings. The trial court once again advised defendant that his motion to withdraw his guilty plea would be recharacterized as a postconviction petition. Additionally, for the first time, the trial court admonished defendant that, because of the recharacterization, he would be subject to the Act's restrictions on successive postconviction petitions. The trial court also admonished defendant that he would be given an opportunity to withdraw the petition or to make any amendments that he desired. Defendant indicated his understanding and assent to the trial court's admonishments.

On January 26, 2007, the trial court entered a written order dismissing defendant's postconviction petition as frivolous and patently without merit. Based upon its review of the transcript of the guilty plea proceedings, the trial court concluded that the record belied defendant's claim that he did not knowingly and intelligently plead guilty. The trial court noted that the trial judge who had accepted defendant's plea had been well informed of defendant's mental history and had specifically inquired and confirmed defendant's fitness to enter a plea. Accordingly, the trial court concluded that defendant's postconviction petition failed to state the gist of a constitutional claim. Defendant subsequently filed a timely notice of appeal.

Prior to considering the merits of the appeal, we first address defendant's motion for summary remand...