People v. Swazo
Decision Date | 23 August 1976 |
Docket Number | No. 27184,27184 |
Citation | 553 P.2d 782,191 Colo. 425 |
Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Anthony SWAZO and Eddie Swazo, Jr., Defendants-Appellees. |
Court | Colorado Supreme Court |
Dale Tooley, Dist. Atty., Brooke Wunnicke, Thomas P. Casey, Chief Appellate Deputy Dist. Attys., Lucy Marsh Yee, Deputy Dist. Atty., Denver, for plaintiff-appellant.
Rollie R. Rogers, Colorado State Public Defender, James F. Dumas, Jr., Chief Deputy State Public Defender, Lawrence J. Schoenwald, Deputy State Public Defender, Denver, for defendant-appellee Authony Swazo.
Holm, Willis & Dill, P.C., H. Alan Dill, Denver, for defendant-appellee Eddie Swazo, Jr.
The district attorney, pursuant to statutory authority re questions of law, appeals from an order of the Denver district court dismissing several felony charges against the defendants. We reverse and order the charges reinstated.
The defendants were originally charged by felony complaint with second degree burglary, felony theft, and conspiracy to commit second degree burglary and theft. After a preliminary hearing in the Denver county court, the charges were dismissed for lack of probable cause.
Subsequently the prosecuting attorney asked leave to file in district court the same charges by direct information. The parties stipulated that District Judge Leonard Plank consented to the filing, although he was not informed of the prior proceedings and the county court dismissal. After the information was filed, Judge Plank signed the same and fixed bail at $5,000 for each of the defendants.
Thereafter the case was assigned to another division of the district court presided over by Judge Joseph R. Quinn. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss, and following arguments by counsel, Judge Quinn made the following finding and ruling:
Defendants' motions to dismiss were granted.
The court was apparently persuaded that its action in dismissing the case was mandated by People v. Burggraf, 36 Colo.App. 137, 536 P.2d 48. That case is distinguishable in that the direct information was filed without leave of court, whereas in the case at bar consent of court was actually obtained.
Therefore the only issue herein is whether the district attorney must...
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People v. Sabell, 84SA105
...7(c)(2), 5 however, requires the district court's consent, which "implies a real application of discretion." People v. Swazo, 191 Colo. 425, 427, 553 P.2d 782, 783 (1976). This court will not overrule the district court unless its ruling was an abuse of discretion. See Holmes, 668 P.2d at 1......
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Holmes v. District Court of Summit County, 83SA221
...A. The requirement of court consent prescribed by Crim.P. 7(c)(2) "implies a real application of discretion." People v. Swazo, 191 Colo. 425, 427, 553 P.2d 782 (1976). Before the district court may properly exercise its discretion, there must be a sufficient evidentiary disclosure by the pr......
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People v. Rotello, 86SA369
...absent an abuse of discretion by the district court. People v. Sabell, 708 P.2d 463, 465 (Colo.1985); see also People v. Swazo, 191 Colo. 425, 427, 553 P.2d 782, 783 (1976). When exercising its discretion, the district court must balance the right of the district attorney to prosecute crimi......
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People v. Freiman, 82SA116
...if: .... "(2) A preliminary hearing was held in the county court and the accused person was discharged." In People v. Swazo, 191 Colo. 425, 553 P.2d 782 (1976), we held that "[t]he requirement of court consent implies a real application of discretion." 191 Colo. 425 at 427, 553 P.2d 782. In......