People v. Taddeo

• Decision Date: 24 December 1969
• Citation: 310 N.Y.S.2d 424,62 Misc.2d 833
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of New York v. Michael and Julie TADDEO.
• Court: New York County Court

Page 424

310 N.Y.S.2d 424

62 Misc.2d 833

The PEOPLE of the State of New York v. Michael and Julie TADDEO.

Onondaga County Court.

Dec. 24, 1969.

Carl W. Peterson, Jr., Corp. Counsel, City of Syracuse, for the City of Syracuse; Edward O. Burke, Syracuse, of counsel.

Ali & Gerber, Syracuse, for defendants; Edward F. Gerber, Syracuse, of counsel.

MEMORANDUM

ORMAND N. GALE, Judge.

Both Defendants have appealed to this Court from a judgment of conviction for violating the following sections of the Syracuse Housing Code, rendered after trial on Feb. 6, 1969 by Honorable Rocco P. Regitano, Chief Judge of the City Court of Syracuse, Criminal Division:

27--32(c) 2 Repair downspouts, both sides of house

27--14(b) 2 Basement apartments must be vacated and discontinued (inadequate exits--below grade)

27--23(e) 2 Repair plaster, 1st floor rear hallway

27--22(b) 1 Repair rear porch steps

27--22(c) 2 Repair cornice, east and west side of house

27--22(c) 2 Repair window, front hallway

27--44 Repair and replace floor register in front hall, broken

27--18(d) Discontinue use of third floor for residential occupancy (inadequate exists--no fire protection--created without a permit).

Thereafter, on May 7, 1969 a fine of $150.00 apiece was assessed against each Defendant.

The original action was instituted on behalf of the City of Syracuse against the Defendants who own several parcels of residential property within the city limits, for specific violations allegedly existing at rental property known as 118 Kirk Avenue in the city. On June 19, 1968 the Syracuse Housing Inspectors were apparently admitted to the property by the tenant in residence in order to view the premises. Thereupon the Inspectors noted ten violations of the Syracuse Housing Code.

On June 24, 1968 a notice of the violations and an order to comply with the statutory requirements was mailed to the appellants. On August 1, 1968 a reinspection was effected again, through authorization of the tenant. It appears from testimony at the trial, that little work had been done and on August 7, 1968 a final order was sent to the Defendants. Finally, on August 14, 1968 a work permit was obtained sufficient in scope to remove the violations. At that time, the inspectors went to the premises with appellant-defendant Julie Taddeo, in order to point out the violations to be corrected. On September 20 of that same year, another final order to comply was mailed to appellants. Approximately five weeks later, an action was instituted through service of a summons and complaint upon the defendant-appellants which charged failure to correct numerous violations. This Court takes note of the fact that no tenants were ever made parties to this proceeding.

In seeking reversal, defendant-appellants now contend the following are several errors committed at the trial:

Basically, they attack the Syracuse Housing Code as being unconstitutional in that it fails to provide a provision to obtain a search warrant to review the premises. The claim is made that the United States Supreme Court declared a similar code unconstitutional on grounds of a 'warrantless inspection' in Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 87 S.Ct. 1727, 18 L.Ed.2d 930.

Secondly, the defendant-appellants charge that under Section 27--113 of the Syracuse Housing Code, as amended, refusal of an owner or occupant to allow inspection without a search warrant is deemed an additional violation. Concluding, therefore, that this provision is blatantly unconstitutional on its face, they cite the recent Court of Appeals decision, Finn's Liquor Shop, Inc. v. State Liquor Authority, 24 N.Y.2d 647, 301 N.Y.S.2d 584, 249 N.E.2d 440.

Defendant-appellants claim that there is no showing from a reading of the minutes that the plaintiff met the burden of proving consent was given by the landlord. Further, they argue that the tenant had no right to give consent for the absentee owner of the premises. Even if the tenant's action be construed as consent, they argue that submission to authority is not consent.

In opposition to this appeal the City of Syracuse alleges that absence of formal administrative steps to obtain a search warrant does not make the Syracuse Housing Code unconstitutionally defective, but argue that in any event that question is not properly before this Court, Because defendant-appellants were not charged with a violation of this section, i.e. they were not charged with failing to admit an inspector to the premises.

Plaintiff-respondent challenges the standing of the owners to even argue the waiver by the tenant to entry into the premises and further would have this Court construe Julie Taddeo's actions in July of 1968 as consent when she did, in fact, meet the inspectors at the premises.

We cannot agree with the contention that the landlords lack standing to contest alleged violations against them, which consequentially would subject them to fine or eventual imprisonment. However, granting them standing to contest the violations does not, by any means, dismiss their liability and responsibility with regard to their property.

Initially, we must follow the well-settled rule that the Courts have inherent authority to determine whether a statute enacted by the legislature transcends the limits imposed by the Federal or State Constitution, Lincoln Building Associates v. Barr, 1 Misc.2d 560, 149 N.Y.S.2d 460, aff'd 1 N.Y.2d 413, 153 N.Y.S.2d 633, 135 N.E.2d 801. The burden of proof is on one attacking the constitutionality of the statute, New York State Thruway Authority v. Ashley Motor Court, 12 A.D.2d 223, 210 N.Y.S.2d 193, aff'd 10 N.Y.2d 151, 218 N.Y.S.2d 640, 176 N.E.2d 566. Further, the Court has the right to assume a statute constitutional in the first instance until otherwise determined by the higher Courts, People v. Wright, 12 Misc.2d 961, 173 N.Y.S.2d 160. No court will invalidate a statute on constitutional grounds except on a clear showing that the legislation exceeds the constitutional power, Thompson v. Wallin, 276 A.D. 463, 95 N.Y.S.2d 784, aff'd 301 N.Y. 476, 95 N.E.2d 806.

Our reasoning is further bolstered by the recent Court of Appeals decision, People v. Pagnotta, 25 N.Y.2d 333, 305 N.Y.S.2d 484, 253 N.E.2d 202 (1969), which enunciates the rule that a strong presumption of constitutionality attaches to legislation duly enacted within our jurisdiction:

'Indeed, we have...