People v. Taylor

• Decision Date: 02 December 2015
• Citation: 21 N.Y.S.3d 300,134 A.D.3d 739
• Parties: The PEOPLE, etc., respondent, v. Winfred L. TAYLOR, appellant.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

134 A.D.3d 739

21 N.Y.S.3d 300

The PEOPLE, etc., respondent,

v.Winfred L. TAYLOR, appellant.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department, New York.

Dec. 2, 2015.

Mark Diamond, New York, N.Y., for appellant, and appellant pro se.

Thomas J. Spota, District Attorney, Riverhead, N.Y. (Edward A. Bannan of counsel), for respondent.

MARK C. DILLON, J.P., SANDRA L. SGROI, JEFFREY A. COHEN, and HECTOR D. LaSALLE, JJ.

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the County Court, Suffolk County (Weber, J.), rendered February 23, 2012, convicting him of robbery in the second degree and assault in the third degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence. The appeal brings up for review the denial, after a hearing, of that branch of the defendant's omnibus motion which was to suppress identification testimony.

ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.

The defendant's contention that the evidence was legally insufficient to support his convictions of robbery in the second degree and assault in the third degree is unpreserved for appellate review (see CPL 470.05[2] ; People v. Gray, 86 N.Y.2d 10, 20, 629 N.Y.S.2d 173, 652 N.E.2d 919 ; People v. Williams, 187 A.D.2d 547, 589 N.Y.S.2d 604 ). In any event, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution (see People v. Contes, 60 N.Y.2d 620, 621, 467 N.Y.S.2d 349, 454 N.E.2d 932 ), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish the defendant's guilt of those crimes beyond a reasonable doubt. Moreover, in fulfilling our responsibility to conduct an independent review of the weight of the evidence (see CPL 470.15[5] ; People v. Danielson, 9 N.Y.3d 342, 849 N.Y.S.2d 480, 880 N.E.2d 1 ), we nevertheless accord great deference to the jury's opportunity to view the witnesses, hear the testimony, and observe demeanor (see People v. Mateo, 2 N.Y.3d 383, 410, 779 N.Y.S.2d 399, 811 N.E.2d 1053 ; People v. Bleakley, 69 N.Y.2d 490, 495, 515 N.Y.S.2d 761, 508 N.E.2d 672 ). Upon reviewing the record here, we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt was not against the weight of the evidence (see People v. Romero, 7 N.Y.3d 633, 826 N.Y.S.2d 163, 859 N.E.2d 902 ).

The defendant contends that the branch of his omnibus motion which was to suppress identification testimony should have been granted because the identification was the result of an impermissibly suggestive showup procedure. However, the complainant's identification of the defendant near the scene of the crime was spontaneous, and not the result of a police-arranged confrontation, even though the complainant was being driven home from the hospital by the police at the time (see People v. Tlatelpa, 107 A.D.3d 1022, 966 N.Y.S.2d 903 ).

The defendant's arguments regarding alleged prosecutorial misconduct during summation are largely unpreserved for appellate review (see CPL 470.05[2] ; People v. Garner, 27 A.D.3d 764, 815 N.Y.S.2d 614 ). In any event, the challenged remarks were either fair comment on the evidence, permissive rhetorical comment, or responsive to defense counsel's summation (see People v. Galloway, 54 N.Y.2d 396, 446 N.Y.S.2d 9, 430 N.E.2d 885 ; People v. Garner, 27 A.D.3d at 764, 815 N.Y.S.2d 614 ; People v. Rhodes, 11 A.D.3d 487, 782 N.Y.S.2d 788 ).

There is no merit to the defendant's contention that he was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel based solely on defense counsel's failure to object to the alleged prosecutorial misconduct (see People v. Parker–Davidson, 89 A.D.3d 1114, 933 N.Y.S.2d 603 ; People v. Dunn, 54 A.D.3d 871, 864 N.Y.S.2d 107 ).

The County Court properly declined to charge the jury on the defense of justification, because there was no reasonable view of the evidence supporting a justification charge (see People v. Baranov, 121 A.D.3d 706, 707, 993 N.Y.S.2d 337 ; People v. Pine, 82 A.D.3d 1498, 919 N.Y.S.2d 564 ; People v. Victor, 176 A.D.2d 769, 574 N.Y.S.2d 826 ; People v. White, 168 A.D.2d 962, 565 N.Y.S.2d 344 ).

The defendant's contention that the County Court violated his rights under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution is not preserved for appellate review (see People v. Walker, 70 A.D.3d 870, 894 N.Y.S.2d 156 ). In any event, the contention is without merit. While the Confrontation Clause guarantees an opportunity for effective cross-examination, it does not guarantee a cross-examination "that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish" (Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 20, 106 S.Ct. 292, 88 L.Ed.2d 15 ; see People v. Burns, 6 N.Y.3d 793, 811 N.Y.S.2d 297, 844 N.E.2d 751 ; People v. Goodson, 35 A.D.3d 760, 761, 825 N.Y.S.2d 778 ). It is within the discretion of the trial court to limit the scope of cross-examination when questions are irrelevant, concern collateral issues, or risk misleading the jury (see Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 678–679, 106 S.Ct. 1431, 89 L.Ed.2d 674 ; People v. Francisco, 44 A.D.3d 870, 843...