People v. Taylor

• Decision Date: 28 February 1986
• Citation: 178 Cal.App.3d 217,223 Cal.Rptr. 638
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Danny Bill TAYLOR, Defendant and Appellant. Crim. 13533.

Page 638

223 Cal.Rptr. 638

178 Cal.App.3d 217

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Danny Bill TAYLOR, Defendant and Appellant.

Crim. 13533.

Court of Appeal, Third District, California.

Feb. 28, 1986.

Daniel G. McCoy, Sacramento, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for defendant and appellant.

John K. Van de Kamp, Atty. Gen., Garrick W. Chock, Deputy Atty. Gen., for plaintiff and respondent.

SIMS, Associate Justice.

In this case, we consider when law enforcement officers are required to give Miranda ¹ warnings to a suspect whom they have detained pursuant to an "investigative stop." We conclude that where defendant was detained by at least four sheriff's officers, several patrol cars and a helicopter, and was held at gunpoint, Miranda warnings were required before an officer showed defendant suspicious items of property to find out whether the items belonged to him.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On the evening of March 17, 1983, Sacramento County Sheriff's Detective Charles Long was positioned in a marked patrol unit in the vicinity of 28th and Q streets on a residential "stake out". Jessie Taylor, described by the officer only as a "white man" who was a "wanted person," was the subject of the surveillance.

When Detective Long observed a vehicle, driven by a white male, leave the Taylor residence, Long followed the vehicle, believing the driver to be Jessie Taylor. The vehicle soon accelerated to a high rate of speed. In response, Detective Long activated the patrol car's red light and siren and "advised radio" of tehprusit. Long obtained assistance from other patrol cars and the department's helicopter. A pursuit ensued for approximately a mile and a half at which point the helicopter and several patrol cars effected a stop. Detective Long arrived immediately thereafter.

Corporal Lauther also arrived at the scene of the stop and observed Officer Ritter, with his gun drawn, instructing a man to come forward. No other reference to the gun appears in the record. The man was 15 feet away from a tree situated in a back yard. Next to the tree was a fence. The man was then identified not as "wanted person" Jessie Taylor but rather as Danny Taylor.

Corporal Lauther was advised by Officer Yoshita, who piloted the helicopter, to search the area around the tree as defendant had been observed in that area. Lauther found a woman's bracelet and a glove near the tree and observed car keys and a flashlight on the other side of the fence in the back yard. Lauther handed Detective Long the bracelet and directed him to complete the search of the area near the tree and the fence. Long retrieved the flashlight, car keys and one brown glove from the back yard. On a tree near the street, Long located another brown glove.

Without asking defendant any questions Detective Long then showed the items to the defendant to find out whether they belonged to him. Defendant remarked, "I don't know why, I just lost my head, when I threw them away, I just lost my head." Defendant was then arrested and other items of jewelry were found in his pockets during a subsequent booking search at the jail.

At the time Detective Long showed defendant the items, he had no information that the items were either contraband or tools used to commit a crime. At that time, defendant was not suspected of having committed a crime warranting a custodial arrest but was rather being detained for traffic violations: failure to yield to a red light and siren, speeding, and reckless driving.

The bracelet and the jewelry found on defendant were later identified as having been taken in a burglary that had occurred earlier that month.

Defendant pled guilty to one count of receiving stolen property (Pen. Code, § 496) ² and admitted he violated probation which had been granted upon a prior conviction for credit card fraud. ( § 484f.)

On appeal, defendant contends the trial court erroneously denied his motion to suppress evidence ³ ( § 1538.5) inasmuch as the evidence was a product of an illegal arrest. He argues the statement made to Detective Long, upon which the officers and the trial court relied to establish probable cause to arrest, ⁴ was obtained unlawfully because he had not been given his Miranda rights. ⁵ Thus, his argument continues, the arrest was illegal and the fruits of the illegality--particularly the items found in his pockets when he was booked at the jail--should have been suppressed. Defendant contends Detective Long should have given him his Miranda rights because he was "in custody" at the time. ⁶

DISCUSSION

I

Under Miranda, "the prosecution may not use statements ... stemming from custodial interrogation ... unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination." (Miranda v. Arizona, supra, 384 U.S. at p. 444, 86 S.Ct. at p. 1612, 16 L.Ed.2d at p. 706.) The People initially contend we need not reach the question whether defendant was "in custody" for Miranda purposes because no "interrogation" occurred. The People's argument is premised on the fact that Detective Long merely showed the items of property to defendant without asking him any questions.

The argument is unavailing. "Miranda safeguards come into play whenever a person in custody is subjected to either express questioning or its functional equivalent. That is to say, the term 'interrogation' under Miranda refers not only to express questioning, but also to any words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect." (Rhode Island v. Innis (1980) 446 U.S. 291, 300-301, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 1689, 64 L.Ed.2d 297, 307-308, fns. omitted.) While Detective Long's display of the items to defendant was not certain to provoke an incriminating response, given all circumstances such a response was reasonably likely.

Moreover, if defendant was "in custody," Miranda warnings were required even though by showing defendant the items Detective Long merely intended to allow defendant to explain incriminating circumstances. (See People v. Turner, supra, 37 Cal.3d at p. 318, 208 Cal.Rptr. 196, 690 P.2d 669, opn. by Kaus, J.) "[U]nder Miranda the vital question is custody, not whether the investigation has focused on the person interrogated [citations], and it is immaterial that the questioning relates to a crime other than the one which triggered the custody and is investigatory as far as that offense is concerned. [Citations.]" (In re James M. (1977) 72 Cal.App.3d 133, 136-137, 139 Cal.Rptr. 902, fn. omitted, opn. by Kaus, J.) Thus, if defendant was "in custody" when Detective Long showed him the items, Miranda warnings were required. We therefore turn to that issue: whether defendant was "in custody."

II

Miranda warnings are required only where a suspect is subject to "custodial interrogation." (Oregon v. Mathiason (1977) 429 U.S. 492, 494, 97 S.Ct. 711, 713, 50 L.Ed.2d 714, 719.) "While arrest is not a condition precedent to the right to Miranda ... warnings, custody is: the vice requiring the prophylaxis of the notice of rights is the inherently coercive atmosphere pervading custodial interrogation. [Citation.]" (People v. Leach (1975) 15 Cal.3d 419, 443, 124 Cal.Rptr. 752, 541 P.2d 296, emphasis in original.)

California cases have held that suspects were not "in custody" where they were stopped routinely for traffic violations (see, e.g., People v. Lopez (1985) 163 Cal.App.3d 602, 608-609, 209 Cal.Rptr. 575; People v. Montoya (1981) 125 Cal.App.3d 807, 810, 178 Cal.Rptr. 211; People v. Hubbard (1970) 9 Cal.App.3d 827, 835-836, 88 Cal.Rptr. 411) or for "investigatory stops" or "detentions." (See e.g., People v. Hill (1974) 12 Cal.3d 731, 767, 117 Cal.Rptr. 393, 528 P.2d 1, overruled on other grounds in People v. DeVaughn (1977) 18 Cal.3d 889, 896, fn. 5, 135 Cal.Rptr. 786, 558 P.2d 872; People v. Salinas (1982) 131 Cal.App.3d 925, 936, 182 Cal.Rptr. 683, and authorities cited therein; Lockridge v. Superior Court (1969) 275 Cal.App.2d 612, 620, 80 Cal.Rptr. 223; People v. Manis (1969) 268 Cal.App.2d 653, 669, 74 Cal.Rptr. 423.) However, none of these cases involved the kinds of restraint that were used to stop and detain defendant in the instant matter. We therefore turn to basic Miranda principles.

The rule is that Miranda warnings are required before questioning where a citizen has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom in any significant way or is led to believe, as a reasonable person, that he is so deprived. (Berkemer v. McCarty (1984) 468 U.S. 420, ----, 104 S.Ct. 3138, 3148, 3152, 82 L.Ed.2d 317, 332, 336; Oregon v. Mathiason, supra, 429 U.S. at p. 495, 97 S.Ct. at p. 714, 50 L.Ed.2d at p. 719; Miranda v. Arizona, supra, 384 U.S. at p. 444, 86 S.Ct. at p. 1612, 16 L.Ed.2d at p. 706; People v. Arnold (1967) 66 Cal.2d 438, 448, 58 Cal.Rptr. 115, 426 P.2d 515; see Green v. Superior Court, supra, 40 Cal.3d at pp. 133-134, 219 Cal.Rptr. 186, 707 P.2d 248 (plurality opn. of Kaus and Grodin, JJ.).) "Although the circumstances of each case must certainly influence a determination of whether a suspect is 'in custody' for purposes of receiving Miranda protection, the ultimate inquiry is simply whether there is a 'formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement' of the degree associated with a formal arrest." (California v. Beheler (1983) 463 U.S. 1121, 1125, 103 S.Ct. 3517, 3519-3520, 77 L.Ed.2d 1275, 1279, quotingOregon v. Mathiason, supra, 429 U.S. at p. 495, 97 S.Ct. at p. 714, 50 L.Ed.2d at p. 719; see Green v. Superior Court, supra, 40 Cal.3d at pp. 134-135, 219 Cal.Rptr. 186, 707 P.2d 248 (Plurality opn. of Kaus and Grodin, JJ.).)

As applied to interactions between citizens and police on the street, these concepts were recently given further definition in Berkemer v. McCarty, supra, 468 U.S. 420, 104 S.Ct. 3138, 82 L.Ed.2d 317. There...