People v. Taylor

• Decision Date: 24 February 1986
• Court: California Superior Court
• Parties: 179 Cal.App.3d Supp. 1 The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Randall John TAYLOR, Defendant and Appellant. Crim. A. 1736. Appellate Department, Superior Court, Santa Clara County, California

Page 430

225 Cal.Rptr. 430

179 Cal.App.3d Supp. 1

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Randall John TAYLOR, Defendant and Appellant.

Crim. A. 1736.

Appellate Department, Superior Court, Santa Clara County, California.

Argued and Submitted Dec. 5, 1985.

Decided Feb. 24, 1986.

[179 Cal.App.3d Supp. 3] Leo Himmelsbach, Dist. Atty., and Hilda D'Esopo, Deputy Dist. Atty., for plaintiff and respondent.

Dennis William Smith, San Jose, for defendant and appellant.

CHAPMAN, Judge.

PROCEDURAL FACTS

In this appeal we are asked to determine the validity of a grant of probation conditioned upon an order of restitution for damages caused by an automobile accident.

On March 21, 1984, the Campbell City Police responded to an accident at the intersection of Nobli and Fowler. They determined that one of the drivers involved in the accident was the defendant, Randall John Taylor, whose license and driving privilege had been suspended or revoked. They also determined that the accident was caused, at least in part, by the defendant improperly failing to yield while making a left turn. They cited the defendant for a violation of Vehicle Code section 14601.1, subdivision (a), driving on a suspended license, a misdemeanor, and for a violation of Vehicle Code section 21801, subdivision (a), failure to yield while making a left turn, an infraction.

Following arraignment the defendant pleaded guilty to the charge of driving on a suspended license, and nolo contendre to the charge of making an illegal left turn. The trial judge placed defendant on probation on the charge of driving on a suspended license, upon the condition that he pay a fine in the total amount of $255. He suspended judgment on the charge of illegal turn. The matter was thereupon referred to the Victim Assistance Program and continued for further hearing regarding restitution.

At the hearing on restitution the trial judge determined that the other party to the accident had suffered damages to her automobile in the amount of $2,960, but because she had also been at fault in the accident the court limited restitution to one-half of the loss, and ordered the defendant to reimburse the other party in the amount of $1,480.12.

CONTENTIONS ON APPEAL

Defendant contends on appeal that restitution is not an appropriate condition of probation upon a conviction of driving on a We agree.

suspended license, and that the order denies him due process of law.

DISCUSSION

It will be important throughout this discussion to bear in mind that the probationary order is based on the conviction of the crime defined by Vehicle Code section 14601.1, subdivision (a); to-wit, driving on a suspended license, and not on the conviction of the infraction of making an illegal turn.

Restitution or reparation as a condition of probation is expressly authorized by statute and is sanctioned by case authority. People v. Williams (1966) 247 Cal.App.2d 394, 399, 55 Cal.Rptr. 550. Penal Code section 1203.1 provides: "The court or judge thereof, in the order granting probation ... shall provide for restitution in proper cases; ..." Penal Code section 1203.04, subdivisions (a) and (d) provide: "(a) In every case where a person is convicted of a crime and is granted probation the court shall require, as a condition of probation, that the person make restitution as follows: [p] (1) To the victim, if the crime involved a victim.... [p] (d) ... 'restitution' means full or partial payment for the value of ... damages property ... which losses were caused by the defendant as a result of committing the crime for which he or she was convicted...." (Emphasis added.)

Defendant contends that the crime of driving on a suspended license is a victimless crime, and that the probation laws are designed to effect the rehabilitation of the criminal, and not to resolve civil liability of the parties. He further points out that important civil due process rights are involved in the determination of civil liability, including the right to a jury trial, and the right to raise the defense of comparative negligence.

In response the district attorney asserts a "but for" argument, i.e., if the defendant had not been driving while his license was suspended the accident would not have occurred and there would have been no damage, and that for this reason the trial court did not abuse discretion in ordering restitution as a condition of probation, and furthermore, that defendant's due process rights were protected in that the trial court conducted a hearing to determine fault and the amount of damages.

A "but for" rule is not the test of the validity of a condition of restitution. The district attorney cites People v. Axtell (1981) 11B Cal.App.3d 246, 256, 173 Cal.Rptr. 360, for the proposition that probation is an act of leniency, not a matter of right. Historically this was the rule. Defendant could reject probation and stand before the court for judgment, but if he accepted probation he did so on whatever conditions the court saw fit to impose. Inasmuch as he had accepted probation, he accepted the conditions of probation and therefore had no grounds to object. The idea that a grant of probation was an absolute act of grace was laid to rest in People v. Dominguez, (1967) 256 Cal.App.2d 623, 64 Cal.Rptr. 290.

Dominguez is a landmark case, and has been cited many times by the California Supreme Court. See People v. Lent (1975) 15 Cal.3d 481, 486, and People v. Richards (1976) 17 Cal.3d 614, 621, 131 Cal.Rptr. 537, 552 P.2d 97. In People v. Lent, supra, 15 Cal.3d at page 486, 124 Cal.Rptr. 905, 541 P.2d 545, the Supreme Court cites the Dominguez rule as follows: "A condition of probation will not be held invalid unless it '(1) has no relationship to the crime of which the offender was convicted, (2) relates to conduct which is not in itself criminal, and (3) requires or forbids conduct which is not reasonably related to future criminality....' [Citation.] Conversely, a condition of probation which requires or forbids conduct which is not itself criminal is valid if that conduct is reasonably related to the crime of which the defendant was convicted or to future criminality."

The Dominguez standard is often very difficult to apply. For example, in the present case one could argue that the condition is directly related to the crime of which defendant was convicted, i.e., driving on a suspended license, because he was in The vagueness of the Dominguez rule is discussed in a note entitled Jacobson, Use of Restitution in the Criminal Process: People v. Miller (1968-1969) 16 UCLA L.Rev. 456. The note suggests a better test would be to focus on the language of the statute, i.e. Penal Code section 1203.1, which provides in part: "The court may ... require ... conditions ... as it may determine are fitting and proper to the end that justice may be done, that amends may be made to society for the breach of the law, for any injury done to any person resulting from such breach and generally and specifically for the reformation and rehabilitation of the probationer." (Emphasis added).

                fact driving when the accident occurred, especially since defendant conceded by his plea of no contest that [179 Cal.App.3d Supp. 6] he made an illegal turn.  On the other hand, one can argue with equal vigor that it doesn't relate to such a crime because the lack of license is an existing condition and not a cause of the accident.  In California, as in most jurisdictions, it has long been the rule in both civil and criminal cases that evidence that a driver is unlicensed is not admissible on the issue of negligence as the cause of an accident.  Lehmuth v. Long Beach Unified School District (1960) 53 Cal.2d 544, 554, 2 Cal.Rptr. 279, 348 P.2d 887;  Strandt v. Cannon (1938) 29 Cal.App.2d 509, 518, 85 P.2d 160;  People v. Spragney (1972) 24 Cal.App.3d 333, 100 Cal.Rptr. 902.   In Spragney the court said on page 338, 100 Cal.Rptr. 902:  "... 'the operator's negligence is to be determined by the facts existing at the time of the accident, and whether the operator had a license to operate an automobile under the laws of this state is immaterial unless there is some causal relationship between the injuries and the failure to have a license or the violation of the statute in failing to have one...'  [Strandt v. Cannon, supra, [29 Cal.App.2d] at p. 518 [85 P.2d 160]].  [p] ... there is no reason why the general rule of inadmissibility should not apply in a criminal proceeding in which negligence is an essential part of the People's case.  Indeed the opinion of the Supreme Court in People v. Costa, [1953] 40 Cal.2d 160, 167 [252 P.2d 1], appears to so assume."
                

The note concludes, on page 474: "This note has attempted to formulate guidelines which would not frustrate the use of corrective restitution in instances where that use would be rehabilitative, but also would not allow a court total discretion as to what was and what was not rehabilitative. The conclusion is that restitution, as a condition of probation, is proper if it requires the payment of fixed liabilities: (1) incurred as the proximate result of the criminal act for which the probationer was convicted, or (2) incurred as the result of conduct which is substantially related in kind, including the state of mind of the actor, to the breach for which the individual was criminally convicted."

The conclusion is based in part on an observation that: "A majority of jurisdictions in the United States, as well as foreign courts, sanction reparation by the offender as a condition of probation. A preponderance of these jurisdictions, including the federal judicial system, limit such restitution to the pecuniary harm proximately caused by the act for which the probationer was convicted." (Page 460, footnotes omitted.) The note would expand the probationer's responsibility to include: "... those debts or injuries which result from conduct substantially related in kind to the criminal conduct. [p ] T...