People v. Taylor

• Decision Date: 06 June 2001
• Docket Number: Docket No. 216362.
• Citation: 245 Mich. App. 293,628 N.W.2d 55
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Willie J. TAYLOR, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

628 N.W.2d 55

245 Mich. App. 293

PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Willie J. TAYLOR, Defendant-Appellant.

Docket No. 216362.

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Submitted December 5, 2000, at Detroit.

Decided April 6, 2001, at 9:15 a.m.

Released for Publication June 6, 2001.

Jennifer M. Granholm, Attorney General, Thomas L. Casey, Solicitor General, John D. O'Hair, Prosecuting Attorney, Timothy A. Baughman, Chief of Research, Training, and Appeals, and Karen M. Woodside, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for the people.

State Appellate Defender (by Chari K. Grove), for the defendant on appeal.

Before SAAD, P.J., and WHITE and HOEKSTRA, JJ.

SAAD, P.J.

I. Nature of the Case

Defendant appeals as of right his bench trial conviction of armed robbery pursuant to M.C.L. § 750.529; MSA 28.797, which provides in part:

Any person who shall assault another, and shall feloniously rob, steal and take from his person, or in his presence, any money or other property, which may be the subject of larceny, such robber being armed with a dangerous weapon, or any article used or fashioned in a manner to lead the person so assaulted to reasonably believe it to be a dangerous weapon, shall be guilty of a felony, punishable by imprisonment in the state prison for life or for any term of years.

Defendant argues that the prosecutor presented insufficient evidence that, during the robbery, defendant was armed with a dangerous weapon or that he used or fashioned an article to lead complainant to reasonably believe it to be a dangerous weapon.¹

Typically, to prove the "armed" element of armed robbery, the prosecutor submits into evidence the weapon itself or presents the testimony of a witness who saw the weapon while the perpetrator committed the act. However, in a hidden or feigned weapon case, in which a defendant obscures or simulates a weapon to induce the victim to turn over money or other property to the defendant, the prosecutor need not present the weapon itself or its specific description at trial. Rather, in a "feigned weapon" case, the prosecutor meets the "armed" requirement of the statute by proving that during the commission of a robbery the defendant simulated a weapon so as to induce the victim to reasonably believe he was armed. Here, because the defendant placed his hand under his clothing, the victim observed a bulge under the clothing, and defendant announced a robbery ("This is a stick up"), all of which led the victim to reasonably believe defendant was armed, we find that the prosecutor met his burden by introducing a sufficient quantum of evidence to prove the "armed" element of armed robbery.

II. Facts

On February 28, 1998, just before 4:00 a.m., defendant knocked on the locked door of a Mobil gasoline station and asked the clerk on duty, complainant, to let him inside. Defendant waived to complainant as though he needed help and complainant opened the door so defendant could enter the station. Defendant stood near the counter and said he needed some water for his car. Complainant, now standing behind the counter near the cash register, told defendant he did not have any radiator water available for sale. Defendant then mumbled a few words while stepping closer to the counter. Defendant placed his hand inside his partially buttoned jacket and into the front of his pants. Complainant testified that defendant appeared to grab something inside his jacket and that he saw a bulge near defendant's hand. Defendant said to complainant, "This is a stick up," and, "Open the drawer," referring to the cash register. Complainant complied and then lifted his hands in the air. Defendant's right hand remained inside his jacket while he used his left hand to take approximately $440 from the cash register.

After taking the money, defendant backed away from the counter and continued to watch complainant as he left the station. As defendant got into a car and pulled away, complainant observed the license plate number. Complainant then called the police to report the robbery and he gave them the license plate number and a description of the car. Police arrested defendant days later, and complainant identified defendant as the perpetrator at a police lineup and at trial.

III. Analysis

In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we view the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution and determine if any rational trier of fact could have found that the essential elements of the crime were proved beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Johnson, 460 Mich. 720, 723, 597 N.W.2d 73 (1999), citing People v. Wolfe, 440 Mich. 508, 515-516, 489 N.W.2d 748 (1992), amended 441 Mich. 1201 (1992).

The armed robbery statute requires a showing that the defendant was "armed with a dangerous weapon, or any article used or fashioned in a manner to lead the person so assaulted to reasonably believe it to be a dangerous weapon." MCL 750.529; MSA 28.797. By allowing proof that the defendant simulated a weapon to induce the victim to believe it to be a dangerous weapon, the statute recognizes (1) the difficulty of proving actual possession of a dangerous weapon if, as in many cases, the robber obscures or feigns a weapon to induce compliance by a victim and (2) the aggravated nature of a confrontation in which no weapon is visible, but the robber's conduct leads the complainant to reasonably believe the robber is armed.

While this portion of the armed robbery statute focuses on the belief of the victim that the defendant was armed, that belief must be reasonable and our courts have long recognized that the victim's subjective belief alone is insufficient to support a conviction of armed robbery. People v. Jolly, 442 Mich. 458, 468, 502 N.W.2d 177 (1993). Therefore, the prosecutor must submit "some objective evidence of the existence of a weapon or article" to the finder of fact. Id. The nature and quantity of that evidence has been addressed by our Supreme Court in two "feigned weapon" cases that control our decision here.

In Jolly, two robbers, a male and a female, entered a fast-food restaurant and demanded money from the victim, who was working there as a cashier. Jolly, supra at 461, 502 N.W.2d 177. The female told the victim that her companion had a gun and that he would shoot unless the victim turned over the money. Id. The victim testified that he never saw a weapon, but that he observed a bulge under the defendant's vest even though the defendant's hands were visible throughout the confrontation. Id. at 461, 463, 502 N.W.2d 177. The trial court denied the defendant's motion for a directed verdict, and he was convicted of unarmed robbery. Id. at 464, 502 N.W.2d 177. This Court reversed, finding the evidence insufficient to enable a trier of fact to find the defendant was armed and that the armed robbery charge should not have been submitted to the jury. Id. at 464-465, 502 N.W.2d 177.

However, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and reinstated the defendant's conviction, holding that the circumstantial evidence was sufficient for the jury to objectively determine the existence of a dangerous weapon. Id. at 470-471, 502 N.W.2d 177. The Court stated that, where the prosecutor attempts to prove that the defendant was armed with an article used or fashioned to feign a weapon, actual possession of an article is required to satisfy the "armed" element. Id. at 467, 502 N.W.2d 177. The Court then addressed the question of what constitutes "actual possession" for purposes of the statute and opined:

[T]here must be some objective evidence of the existence of a weapon or article before a jury will be permitted to assess the merits of an armed robbery charge. For example, an object pointing out from under a coat, together with statements threatening a victim with being shot, clearly satisfies the statutory definition of armed robbery. In such a case, there is evidence of actual possession of a weapon or article and the testimony regarding statements that, if believed, make clear an intent to convince the victim of the existence of such a weapon or article. [Id. at 468-469, 502 N.W.2d 177.]

The Court observed that the complainant's subjective belief alone is insufficient to satisfy the armed element, but that objective evidence may support the reasonable conclusion that a defendant is armed in a feigned weapon case. Id. at 467-468, 502 N.W.2d 177. The Court explained:

The typical armed robbery case prosecuted under the feigned weapon method involves either the use of a toy gun or a finger or other object hidden in a bag or under a coat to simulate the appearance of a weapon together with threatening behavior and statements indicating the existence of a weapon. The existence of some object, whether actually seen or obscured by clothing or something such as a paper bag, is objective evidence that a defendant possesses a dangerous weapon or an article used or fashioned to look like one. Related threats, whether verbal or gesticulatory, further support the existence of a weapon or article. [Id. at 469-470, 502 N.W.2d 177.]

The Court further stated that "the factfinder must be permitted to determine the existence of a weapon or an article used or fashioned to resemble one on the basis of all circumstantial evidence where the evidence is `sufficient.'" Id. at 470, 502 N.W.2d 177, citing State v. McCracken, 829 S.W.2d 634 (Mo.App., 1992). Accordingly, the Court concluded that the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to submit the armed robbery charge to the jury though, in Jolly, the jury ultimately concluded that the defendant was unarmed. Jolly, supra at 461, 470-471, 502 N.W.2d 177.

The Supreme Court again addressed a "feigned weapon" case in People v. Banks, 454 Mich. 469, 563 N.W.2d 200 (1997), in which the defendant and an accomplice, Hubbard Hudson, entered a convenience store and Hudson told the clerk, "You are going to be robbed." Id. at 471, 563 N.W.2d 200....