People v. Taylor
| Decision Date | 21 January 1965 |
| Docket Number | No. 37932,37932 |
| Citation | 32 Ill.2d 165,204 N.E.2d 734 |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Defendant in Error, v. John Lee TAYLOR, Plaintiff in Error. |
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
Mort A. Segall, Champaign, for plaintiff in error.
William G. Clark, Atty. Gen., Springfield, and Robert J. Waaler, State's Atty., Urbana, (Fred G. Leach, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Andrew Stecyk, Jack Waaler, and James L. Hafele, Asst. State's Attys., of counsel), for defendant in error.
The defendant, John Lee Taylor, was tried by jury in the circuit court of Champaign County and convicted of the crimes of rape and burglary. He was sentenced to the penitentiary on the rape charge for a term of 25 to 50 years and on the burglary charge for a term of 15 to 40 years, the sentences to be served concurrently. We have jurisdiction on direct appeal because of constitutional claims advanced by the defendant.
Before discussing these claims, we shall consider the defendant's argument that the evidence was insufficient to establish his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The victim of the crimes testified that as she was reading in bed at about 12:30 A.M. she heard a noise from the kitchen of her basement apartment. She went to the kitchen to investigate and saw a man stepping off the sink into the kitchen. He choked her and covered her eyes. She became unconscious and when she awoke she was on her bed, gagged and tied, with her head completely covered. The intruder told her that if she screamed or moved he would slit her throat. He then untied her legs and had intercourse with her. After he left she called a friend and told her she had been raped and the friend called the police. The victim was taken to the hospital where a medical examination disclosed that she had recently had intercourse, and also that she had lacerations on her face. The victim was unable to identify the defendant.
A detective testified that he checked the apartment for fingerprints and found some prints on the inside of the lower window sash of the kitchen window. These prints were in a position indicating that they had been placed there by someone opening the window from the outside. An F.B.I. agent was called to assist the detective and pictures were taken of the prints and the prints were 'lifted'. The photographic negatives were sent to F.B.I. headquarters and about a week later the F.B.I. reported that the prints were those of John Lee Taylor. A warrant was issued for Taylor's arrest, but he was not arrested until about 16 months later when he was located in Chicago. At the trial in F.B.I. fingerprint expert testified that the print on the inside of the window was the defendant's. Although the defendant testified in his own behalf he did not attempt to explain the presence of his fingerprint on the window.
The defendant concedes that this evidence is sufficient to prove that the crimes of burglary and rape occurred but contends that it does not establish that he committed them. The defendant relies upon that fact that the evidence showed that there were other smudged fingerprints on the window, which were not identified. He argues that these prints may have been those of someone else and that there is therefore a reasonable doubt that he is the guilty party. The authorities cited in support of this argument are inapplicable, for they deal with situations where the presence of the defendant's prints and the prints of others could be reasonably explained because of the public accessibility of the place where the prints are found and the possibility that the prints were made at a time other than when the offense occurred. (See: Cases collected, 28 A.L.R.2d 1155.) Even if it be conceded that in the present case there were prints of others on the window (perhaps the prints of the victim), the unexplained presence of the defendant's prints is not consistent with any reasonable hypothesis of innocence. We therefore hold that the evidence establishes the defendant's guilt.
We now turn to a consideration of the defendant's constitutional claims. He argues that he was denied a speedy trial but we find it unnecessary to consider the merits of this claim, for the record discloses that the issue was never presented to the trial court, either by a motion prior to trial or in the post-trial motion. The claim was therefore waived and will not be considered. People v. Morris, 3 Ill.2d 437, 442, 121 N.E.2d 810.
The defendant also argues that he was deprived of a fair and impartial trial by reason of alleged prejudicial conduct by the court and the prosecutor. We do not believe it is necessary to recite in detail the numerous examples of such alleged conduct cited by the defendant. Many of these examples are unsupported by the cerfified record and are only contained in an uncertified record prepared by the defendant's counsel, which was filed by leave of court. Although we granted leave to file this record, we have determined, after a complete examination of the certified record and the supplemental record, that we must base our decision on the certified record alone. This record shows that on several occasions the court and the prosecutor lost patience with defense counsel because of repeated objections, interruptions and requests for conferences in chambers. Our review of the record satisfies us that the remarks of the court and the prosecutor, while ill-advised, were provoked by the conduct of defense counsel and can not be held prejudicial error.
It is also urged that the defendant was denied his constitutional right to counsel. The record shows that while defense counsel was out of the court room the prosecutor commenced examining a witness for the State. After she gave her name and address and testified that the victim had been at her house earlier on the night of the attack, counsel returned and moved to strike the testimony or in the alternative asked that the reporter read the testimony which the witness had given. Both motions were denied. While...
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People v. Exson
...7 Ill.Dec. 3, 363 N.E.2d 924 (1977)). Even the constitutional right to a speedy trial is subject to waiver. See People v. Taylor, 32 Ill.2d 165, 168, 204 N.E.2d 734 (1965); People v. Hamby, 27 Ill.2d 493, 497, 190 N.E.2d 289 (1963). Also, statutorily based speedy trial claims are not consti......
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...circumstances may well support an inference that the print was made at the time of the commission of the offense. See People v. Taylor (1965), 32 Ill.2d 165, 204 N.E.2d 734 (defendant's fingerprints on inside of window sash in apartment of rape and burglary victim sufficient evidence to est......
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