People v. Taylor
Decision Date | 20 February 2008 |
Docket Number | No. B194403.,B194403. |
Citation | 160 Cal.App.4th 304,72 Cal.Rptr.3d 740 |
Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
Parties | The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Kory TAYLOR, Defendant and Appellant. |
Rudy Kraft, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, Herbert S. Tetef, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
In In re Conservatorship of Ben C. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 529, 53 Cal.Rptr.3d 856, 150 P.3d 738 (Ben C), our Supreme Court held that the judicial review procedures established in Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493, and People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, 158 Cal.Rptr. 839, 600 P.2d 1071, do not apply to conservatorship proceedings under the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act (LPSA) (Welf. & Inst.Code, § 5000 et seq.). Here we conclude that appeals from civil commitments under the Mentally Disordered Offender Act (MDOA) (Pen.Code,1 § 2962 et seq.) are also exempt from the Anders/Wende review requirements.
After a court trial, appellant Kory Taylor was ordered committed to the Department of Mental Health for treatment as a mentally disordered offender (MDO). Appointed appellate counsel filed an opening brief raising no issues and requesting our independent review of the record pursuant to Wende. At our request, the parties filed supplemental briefing addressing whether the judicial review procedures established by Anders and Wende apply to MDOA proceedings. Because we answer that question in the negative, we shall dismiss the appeal.
In 1994, Taylor was convicted of battery on a police officer (§ 243, former subd. (c), now subd. (c)(1)) and was sentenced to state prison. Prior to his release on parole, the Board of Parole Hearings (BPH) determined that he met the MDO criteria. On May 26, 2006, Taylor petitioned for a hearing challenging the BPH's finding pursuant to section 2966, subdivision (b).
Emily Rosten, Taylor's treating psychologist, testified that he suffered from schizoaffective disorder, bipolar type. As a result of that disorder, Taylor experienced "very significant" auditory hallucinations and was "severely depressed and self injurious." Since his commitment four months earlier, staff usually had to monitor him to ensure he did not harm himself or others in complying with the "commands" he was hearing. Taylor's commitment offense occurred when he went to the police station to complain about a jaywalking ticket and assaulted a police officer who was sitting at the front desk. Taylor was also convicted of two felonies committed during his incarceration, both of which involved assaults on police officers.
Dr. Rosten opined that Taylor's severe mental disorder was a cause or aggravating factor in his commission of these offenses, noting that his mental health problems began when he was 13 years old and that he had been hospitalized multiple times prior to his incarceration. The doctor further opined that Taylor's disorder was not in remission and could not be kept in remission without treatment and that he was "resistive to treatment, uncooperative, assaultive and threatening." She also concluded that Taylor represented a substantial danger of physical harm to others as a result of his severe mental disorder, as demonstrated by his violent behavior and his failure to acknowledge that he suffered from a mental illness.
Taylor testified on his own behalf. He denied suffering from a severe mental disorder, and challenged Dr. Rosten's characterization of the commitment offense. According to Taylor, his assault on the officer at the police station "wasn't really that serious" and the fights he engaged in during his incarceration were "inevitable." He also believed he did not present a danger to others if released because he planned to attend Alcoholics Anonymous and get a job. He also represented that he would not fight anymore if the judge told him not to.
In Anders, the United States Supreme Court held that when appointed counsel in a criminal defendant's first appeal is unable to find any arguable issues for briefing counsel should submit a brief referring to any matters in the record which might arguably support the appeal, provide the defendant a copy, and request permission to withdraw. (Anders v. California, supra, 386 U.S. at p. 744, 87 S.Ct. 1396.) After the defendant is given the opportunity to raise any points he or she wants the appellate court to consider, the court independently reviews the proceedings to determine whether the appeal is "wholly frivolous." (Ibid.) In Wende, the California Supreme Court concluded that Anders required the Courts of Appeal (People v. Wende, supra, 25 Cal.3d at pp. 441-442, 158 Cal.Rptr. 839, 600 P.2d 1071.) The court further recognized that "counsel may properly remain in the case so long as he has not described the appeal as frivolous and has informed the defendant that he may request the court to have counsel relieved if he so desires." (Id, at p. 442, 158 Cal.Rptr. 839, 600 P.2d 1071, fn. omitted.)
In Sade C, our Supreme Court held that Anders and Wende do not extend to an indigent parent's appeal of an order adversely affecting custody rights or parental status. (In re Sade C. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 952, 959, 55 Cal.Rptr.2d 771, 920 P.2d 716.) After concluding that those procedures apply only as a matter of right to criminal appeals, the court found no reason to extend those procedures to indigent parent appeals after conducting a three-part analysis of the private interests at stake, the state's interests, and the risk that the absence of the review procedures would result in erroneous resolution of the appeal. (Id., at pp. 986-987, 55 Cal.Rptr.2d 771, 920 P.2d 716, citing Lassiter v. Department of Social Services (1981) 452 U.S. 18, 27, 101 S.Ct. 2153, 68 L.Ed.2d 640.) The private interests at stake in Sade C. were the interests of the parent and the child, a relationship the court recognized is implicit in the concept of liberty protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. (In re Sade C, supra, at pp. 987-988, 55 Cal.Rptr.2d 771, 920 P.2d 716.) The state's interests were identified as the parens patriae interest in preserving and promoting child welfare, the "interest in an accurate and just resolution of the parent's appeal," and a (Id., at pp. 989-990, 55 Cal.Rptr.2d 771, 920 P.2d 716.) In the third stage of the analysis, the court concluded that the risk that the absence of Anders review would lead to an erroneous determination of the parent's appeal was "negligible" because experience indicated that "appointed appellate counsel faithfully conduct themselves as active advocates in behalf of indigent parents." (Id, at p. 990, 55 Cal.Rptr.2d 771, 920 P.2d 716.)
After balancing all three elements, the court concluded (In re Sade C, supra, 13 Cal.4th at pp. 990-991, 55 Cal.Rptr.2d 771, 920 P.2d 716, fn. omitted.) The court recognized that indigent parents and criminal defendants are not similarly situated because the former are not subject to punishment and the latter enjoy a wide range of constitutional rights. (Id., at pp. 991-992, 55 Cal.Rptr.2d 771, 920 P.2d 716.) The court also declined to extend the Anders procedures to indigent parent appeals pursuant to its inherent power to declare rules of appellate procedure, reasoning that (Id., at p. 993, 55 Cal.Rptr .2d 771, 920 P.2d 716.)
More recently, in Ben C, the court held that LPSA conservatorship proceedings are not subject to Anders/Wende review. In applying the first two parts of the Sade C. analysis, which address the private and public interests at stake, the court noted that the LPSA furthered both private and public interests in, among other things, " (Ben C, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 540, 53 Cal.Rptr.3d 856,150 P.3d 738.)
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