People v. Tejada

• Decision Date: 25 March 1993
• Citation: 81 N.Y.2d 861,597 N.Y.S.2d 626,613 N.E.2d 532
• Parties: , 613 N.E.2d 532 The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Rawline TEJADA, Appellant.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 626

597 N.Y.S.2d 626

81 N.Y.2d 861, 613 N.E.2d 532

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Rawline TEJADA, Appellant.

Court of Appeals of New York.

March 25, 1993.

Kerry Elgarten and Philip L. Weinstein, New York City, for appellant.

Robert M. Morgenthau, Dist. Atty. of New York [81 N.Y.2d 862] County, New York City (Jeanne A. Olivo, Phyllis A. Monroe, Norman Barclay and Alan Gadlin, of counsel), for respondent.

OPINION OF THE COURT MEMORANDUM.

The order of the Appellate Division should be affirmed.

Defendant-appellant was convicted, after a nonjury trial, of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree, criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree, and criminally using drug paraphernalia in the second degree. The Appellate Division held his appeal to that Court in abeyance subject to a remittal for a hearing on defendant's motion to suppress evidence, which had been summarily denied for lack of standing. After conducting the hearing, Supreme Court held that defendant had automatic standing to challenge the seizure of the illegal drugs, since that count was rooted solely in the statutory presumption under Penal Law § 220.25(2). As to the remaining counts, however, Supreme Court held that the defendant would have standing only if he established a personal expectation of privacy.

On review of the entire judgment of conviction in that procedural context, the Appellate Division modified the judgment by reversing and dismissing the conviction for criminal possession of a controlled substance. It affirmed as to the remaining counts. 183 A.D.2d 500, 583 N.Y.S.2d 433. The only issue before this Court, on a grant of leave by a Judge of this Court, is whether the defendant should also have been accorded automatic standing to challenge the search and seizure of the weapon and drug paraphernalia. We agree with Supreme Court and the Appellate Division that well-settled principles lead to the conclusion that he should not.

We have held that where a criminal charge is predicated on ordinary constructive possession principles, standing is available only if the defendant "demonstrate[s] a personal legitimate expectation of privacy in the searched premises" (People v. Wesley, 73 N.Y.2d 351, 357, 540 N.Y.S.2d 757, 538 N.E.2d 76 [emphasis added]; People v. Rodriguez, 69 N.Y.2d 159, 162, 513 N.Y.S.2d 75, 505 N.E.2d 586). Defendant makes no claim of a personal expectation of privacy with respect to the apartment where the seizure occurred, which was not his residence. That the weapon and paraphernalia counts were rooted in ordinary constructive possession principles is also not controverted.

Nevertheless, defendant urges this Court extend the automatic standing exception to all situations where a statutorily presumptive possessory count is included among other criminal charges emanating from ordinary constructive possession. Such a change in the rule would extend the narrow exception of People v. Millan, 69 N.Y.2d 514, 518-519, 516 N.Y.S.2d 168, 508 N.E.2d 903 [1987], and render the exception the rule (see also, People v. Ponder, 54 N.Y.2d 160, 445 N.Y.S.2d 57, 429 N.E.2d 735 [1981]; People v. Rodriguez, 69 N.Y.2d 159, 513 N.Y.S.2d 75, 505 N.E.2d 586, supra [1987]; People v. Wesley, 73 N.Y.2d 351, 540 N.Y.S.2d 757, 538 N.E.2d 76, supra [1989].

This Court, over a decade ago, eliminated the automatic standing rule in New York and concluded that " 'it is entirely proper to require of one who seeks to challenge the legality of a search as the basis for suppressing relevant evidence that he * * * establish, that he himself was the victim of an invasion of privacy' " (People v. Ponder, supra, 54 N.Y.2d at 165, 445 N.Y.S.2d 57, 429 N.E.2d 735, quoting Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 261, 80 S.Ct. 725, 731, 4 L.Ed.2d 697). In People v. Rodriguez, after tracing the history of the standing requirement, the Court followed the path of Ponder and held, in circumstances very much like those present here, that the defendant's presence in an apartment in which he did not reside did not confer standing upon him to challenge the search and seizure in that apartment ( People v. Rodriguez, 69 N.Y.2d, at 165, 513 N.Y.S.2d 75, 505 N.E.2d 586, supra ). Shortly thereafter, we recognized a need and justification for a limited form of automatic standing, but only where the criminal possessory charge is rooted solely in a statutory presumption attributing possession to a defendant ( People v. Millan, 69 N.Y.2d, at 518-519, 516 N.Y.S.2d 168, 508 N.E.2d 903, supra ). Criminal charges arising out of ordinary constructive possession--like those at issue on this appeal--have remained subject to the general rule and to the rationale of People v. Wesley, 73 N.Y.2d 351, 540 N.Y.S.2d 757, 538 N.E.2d 76, supra, that the "unfairness * * * perceived in Millan is not present in cases where a defendant is charged with constructive possession on the basis of evidence other than the statutory presumption" (id., at 361, 540 N.Y.S.2d 757, 538 N.E.2d 76; see also, People v. Rodriguez, 69 N.Y.2d 159, 513 N.Y.S.2d 75, 505 N.E.2d 586, supra ).

Appellant's other arguments are unpreserved.

HANCOCK, Judge (dissenting).

It is basic that under our State and Federal Constitutions all evidence obtained as a direct result of an unlawful invasion by the State must be suppressed (see, e.g., Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 485, 83 S.Ct. 407, 416, 9 L.Ed.2d 441; People v. Stith, 69 N.Y.2d 313, 317-318, 514 N.Y.S.2d 201, 506 N.E.2d 911). Here, the police concededly entered and searched the apartment illegally and, as a direct result of that illegality, seized drugs, drug paraphernalia and a weapon. The courts below, however--instead of applying the exclusionary rule to all of the illegally obtained evidence--have suppressed only the drugs and have absolved the State from the consequences of the illegal police conduct with respect to the drug paraphernalia and the weapon. The justification offered for the obvious disparity--acknowledged by the Appellate Division to be an "apparent anomaly" (183 A.D.2d 500, 501, 583 N.Y.S.2d 433)--is found in an unprecedented application of the standing rule, not as a threshold bar to the challenge of the illegality but as a means of shielding the State from what would otherwise be the legal consequences of that illegality: suppression of the evidence by operation of the exclusionary rule. The majority now approves this result. Because I am convinced that this is a misuse of the standing doctrine which results in a deprivation of defendant's State and Federal constitutional rights and defeats the very purpose of the exclusionary rule, I dissent.

The doctrine of standing in challenges to illegal entries and searches is a judicially created rule "that--recognizing the rights protected by the Fourth Amendment as personal rights--limits invocation of the exclusionary remedy to persons whose own protection has been infringed by the search and seizure" (People v. Wesley, 73 N.Y.2d 351, 355, 540 N.Y.S.2d 757, 538 N.E.2d 76 [emphasis added]. Standing is a threshold determination as to "who is, or should be, entitled to enforce the prohibition against unreasonable searches" (id., at 355, 540 N.Y.S.2d 757, 538 N.E.2d 76). In cases where the defendant lacks standing the challenge is dismissed and no determination is made as to the legality of the police conduct (see, e.g., Wesley, supra; People v. Ponder, 54 N.Y.2d 160, 445 N.Y.S.2d 57, 429 N.E.2d 735).

The distinction between this case and cases such as Wesley and Ponder, of course, is that here the critical threshold determination has been made that defendant has standing to contest the violation of his constitutional rights--i.e., defendant is a person who has been a victim of the unlawful police conduct and is, therefore, "entitled to enforce the prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures" (Wesley, supra, 73 N.Y.2d at 355, 540 N.Y.S.2d 757, 538 N.E.2d 76). The Appellate Division has held that defendant "had standing to challenge the search, this because the People's...