People v. Stith

• Citation: 506 N.E.2d 911,69 N.Y.2d 313,514 N.Y.S.2d 201
• Parties: , 506 N.E.2d 911, 55 USLW 2566 The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Otis STITH and Cardell Newton, Appellants.
• Decision Date: 26 March 1987
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 201

514 N.Y.S.2d 201

69 N.Y.2d 313, 506 N.E.2d 911, 55 USLW 2566

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Otis STITH and Cardell Newton, Appellants.

Court of Appeals of New York.

March 26, 1987.

Isabelle Rawich, South Fallsburg, for Otis Stith, appellant.

Steven S. Katz, Liberty, for Cardell Newton, appellant.

Steven F. Lungen, Dist. Atty. (Bonnie M. Mitzner, Monticello, of counsel), for respondent.

OPINION OF THE COURT

HANCOCK, Judge.

Defendants were arrested and charged with criminal possession of a weapon when police officers discovered a loaded gun in a concededly unlawful search of the cab of a truck tractor following a traffic stop. Later, after it was discovered that the tractor was stolen, defendants were also charged with criminal possession of stolen property. In defendants' appeals from convictions on both charges, they argue that it was error to deny their motions to suppress the gun. The suppression court and the Appellate Division agreed that the search and seizure were in violation of defendants' constitutional rights. Nevertheless, both courts, applying the inevitable discovery rule, held that the evidence should not be excluded, reasoning that the gun would inevitably have been discovered during the inventory search following defendants' arrest when, as would shortly have been revealed in a routine registration check, the police learned that the truck was stolen. The sole issue is whether the inevitable discovery exception to the exclusionary rule was properly invoked in these circumstances. Because we conclude that it was not, the order of the Appellate Division, 124 A.D.2d 342, 507 N.Y.S.2d 283, should be modified. ^* The convictions for criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree should be reversed, the motions to suppress granted, and the weapon possession count in the indictment should be dismissed. The convictions for criminal possession of stolen property in the first degree should, however, be affirmed.

I

State Troopers Clifford and Figueroa, patrolling New York State Route 17 near Liberty, stopped defendants' truck tractor for speeding. Clifford asked the driver, defendant Newton, for a driver's license and registration. Newton produced a Connecticut driver's license, but was unable to locate a registration for the truck in the piles of papers strewn about the cab. Dissatisfied with Newton's attempts to find the registration, Clifford ordered Newton out of the truck and climbed in the driver's side to conduct his own search. Clifford saw a brown vinyl bag on the console between the seats. A logbook portfolio stuck out from an unzippered side pocket of the bag. On removing the portfolio, Clifford noticed the butt of a revolver inside the pocket. The troopers arrested both defendants for criminal possession of a weapon, handcuffed them, put them in the back of the police car, and took them to the Ferndale State Police barracks. On the trip to Ferndale, a radio check showed Newton's license to have expired and the truck to be stolen. Defendants were then charged with criminal possession of stolen property.

II

The exclusionary rule generally bars "from trial physical, tangible materials obtained either during or as a direct result of an unlawful invasion" (Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 485, 83 S.Ct. 407, 416, 9 L.Ed.2d 441; see, People v. Bethea, 67 N.Y.2d 364, 502 N.Y.S.2d 713, 493 N.E.2d 937; People v. Johnson, 66 N.Y.2d 398, 497 N.Y.S.2d 618, 488 N.E.2d 439; People v. Bigelow, 66 N.Y.2d 417, 497 N.Y.S.2d 630, 488 N.E.2d 451; People v. Gokey, 60 N.Y.2d 309, 469 N.Y.S.2d 618, 457 N.E.2d 723; People v. Elwell, 50 N.Y.2d 231, 428 N.Y.S.2d 655, 406 N.E.2d 471; cf., People v. Arnau, 58 N.Y.2d 27, 457 N.Y.S.2d 763, 444 N.E.2d 13). A prime purpose of the rule is to deter police misconduct (see, Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 442-443, 104 S.Ct. 2501, 2508-2509, 81 L.Ed.2d 377; People v. Bigelow, 66 N.Y.2d 417, 427, 497 N.Y.S.2d 630, 488 N.E.2d 451, supra ). It has been recognized, however, "that in some circumstances strict adherence to the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule imposes greater cost on the legitimate demands of law enforcement than can be justified by the rule's deterrent purposes" (Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 608-609, 95 S.Ct. 2254, 2264, 45 L.Ed.2d 416 [Powell, J., concurring in part] ). Thus, courts have held that evidence should not be suppressed if knowledge of it "is gained from an independent source" (Silverthorne Lbr. Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392, 40 S.Ct. 182, 183, 64 L.Ed. 319; People v. Arnau, 58 N.Y.2d 27, 457 N.Y.S.2d 763, 444 N.E.2d 13, supra ). Similarly, "the detrimental consequences of illegal police action [may] become so attenuated" that the taint of the initial misconduct is dissipated (Brown v. Illinois, supra, 422 U.S. at 609, 95 S.Ct. at 2264 [Powell, J., concurring in part] ). Sufficient attenuation to avoid application of the exclusionary rule has been found when the linkage between the police misconduct and that evidence is interrupted by interveni events (see, e.g., Wong Sun v. United States, supra, 371 U.S. at 491, 83 S.Ct. at 419; People v. Graham, 90 A.D.2d 198, 200-203, 457 N.Y.S.2d 962, cert. denied 464 U.S. 896, 104 S.Ct. 246, 78 L.Ed.2d 234) or becomes overly extended and weakened by passage of time (see, e.g., People v. Minley, 112 A.D.2d 712, 492 N.Y.S.2d 199, affd. 68 N.Y.2d 952, 510 N.Y.S.2d 87, 502 N.E.2d 1002; People v. Miller, 105 A.D.2d 1127, 1128, 482 N.Y.S.2d 193; see generally, 3 LaFave, Search and Seizure § 11.4, at 614-621). The question is " 'whether, granting the establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence to which instant objection is made has been come at by exploitation of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint' " (Wong Sun v. United States, supra, 371 U.S. at 488, 83 S.Ct. at 417, quoting Maguire, Evidence of Guilt, at 221 [1959] ).

Applying this same rationale courts have refused to suppress evidence if it can be shown by "a very high degree of probability" (People v. Payton, 45 N.Y.2d 300, 313, 408 N.Y.S.2d 395, 380 N.E.2d 224, revd. 445 U.S. 573, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639, on remand 51 N.Y.2d 169, 433 N.Y.S.2d 61, 412 N.E.2d 1288) that the evidence sought to be suppressed would inevitably have been discovered irrespective of the initial wrong. Like the independent source and attenuated connection exceptions to the exclusionary rule, the inevitable discovery exception is based on the perception that in certain circumstances the interest of society is better served by having relevant and material evidence admitted in criminal cases than by deterring police misconduct through the exclusion of evidence unlawfully acquired (see, Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 442-443, 104 S.Ct. 2501, 2508-2509, 81 L.Ed.2d 377, supra ).

Although the inevitable discovery rule has for several years been established law in this State (see, People v. Payton, supra; People v. Fitzpatrick, 32 N.Y.2d 499, 346 N.Y.S.2d 793, 300 N.E.2d 139; cf., People v. Knapp, 52 N.Y.2d 689, 439 N.Y.S.2d 871, 422 N.E.2d 531), our court has never applied the rule where, as here, the evidence sought to be suppressed is the very evidence obtained in the illegal search. In People v. Fitzpatrick (supra) and People v. Payton (supra), as in Nix v. Williams (supra), the evidence saved from suppression by the inevitable discovery rule was not evidence illegally obtained during or as the immediate consequence of the challenged police conduct. It was evidence obtained indirectly as a result of leads or information gained from that primary evidence. In Fitzpatrick, for example, the evidence the court declined to exclude was a gun found in a closet as a result of information obtained in an illegally acquired statement. In Payton we applied the rule to information linking the defendant to the murder weapon which was discovered by tracing a sales slip found in the initial illegal search. Similarly, in Nix v. Williams the Supreme Court, in adopting the inevitable discovery rule, held that evidence obtained through defendant's illegally elicited statements (the location of the body of the victim) should not have been suppressed because it would inevitably have been discovered in a search which was already in progress.

When the inevitable discovery rule is applied to secondary evidence, as in Payton, Fitzpatrick and Nix, the effect is not to excuse the unlawful police actions by admitting what was obtained as a direct result of the initial misconduct. It is not the tainted evidence that is admitted, but only what comes from it as a result of further police investigation. The rationale is that when the secondary evidence would have been found independently in any event, "the prosecution [should not be] put in a worse position simply because of some earlier police error or misconduct" (Nix v. Williams, supra, 467 U.S. at 443, 104 S.Ct. at 2508; emphasis in original). In contrast,...