People v. Thibeault

• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division
• Writing for the Court: KAVANAGH
• Citation: People v. Thibeault, 900 N.Y.S.2d 501, 73 A.D.3d 1237 (N.Y. App. Div. 2010)
• Decision Date: 06 May 2010
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Charles R. THIBEAULT Sr., Appellant.

900 N.Y.S.2d 501

73 A.D.3d 1237

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent,

v.Charles R. THIBEAULT Sr., Appellant.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Department, New York.

May 6, 2010.

Cynthia Feathers, Saratoga Springs, for appellant.

Mark D. Suben, District Attorney, Cortland, for respondent.

Before: CARDONA, P.J., MERCURE, SPAIN, KAVANAGH and GARRY, JJ.

KAVANAGH, J.

Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of Cortland County (Campbell, J.), rendered April 23, 2009, upon a verdict convicting defendant of the crimes of murder in the second degree, burglary in the first degree, criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree and criminal contempt in the first degree.

On the evening of May 26, 2008, the bloody and half-clad body of defendant's estranged wife was found at the bottom ofthe staircase inside their home. An autopsy subsequently determined that the victim had been assaulted and while she lay at the bottom of the staircase her voice box was crushed and she was strangled to death. At the time of the victim's death, the parties' 23-year marriage had badly deteriorated and they were living apart pursuant to an order of protection that the victim had obtained because defendant had previously assaulted her and, during the course of that assault, attempted to choke her. After traces of defendant's DNA were found on the blood-stained shirt that the victim was wearing on the day of her death and her DNA was recovered from a blood spot found on a truck that defendant was driving on the night of the attack, defendant was charged by indictment with murder in the second degree, burglary in the first degree, criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree ¹ and criminal contempt in the first degree. After trial, defendant was convicted as charged and anaggregate prison term of 25 years to life was imposed as his sentence. Defendant now appeals.

Defendant has consistently maintained that he is innocent of any wrongdoing, and on this appeal argues, among other things, that his conviction of these crimes is not supported by legally sufficient evidence, the jury's verdict is against the weight of the credible evidence and evidence was improperly admitted that served to deprive him of a fair trial.² We disagree.

Throughout this trial, the prosecution based much of its claim that defendant committed this murder on the fact that circumstantial evidence found at the crime scene strongly suggested that the perpetrator knew the victim, had access to her home and entered it intending to harm her. In that regard, it was established that force was not used to gain entry into the victim's home, nor does it appear that any money or property was forcibly taken from the victim during the attack.³ In addition, the postmortem examination confirmed that, while the victim had been battered and bruised during the attack, she was not sexually assaulted. Moreover, the manner of her death-the sheer ferocity of the attack and the fact that the victim died from manual strangulation after she was seriously injured and while she lay helpless on the bottom of the staircase-provides compelling corroboration for the prosecution's contention that this was an attack deliberately aimed at the victim by someone who harbored a deep-seated hatred for her.

The evidence at trial established that the only person in the victim's life who had such a motive and posed a genuine threat to her physical well-being at the time of her death was defendant. As previously noted, an order of protection was in place at the time of the murder barring defendant from the marital residence and prohibiting him from having any contact with the victim. It was also established that, inthe days leading up to the murder, defendant repeatedly violated the terms of this order and, in retrospect, engaged in conduct that had ominous implications for the victim's welfare and physical safety. For example, on May 12, 2008, some two weeks prior to the murder, defendant was caught on film by a store security camera walkingbehind the victim as she entered a local grocery store and then leaving the store without making any purchases immediately after the victim had exited the premises. It also appears from the video that the victim, at some point while in the store, realized that defendant was present because she suddenly ends her shopping, abandons her grocery cart and abruptly leaves the premises without making any purchases or carrying any packages. In addition, after his arrest, defendant admitted to his sister that on the night prior to the murder he had been in the vicinity of the marital residence surveilling the victim. This conduct certainly puts in its proper perspective why the victim felt the need to have friends stay overnight with her at the marital residence and why she told them of her mortal fear of defendant. Also, evidence was produced at trial that defendant knew the victim would be alone until 7:00 P.M. on the night she was murdered and, on that date, had keys that gave him ready access to the premises. In addition, defendant was seen later that evening with fresh scratch marks on his arm not long after the attack on the victim had taken place. Finally, the DNA findings provided a link that connected defendant with the crime scene and the victim and, when considered with the other evidence, established his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and that the verdict was supported by the weight of the credible evidence ( see People v. Romero, 7 N.Y.3d 633, 643-644, 826 N.Y.S.2d 163, 859 N.E.2d 902 [2006]; People v. Smith, 63 A.D.3d 1301, 1303, 880 N.Y.S.2d 760 [2009], lv. denied 13 A.D.3d 862, 785 N.Y.S.2d 796 [2009] ).

In making this determination, we have taken into account defendant's arguments made at trial as to the condition of the patio door and the timeline of his activities on the day of the murder, which he claims serve to create a reasonable doubt as a matter of law as to his guilt. However, even if the jury fully embraced defendant's interpretation of this evidence, it still did not make it impossible or even improbable that he committed this crime. Weighing the conflicting testimony and conflicting inferences that flowed from this evidence, and given the deference that is traditionally accorded a jury's credibility determinations, we conclude that "the jury was justified in finding defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt" ( People v. Danielson, 9 N.Y.3d 342, 348, 849 N.Y.S.2d 480, 880 N.E.2d 1 [2007]; see People v. Levy, 52 A.D.3d 1025, 1026, 859 N.Y.S.2d 527 [2008] ).

We disagree with defendant's contention that it was error for County Court to allow into evidence a description of the circumstances that led to the issuance of the order of protection or to permit testimony regarding statements made by the victim to third parties to the effect that she was afraid of defendant. Theorder of protection, as well as its terms and conditions, were admitted to prove an essential element of the criminal contempt charge ( see Penal Law § 215.51[b] ), and evidence regarding the surrounding circumstances that led to it being issued was relevant in establishing defendant's "motive and intent to assault his victim," as well as to provide "necessary background information" on the status of the victim's relationship with defendant at the time of her murder ( People v. Dorm, 12 N.Y.3d 16, 19, 874 N.Y.S.2d 866, 903 N.E.2d 263 [2009]; see People v. Till, 87 N.Y.2d 835, 837, 637 N.Y.S.2d 681, 661 N.E.2d 153 [1995]; People v. Colbert, 60 A.D.3d 1209, 1212, 875 N.Y.S.2d 339 [2009]; People v. Timmons, 54 A.D.3d 883, 885, 864 N.Y.S.2d 111 [2008], lv. denied 12 N.Y.3d 822, 881 N.Y.S.2d 30, 908 N.E.2d 938 [2009]; People v. Beriguete, 51 A.D.3d 939, 940, 858 N.Y.S.2d 369 [2008], lv. denied 11 N.Y.3d 734, 864 N.Y.S.2d 393, 894 N.E.2d 657 [2008]; People v. Westerling, 48 A.D.3d 965, 966, 852 N.Y.S.2d 429 [2008]; People v. Gorham, 17 A.D.3d 858, 860, 793 N.Y.S.2d 281 [2005] ). Moreover, County Court advised the jury in what context this evidence could be considered and gave appropriate instructions regarding its limited relevance ( see People v. Poquee, 9 A.D.3d 781, 782, 780 N.Y.S.2d 247 [2004], lv. denied 3 N.Y.3d 741, 786 N.Y.S.2d 821, 820 N.E.2d 300 [2004] ). We also note that the court's decision to admit this evidence was part of a measured effort to achieve an appropriate balance that addressed the legitimate needs of defendant as well as the prosecution and, in that vein, denied the prosecution's request to present other evidence of domestic violence involving defendant and his former wife.

As for the testimony of the witnesses who stayed overnight with the victim to provide her with company and protection, no claim has been made that this arrangement did not exist or that defendant was not aware of it. In fact, defendant does not contend that his wife never made statements-attributed to her by these witnesses-that she feared defendant or that at the time of her death he was not aware that she was deeply afraid of him. Instead, he argues that this testimony and, in particular, any reference to statements made by the victim to these witnesses constituted hearsay and should not have been admitted as evidence at trial. While it is true that these witnesses did describe what the victim had told them about defendant, this testimony was needed to establish why they were staying with the victim overnight at her home and why, instead of sleeping in her own room, the victim insisted on staying on the floor next to her guests while they slept on the living room couch ( see People v. Dorm, 12 N.Y.3d at 19, 874 N.Y.S.2d 866, 903 N.E.2d 263; People v. Till, 87 N.Y.2d at 837, 637 N.Y.S.2d 681, 661 N.E.2d 153). Moreover, the credibility of these witnesses and the reliability of their testimony has not been seriously questioned, and its relevance to the core issue raised during this trial-defendant's identity as the perpetrator of this brutal crime-is undeniable ( see People...