People v. Thomas

• Decision Date: 04 November 1996
• Parties: The PEOPLE, etc., Respondent, v. Darel THOMAS, Appellant.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

Page 817

649 N.Y.S.2d 817

233 A.D.2d 347

The PEOPLE, etc., Respondent, v. Darel THOMAS, Appellant.

Supreme Court of New York, Appellate Division,

Second Department.

Nov. 4, 1996.

Donald L. Schechter, Great Neck, for appellant.

Richard A. Brown, District Attorney, Kew Gardens (John M. Castellano, Linda Cantoni, and Catherine Murphy, of counsel), for respondent.

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Griffin, J.), rendered October 5, 1994, convicting him of robbery in the first degree and robbery in the second degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence. The appeal brings up for review the denial, after a hearing, of the branch of the defendant's omnibus motion which was to suppress statements made by the defendant to law enforcement authorities.

ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.

Contrary to the defendant's contention, his statements were properly admitted into evidence. It is well settled that "where a person in police custody has been issued Miranda warnings and voluntarily and intelligently waives those rights, it is not necessary to repeat the warnings prior to subsequent questioning within a reasonable time thereafter, so long as the custody remained continuous" (People v. Glinsman, 107 A.D.2d 710, 484 N.Y.S.2d 64, cert. denied 472 U.S. 1021, 105 S.Ct. 3487, 87 L.Ed.2d 621). Here, after the defendant waived his Miranda rights, he remained in continuous custody for approximately seven hours before making the inculpatory statements. Therefore, additional warnings were unnecessary (see, e.g., People v. Baker, 208 A.D.2d 758, 617 N.Y.S.2d 798; People v. Stanton, 162 A.D.2d 987, 557 N.Y.S.2d 782; People v. Williams, 137 A.D.2d 568, 524 N.Y.S.2d 462).

The issue of the legal sufficiency of the evidence is unpreserved for appellate review (see, CPL 470.05[2] ). In any event, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the People (see, People v. Contes, 60 N.Y.2d 620, 467 N.Y.S.2d 349, 454 N.E.2d 932), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Moreover, upon the exercise of our factual review power, we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt was not against the weight of the evidence (see, CPL 470.15[5] ). Resolution of issues of credibility, as well as the weight to be accorded to the evidence presented, are primarily for the jury which saw and heard the witnesses (see, People v. Gaimari, 176 N.Y. 84, 68 N.E. 112). The jury's...