People v. Thomas
| Decision Date | 24 March 1970 |
| Docket Number | No. 42164,42164 |
| Citation | 45 Ill.2d 68,256 N.E.2d 794 |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. William THOMAS, Appellant. |
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
Peter John, Chicago, for appellant.
William J. Scott, Atty. Gen., Springfield, and Edward V. Hanrahan, State's Atty., Chicago (James B. Zagel, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Elmer C. Kissane and Michael Scott Cisney, Asst. State's Attys., of counsel) for the People.
This is an appeal by defendant, William Thomas, from an order of the circuit court of Cook County dismissing a petition seeking relief under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1967, ch. 38, par. 122--1 et seq.) The single issue presented is the recurring problem of the application of the statutory limitations for the filing of petitions under the Act.
Pertinent facts show that defendant, on June 18, 1959, pleaded guilty in the circuit court to crimes of selling and possessing narcotics, and was sentenced to two concurrent terms in the penitentiary. At that time the Post-Conviction Hearing Act provided: 'No proceeding under this Act shall be commenced more than five years after rendition of final judgment, or more than three years after the effective date of this act, whichever is later, unless the petitioner alleges facts showing that the delay was not due to his culpable negligence.' (Ill.Rev.Stat.1957, ch. 38, par. 826.) Six days after being sentenced in the circuit court, defendant was confined in a Federal prison under a Federal conviction. After three and one-half years or in November, 1962, he was released and started serving the sentences imposed by the circuit court. At the time, the provision of the Post-Conviction Hearing Act quoted above was still in full force and effect. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1961, ch. 38, par. 826.) On June 13, 1968, approximately nine years after sentence had been imposed in the circuit court and in excess of five years after his release from Federal prison, defendant filed the post-conviction petition at issue in this appeal. At that time, due to an amendment enacted in 1965, the limitation provision of the post-conviction act provided: 'No proceedings under this Article shall be commenced more than 20 years after rendition of final judgment, unless the petitioner alleges facts showing that the delay was not due to his culpable negligence.' (Ill.Rev.Stat.1967, ch. 38, par. 122--1.) It is defendant's contention that the 20-year period of limitation applies, whereas it is contended by the People that the 5-year period, in effect when sentences were imposed, controls.
For the most part, the facts here are quite similar to those which confronted us in People v. Reed, 42 Ill.2d 169, 246 N.E.2d 238. In that case Reed was convicted and sentenced on July 15, 1958, when the limitation period was five years, and filed a post-conviction petition on July 13, 1967, when, as a result of the 1965 amendment, the period had been increased to 20 years. And in affirming an order which had dismissed the petition, we held that the five-year period in effect when final judgment was rendered was the applicable limitation, that such 5-year period had expired when the petition was filed, and that the 1965 amendment neither revived the expired right to proceed under the act nor created a new right in Reed to do so. In short, we held that the 1965 amendment could not be given retroactive effect under the circumstances presented.
Recognizing that Reed is determinative, defendant asks that we reconsider its holding in light of his contentions that a legislative intent for the retroactive application of the 20-year limitation period is found in the language and history of the statute. Based principally upon the language of the initial sentence of section 122--1 which, as amended in 1965, provided: 'Any person imprisoned in the penitentiary * * * may institute a proceeding under this Article' (emphasis defendant's; Ill.Rev.Stat.1965, ch. 38, par. 122--1), defendant, by two different approaches we deem unnecessary to detail, contends it was the legislative intent that post-conviction procedure was to be available to all persons incarcerated in the penitentiary regardless of the dates of their convictions, provided only that the proceeding be initiated sometime within a 20-year period of incarceration. Or, viewed from another perspective, defendant sees the 20-year limitation subsequently provided for in the section as relating to the opening sentence of the section rather than to the language immediately preceding the limitation. However, the entire section must be read to ascertain the legislative intent. What is more, it is a basic canon of statutory construction that relative or qualifying words, phrases or clauses are to be applied to the wrods or phrases immediately preceding, and not as extending to or including other words, phrases or clauses more remote, unless the intent of the legislature disclosed by the context and a reading of the entire statute requires such extension or inclusion. Stevens v. Illinois Central R.R. Co., 306 Ill. 370, 137 N.E. 859; 34 I.L.P., Statutes, § 120.
As amended in 1965, section 122--1, in its entirety, provided as follows: ...
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...important to note that "whom the city intended and permitted" (emphasis added) refers to and modifies "people." See People v. Thomas (1970), 45 Ill.2d 68, 256 N.E.2d 794. The other limitation in section 3-102(a), "use the property in a manner in which and at such times as it was reasonably ......
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