People v. Thompson

• Decision Date: 08 July 2010
• Citation: 904 N.Y.S.2d 797,75 A.D.3d 760
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Craig THOMPSON, Also Known as Fella, Also Known as Money, Appellant.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

904 N.Y.S.2d 797

75 A.D.3d 760

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent,

v.Craig THOMPSON, Also Known as Fella, Also Known as Money, Appellant.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Department, New York.

July 8, 2010.

Paul J. Connolly, Delmar, for appellant, and appellant pro se.

Robert M. Carney, District Attorney, Schenectady (Gerald A. Dwyer of counsel), for respondent.

Before: SPAIN, J.P., LAHTINEN, STEIN, McCARTHY and GARRY, JJ.

STEIN, J.

Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of Schenectady County (Hoye, J.), rendered December 18, 2008, upon a verdict convicting defendant of the crimes of murder in the second degree, criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree, reckless endangerment in the first degree, tampering with physical evidence (two counts) and criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree.

Defendant was indicted for various crimes relating to the shooting death of Hassan Rainey. Defendant and his friends, Kassun Brown and Keith Dunbar, as well as Rainey, were all involved with selling drugs and had a dispute over money and drug sales during late August and early September 2007. On September 12, 2007, Dunbar was shot in the shoulder during an incident in which Rainey was involved. The next day, after Dunbar was discharged from the hospital, defendant was driving around in his minivan with Brown and Dunbar ¹ and came upon Rainey in his car at a red light. At defendant's urging, Brown pulled up alongside Rainey's vehicle in such a way that the passenger-side door of the minivan was lined up with Rainey's driver-side door. Defendant and Brown then shot at Rainey's vehicle and fled. It was subsequently determined that a .40 caliber bullet caused Rainey's death.

Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of murder in the second degree, criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree, reckless endangerment in the first degree, tampering with physical evidence (two counts) and criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree. Defendant was thereafter sentencedto an aggregate prison term of 27 2/3 years to life. Defendant appeals.

Defendant challenges the legal sufficiency and/or weight of the evidence presented in support of his convictions. A conviction is based on legally sufficient evidence when, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the People, " 'there is a valid line of reasoning and permissible inferences from which a rational jury could have found the elements of the crime proved beyond a reasonable doubt' " ( People v. Acosta, 80 N.Y.2d 665, 672, 593 N.Y.S.2d 978, 609 N.E.2d 518 [1993], quoting People v. Steinberg, 79 N.Y.2d 673, 681-682, 584 N.Y.S.2d 770, 595 N.E.2d 845 [1992]; see People v. Haskell, 68 A.D.3d 1358, 1359, 890 N.Y.S.2d 718 [2009] ). In reviewing whether convictions are supported by the weight of the evidence, we consider the evidence in a neutral light, accord deference to the jury's credibility determinations and, where a contrary verdict would not have been unreasonable, " 'weigh the relative probative force of conflicting testimony and the relative strength of conflicting inferences that may be drawn from the testimony' " ( People v. Bleakley, 69 N.Y.2d 490, 495, 515 N.Y.S.2d 761, 508 N.E.2d 672 [1987], quoting People ex rel. MacCracken v. Miller, 291 N.Y. 55, 62, 50 N.E.2d 542 [1943]; see People v. Johnson, 70 A.D.3d 1188, 1189-1190, 896 N.Y.S.2d 199 [2010] ).

With regard to his conviction of reckless endangerment in the first degree, we agree with defendant's contention that the evidence was legally insufficient to demonstrate a grave risk of death to Sharon Alexander ( see Penal Law § 120.25), the only potential victim who County Court referenced in its charge to the jury. Alexander testified that she was walking down the street when defendant's minivan pulled up alongside Rainey's vehicle and stopped, whereupon several shots were fired from the passenger side window. No evidence was presented that defendant was aiming in Alexander's direction or that she was in or near the line of fire ( see People v. Bennett, 193 A.D.2d 808, 809, 598 N.Y.S.2d 84 [1993]; see also People v. Sallitto, 125 A.D.2d 345, 346, 508 N.Y.S.2d 612 [1986], lv. denied 69 N.Y.2d 833, 513 N.Y.S.2d 1041, 506 N.E.2d 552 [1987]; compare People v. Watson, 299 A.D.2d 735, 737, 753 N.Y.S.2d 530 [2002], lvs. denied 99 N.Y.2d 627, 633, 760 N.Y.S.2d 108, 115, 790 N.E.2d 282, 289 [2003]; People v. Teets, 293 A.D.2d 766, 767, 742 N.Y.S.2d 641 [2002], lv. denied 100 N.Y.2d 543, 763 N.Y.S.2d 9, 793 N.E.2d 423 [2003] ). To the contrary, Alexander testified that she was about three houses from the corner where the shots were fired, that she was on the minivan's driver side and that the shots were fired in the opposite direction of where she was located. Under the circumstances, the evidence did not support a finding that defendant's conduct posed a grave risk of death to Alexander ( see People v. Davis, 72 N.Y.2d 32, 36-37, 530 N.Y.S.2d 529, 526 N.E.2d 20 [1988] ). Accordingly, defendant's conviction of reckless endangerment in the first degree must be reversed.

We also agree with defendant's assertion that his convictionof criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree is not supported by legally sufficient evidence. For defendant to be found guilty of this crime, the People were required to prove, among other things, that he knowingly possessed a loaded firearm between August 20 and 27, 2007 ( see Penal Law § 265.01[1] ). While Adrian Scott testified that he saw a .40 caliber gun at Dunbar's apartment and there was other testimony that such gun belonged to defendant, there was no evidence that defendant was present at Dunbar's apartment or otherwise in possession of the gun during the relevant time. Thus, defendant's conviction of criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree must also be reversed.

We disagree, however, with defendant's contention that his convictions of murder in the second degree and criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree were against the weight of the evidence because they were predicated on the testimony of incredible witnesses. Both Brown and Dunbar testified that, on September 13, 2007, defendant possessed the loaded .40 caliber gun that killed Rainey and that defendant fired the fatal shot. Dunbar also testified that, after they left the scene, defendant stated, "I think I hit him" and two other witnesses testified that defendant admitted to them that he killed Rainey. Rainey's cousin, who was riding in the passenger seat of Rainey's vehicle during the attack, testified that the shots came from the passenger side of the minivan and that the shooter's build was consistent with defendant's.

The foregoing testimony was sufficient to establish the elements of murder in the second degree and criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree ( see Penal Law § 125.25[1]; § 265.03[1][b]). While there were some minor inconsistencies between the witnesses' accounts of the events, there was no inconsistency between the accounts provided by Brown and Dunbar, the witnesses who were presentat the time of the shooting. The fact that some of the witnesses' testimony was given in connection with cooperation agreements with the People, and that such witnesses received some benefit as a result thereof, does not render their testimony incredible as a matter of law ( see People v. Rodriguez, 68 A.D.3d 1351, 1353, 890 N.Y.S.2d 735 [2009], lv. denied 14 N.Y.3d 804, 899 N.Y.S.2d 139, 925 N.E.2d 943 [2010]; People v. Vargas, 60 A.D.3d 1236, 1238, 875 N.Y.S.2d 625 [2009], lv. denied 13 N.Y.3d 750, 886 N.Y.S.2d 104, 914 N.E.2d 1022 [2009] ), especially when considered cumulatively ( see People v. Rodriguez, 68 A.D.3d at 1353, 890 N.Y.S.2d 735; People v. Littebrant, 55 A.D.3d 1151, 1155, 867 N.Y.S.2d 550 [2008], lv. denied 12 N.Y.3d 818, 881 N.Y.S.2d 26, 908 N.E.2d 934 [2009] ). According deference to the jury's credibility determinations, particularly in light of their opportunity to view the witnesses and assess their demeanor ( see People v. Haskell, 68 A.D.3d at 1360, 890 N.Y.S.2d 718; People v. Rodriguez, 68 A.D.3d at 1352-1353, 890 N.Y.S.2d 735), we do not find that these verdicts were against the weight of the evidence.

We turn next to defendant's challenges to the proof relating to his convictions of tampering with physical evidence. As relevant here, one is guilty of tampering with physical evidence where, "[b]elieving that certain physical evidence is about to be produced or used in an official proceeding or a prospective official proceeding, and intending to prevent such production or use, he [or she] suppresses it by any act of concealment, alteration or destruction" (Penal Law § 215.40[2] ). With regard to the charge that defendant concealed the minivan used in the shooting, defendant stipulated that the vehicle was involved in the shooting and that it was thereafter driven to the City of Utica, Oneida County with his knowledge. Janae Wilson testified that defendant drove the minivan to her residence in Utica and placed it in the back of the house. The evidence further established that the minivan was subsequently sold to a third party in New York City.

As to the charge that defendant tampered with the .40 caliber gun that was involved in the shooting, defendant contends that the only evidence of his guilt was Scott's testimony that defendant admitted that he "got rid of it, broke it down." Defendant argues that, inasmuch as his admission was uncorroborated, such evidence was legally insufficient to support his conviction. While it is true that a conviction cannot be predicated solely upon evidence of a defendant's confession or admission without additional proof that the offense charged has been committed ( see CPL 60.50), the rule requiring corroboration "is satisfied by the production of some proof, of whatever weight, that a crime was committed by someone" ( People v. Daniels, 37 N.Y.2d 624, 629, 376 N.Y.S.2d 436,...