People v. Thompson
Decision Date | 01 June 2006 |
Docket Number | No. S130174.,S130174. |
Citation | 38 Cal.4th 811,43 Cal.Rptr.3d 750,135 P.3d 3 |
Court | California Supreme Court |
Parties | The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Daniel Lyon THOMPSON, Defendant and Appellant. |
Richard B. Lennon, Los Angeles, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant.
Thomas W. Sneddon, Jr., District Attorney, and Gerald McC. Franklin, Deputy District Attorney, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
David Labahn, Sacramento; George Kennedy, District Attorney (Santa Clara) and Neal J. Kimball, Deputy District Attorney, for California District Attorneys Association as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Respondent.
A concerned citizen followed defendant, who was driving dangerously and under the influence of alcohol, through the streets of Santa Barbara in the early evening of July 21, 2003. Although defendant sped away and managed to get home, the police, with that citizen's assistance, arrived at the house a short time later. The officers spoke to defendant, who remained inside the house and was visibly intoxicated. When defendant refused to come outside to have his blood tested for the presence of alcohol, the police became anxious about the dissipation of alcohol in his bloodstream and entered the house without a warrant to arrest him for the criminal offense of driving under the influence (DUI).
Relying on Welsh v. Wisconsin (1984) 466 U.S. 740, 104 S.Ct. 2091, 80 L.Ed.2d 732 (Welsh), the Court of Appeal determined that the Fourth Amendment categorically prohibits warrantless entries into the home to effect a DUI arrest when the asserted exigency is merely to prevent the destruction of blood-alcohol evidence. Based on its conclusion that the arrest was unlawful, the Court of Appeal suppressed all the evidence seized during and after the warrantless entry.
Because the Court of Appeal has misread Welsh and because exigent circumstances justified the warrantless entry to effect the DUI arrest here, we reverse the Court of Appeal. We therefore need not consider the People's additional argument that even if the arrest violated the Fourth Amendment, evidence seized outside the home subsequent to the arrest—including the results of a blood-alcohol test—are nonetheless admissible under New York v. Harris (1990) 495 U.S. 14, 110 S.Ct. 1640, 109 L.Ed.2d 13.
On July 21, 2003, Madelene Orvos returned to her apartment complex in Santa Barbara from a walk at the beach with her dogs. She found defendant Daniel Lyon Thompson passed out in a white Ford Bronco in her assigned parking space. A neighbor came out, woke defendant up, and asked him to leave. Before defendant left, Orvos saw him stumble around, toss an empty vodka bottle out of the Bronco, and pass out a second time in the vehicle. She could tell he was intoxicated.
Having seen defendant in this condition on many prior occasions, Orvos decided this time to follow defendant and called 911 to report the situation as she got into her car. Defendant ran a red light and drove about 70 miles per hour when he got onto the freeway, at one point going "way to his right ... close to the concrete on the side of the road." He exited the freeway and turned right onto State Street from the center lane. After defendant turned right onto South Ontare Road, Orvos fell behind because he was running stop signs and driving too fast in a neighborhood where children were present. Fortunately, Santa Barbara Police Officer Adrian Gutierrez arrived at 7:15 p.m., just as Orvos lost track of the Bronco. Gutierrez instructed Orvos to wait at the parking lot of the nearby golf course while he continued the pursuit.
Officer Gutierrez proceeded to 3610 San Jose Lane, which was the address of the Bronco's registered owner, and found the white Bronco parked in front. When Officer Ryan Dejohn arrived to assist, Gutierrez went back to update Orvos and ask her to follow him to identify the vehicle. After Orvos did so, Gutierrez touched the hood of the vehicle and discovered the hood was warm, indicating the Bronco had been driven very recently. He and Dejohn approached the front door, which was wide open, and rang the doorbell.
Slavka Kovarick answered the door. Officer Dejohn asked her who had been driving the Bronco. Kovarick said that Daniel owned the vehicle. Dejohn asked to speak to him, but Kovarick said he was asleep. When Dejohn asked whether she could wake Daniel up, Kovarick entered a bedroom directly to the left of the front door. She remained there a few moments and came back to tell them she could not wake Daniel up. She also refused to let the officers inside and instead walked away.
Officer Dejohn heard people speaking softly down the hall and then saw a tall shirtless White male, about 45 years old, leave the house and go into the backyard. This man, later identified as defendant, matched the description Orvos had provided of the driver. When defendant turned around, he made eye contact with Dejohn, who motioned for him to come to the front door. Defendant reentered the house and approached the officers by exiting the bedroom door near the entryway. He was staggering or swaying slightly, slurring his speech, and gave off a strong odor of alcohol. Dejohn, who addressed defendant as Daniel, explained that they suspected him of driving under the influence of alcohol and wanted to talk to him and perform some tests, but defendant refused to cooperate. As defendant began to walk away, Dejohn entered the house. He was afraid defendant might flee, so he placed his hand on defendant's shoulder. Defendant turned around and grabbed the doorjamb to the bedroom near the entryway. Officer Gutierrez entered the house only to assist Dejohn in effecting the arrest.
After defendant was handcuffed, Orvos identified defendant as the driver. His blood test revealed a blood-alcohol level of 0.21 percent. On the way to the jail, defendant told Officer Dejohn, "I'll kick your fucking ass."
Following a hearing on defendant's motion to suppress, the trial court found there was probable cause to arrest defendant based on Orvos's report of the driver's behavior, defendant's resemblance to the description Orvos had provided of the driver, and defendant's visible intoxication. Under these circumstances, it was a "reasonable implication" that defendant was the driver. Relying on People v. Hampton (1985) 164 Cal.App.3d 27, 209 Cal.Rptr 905, the trial court also found that the warrantless entry to arrest defendant was justified by exigent circumstances—i.e., the need to preserve the evidence of defendant's blood-alcohol level.
Defendant then pleaded no contest to driving with a blood-alcohol level in excess of 0.08 percent (Veh.Code, § 23152, subd. (b)) and to resisting an officer in the performance of his duties (Pen.Code, § 148, subd. (a)(1)) and admitted two prior convictions within the meaning of Vehicle Code section 23546. He was sentenced to 24 months, execution of which was suspended for three years under specified conditions.
A divided panel of the Appellate Division of the Santa Barbara County Superior Court affirmed the denial of the suppression motion, relying on "[t]he exigencies of preventing defendant from fleeing and possibly again driving while intoxicated, and of preserving evidence of his blood alcohol content." The Court of Appeal transferred the matter under rule 62 of the California Rules of Court and reversed in a published opinion. The court disagreed that defendant "was likely to flee and again drive while intoxicated" and declared that the likelihood evidence of driving under the influence would be concealed or destroyed by the passage of time could not justify a warrantless entry into a residence under Welsh.
We granted the People's petition for review.
(Devenpeck v. Alford (2004) 543 U.S. 146, 152, 125 S.Ct. 588, 160 L.Ed.2d 537.) When, as here, the arrest occurs in the home, additional principles come into play. "It is a `basic principle of Fourth Amendment law' that searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable." (Payton v. New York (1980) 445 U.S. 573, 586, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639.) Indeed, "the `physical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed.'" (Id. at p. 585, 100 S.Ct. 1371.) The requirement of a warrant "minimizes the danger of needless intrusions of that sort." (Id. at p. 586, 100 S.Ct. 1371.)
Yet, as with so much of its Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, the high court has stopped short of erecting a categorical bar. The presumption of unreasonableness that attaches to a warrantless entry into the home (People v. Celis (2004) 33 Cal.4th 667, 676, 16 Cal.Rptr.3d 85, 93 P.3d 1027.)
Defendant asserts that the warrantless entry here was unreasonable under the ...
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