People v. Hampton

• Decision Date: 25 January 1985
• Citation: 164 Cal.App.3d 27,209 Cal.Rptr. 905
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of California, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Sherry Stephanie HAMPTON, Defendant and Respondent. A019829.
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 905

209 Cal.Rptr. 905

164 Cal.App.3d 27

The PEOPLE of the State of California, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Sherry Stephanie HAMPTON, Defendant and Respondent.

A019829.

Court of Appeal, First District, Division 3, California.

Jan. 25, 1985.

Rehearing Denied Feb. 22, 1985. ^*

Hearing Denied April 18, 1985. ^**

John K. Van de Kamp, Atty. Gen. of Cal., Ronald E. Niver, J. Patrick Collins, Deputy Attys. Gen., San Francisco, for plaintiff and appellant.

William Bernstein, Mulholland, Bernstein & Peterson, San Rafael, for defendant and respondent.

SCOTT, Associate Justice.

Respondent Sherry Stephanie Hampton was charged with possession of cocaine, driving under the influence of alcohol, driving with 0.10 percent blood alcohol, and resisting a public officer in performing his duties. After her motion to suppress evidence was granted, the trial court dismissed the information pursuant to Penal Code section 1385, and the People have appealed. We reverse.

I

Respondent was stopped in her car on March 27, 1982, at about 4:30 a.m. by Officer John Eubanks. She appeared to be intoxicated. Since she was only about two blocks from home, Eubanks offered her the opportunity to be driven home. Although she insisted that she wanted to continue her search for her boyfriend, and expressed concern that her car might be stolen if she left it in the parking lot, she eventually accepted the officer's offer.

Eubanks locked respondent's car and kept what respondent said were her only keys, which he promised to return to her in the morning. He drove her to her apartment and walked her to her door. She went inside; he returned to his patrol car, and drove to a nearby service station. A few minutes later, he resumed his patrol, and saw respondent's car leaving the parking lot. The driver appeared to be a long-haired female, and Eubanks believed it was respondent.

Eubanks pursued the vehicle, but lost sight of it as it entered the parking lot of respondent's apartment complex. He found the car parked in the stall for respondent's apartment; its hood felt warm. He heard a door slam in the direction of respondent's apartment.

Officer Eubanks quickly went to respondent's apartment and knocked on the door. She opened the door, apparently more intoxicated than before. When asked how her car came to be parked back at the apartment, respondent stated that she had driven it home to prevent its theft. The officer then put his hand on hers, told her she was under arrest, and asked her to step outside. She pulled back into the apartment and Officer Eubanks followed, trying to keep his balance.

Respondent struggled as the officer tried to handcuff her. She called for her roommate, Richard Burrows, who came into the room with a gun. He dropped the gun when Officer Eubanks let respondent go and identified himself.

While Officer Eubanks explained to Burrows that respondent was being arrested for drunk driving, respondent ran into her bedroom. A second officer arrived. Ultimately respondent was taken to jail; during a booking search there, a vial containing powder later determined to be cocaine was found in her pocket.

Respondent moved to suppress the evidence on the grounds that (1) the warrantless misdemeanor arrest was improper because it occurred too long after the offense was committed in the officer's presence; and (2) there were no exigent circumstances justifying the arrest in her home. The People urged that the arrest was justified both under the "hot pursuit" doctrine and to prevent the destruction of evidence. The trial court granted the motion, primarily because it concluded that the "hot pursuit" doctrine was inapplicable to a misdemeanor arrest.

II

First, the People urge that the officer made the arrest within a reasonable time after he observed the commission of the drunk driving offense. We agree.

An officer's authority to make a warrantless arrest for a misdemeanor is governed by Penal Code section 836, subdivision 1, which provides that an officer may arrest a person without a warrant "[w]henever he has reasonable cause to believe that the person to be arrested has committed a public offense in his presence." Such an arrest must be made at the time of the offense or within a reasonable time thereafter. (Jackson v. Superior Court (1950) 98 Cal.App.2d 183, 185, 219 P.2d 879.) In other words, if the arrest is not made "reasonably contemporaneously" with the commission of the offense, "the statutory basis for the arrest has evaporated." (People v. Williams (1971) 17 Cal.App.3d 554, 562, 95 Cal.Rptr. 234.) In Jackson, for example, a deputy sheriff observed a youth destroying public property early one afternoon, but did not attempt to arrest him for the offense until late the next day. By then, the court held, the officer's right to make a warrantless arrest for the offense had ceased. (Jackson v. Superior Court, supra, 98 Cal.App.2d at pp. 184-188, 219 P.2d 879.)

In this case, after the officer initially stopped respondent, he locked her car in the Dandy Market parking lot, and drove her home. In less than 15 minutes, he saw a woman whom he believed to be respondent, driving the car again. He followed and found the car in the rear parking area of her apartment building; he heard a door slam in the direction of respondent's apartment, and "quickly trotted, almost ran" to her door. Less than two minutes passed between the time he saw the car drive out of the Dandy Market lot and the time that he knocked on respondent's door. The arrest was unquestionably made within a reasonable time after the offense was committed in his presence.

III

Whether respondent's warrantless arrest was constitutionally valid presents a more difficult question. Nevertheless, we conclude that the arrest was proper.

A

The Fourth Amendment to the federal Constitution and article I, section 13 of the California Constitution prohibit a warrantless arrest in a suspect's home, absent exigent circumstances. (Payton v. New York (1980) 445 U.S. 573, 576-583, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 1374-1378, 63 L.Ed.2d 639; People v. Ramey (1976) 16 Cal.3d 263, 275-276, 127 Cal.Rptr. 629, 545 P.2d 1333.) "In this context, 'exigent circumstances' means an emergency situation requiring swift action to prevent imminent danger to life or serious damage to property, or to forestall the imminent escape or destruction of evidence. There is no ready litmus test for determining whether such circumstances exist, and in each case the claim of an extraordinary situation must be measured by the facts known to the officers." (Id., at p. 276, 127 Cal.Rptr. 629, 545 P.2d 1333.)

First, the People assume arguendo that the arrest occurred inside respondent's home, and rely on People v. Keltie (1983) 148 Cal.App.3d 773, 196 Cal.Rptr. 243 to urge that the entry was justified by the need to preserve blood alcohol evidence. In Keltie, a person was struck and killed by a vehicle. No one saw the accident, but witnesses who heard the impact saw defendant's van at the scene, and saw him stagger and then drive away. An hour later, police found the van parked in defendant's driveway; the driver's compartment smelled strongly of alcohol, and the side of the van was smeared with blood. Without a warrant, officers entered defendant's home, found him visibly intoxicated, and arrested him for felony drunk driving. (Id., at pp. 778-781, 196 Cal.Rptr. 243.)

The appellate court upheld the warrantless entry. Initially, it rejected the argument that the arrest was necessary to prevent an imminent escape. This "hot pursuit" exception applies where the delay occasioned by obtaining a warrant would permit the escape of one suspected of a grave offense, who remains " 'dangerous to life and limb.' " A person suspected of an alcohol-related offense poses no imminent danger, the court reasoned, once he is separated from his vehicle. (Id., at p. 779, 196 Cal.Rptr. 243.)

However, the court then concluded that the arrest was justified by the need to preserve the blood-alcohol evidence, which dissipates from the bloodstream "inexorably as a function of time." (Id., at pp. 779-781, 196 Cal.Rptr. 243.) The court limited its holding by declaring that in order to justify an arrest on this basis, "the police would have to have probable cause to believe that the suspect was under the influence, that he has committed a felony of which being under the influence of alcohol is an element, and that he is presently at home. In addition, the time interval between the offense and the entry must be brief enough so that evidence of drinking would still remain in the blood." (Id., at p. 780, 196 Cal.Rptr. 243.)

Respondent urges that Keltie is not controlling, because this case involves a misdemeanor, not a felony. Respondent argues that a warrantless arrest in a home for a misdemeanor can never be justified. As we will explain, we disagree.

In Welsh v. Wisconsin (1984) 466 U.S. 740, 104 S.Ct. 2091, 80 L.Ed.2d 732, the Supreme Court considered whether and under what circumstances the Fourth Amendment prohibits the warrantless entry of a person's home to arrest him or her for a nonfelony. In Welsh, a witness observed a car swerve off a Wisconsin road and stop in an open field. The driver emerged, and after a brief conversation with the witness, walked away. Police arrived. The witness reported what he had seen, and said that the driver was either very inebriated or sick. From a registration check, police discovered that the car's owner lived a short distance away. Without a warrant they went to his home, gained entry, found him in bed, and arrested him for driving under the influence of an intoxicant. In Wisconsin, a first offense for driving under the influence was then a noncriminal violation; an offender was subject only to a civil forfeiture proceeding with a maximum fine of $200. (At pp. ---- - ----, 104 S.Ct. at pp. 2093-2095.)

The Supreme Court held that this warrantless entry was constitutionally invalid. In so holding, the court...