People v. Thornton
| Decision Date | 05 May 2022 |
| Docket Number | 356499 |
| Parties | PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LANCE DUANE THORNTON, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US |
UNPUBLISHED
Oakland Circuit Court LC No. 2016-258686-FC.
Before: Anica Letica, P.J., and James Robert Redford and Michelle M. Rick, JJ.
A jury convicted defendant Lance Duane Thornton of multiple counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct. The victim, KW, was the young daughter of Thornton's ex-girlfriend. KW was six years old when the abuse began, and 11 years old when she reported it to a friend.
Thornton challenges the admission of other-acts evidence, asserts that his counsel performed ineffectively by failing to consult with an expert, and claims that the trial court violated the "two-thirds rule" when it sentenced him to four concurrent terms of 25 to 38 years' imprisonment. We discern no merit in any of Thornton's arguments and affirm his convictions and sentences.
Thornton originally stood trial in 2016 and was convicted of four counts of CSC-I, MCL 750.520b(1)(a) (). The trial court vacated his convictions on grounds irrelevant to this appeal. When the victim, KW testified at the first trial, she 13 years old. At the retrial giving rise to this appeal, KW was 15 years old. The prosecutor presented the testimony of eight additional witnesses and records of Thornton's phone and text messages.
KW described multiple incidents of abuse committed by Thornton in considerable detail. She recalled that almost every time Thornton abused her, he also pulled her hair. KW's mother testified that Thornton often pulled her hair during sexual intercourse. The text messages offered as exhibits highlighted that Thornton enjoyed pulling the hair of his consensual sexual partners.
Dr. Denise Shuttie testified that she examined KW for evidence of trauma but found none. She opined that an absence of physical evidence of trauma is not inconsistent with sexual assault. Defense counsel did not present an expert to counter Dr. Shuttie's testimony.
The jury convicted Thornton as charged and the trial court sentenced him to four concurrent prison terms of 25 to 38 years, with credit for 1, 000 days served. At the sentencing hearing, the prosecutor requested a sentence of 30 to 60 years' imprisonment, [1] and defense counsel asked the trial court to impose a 25- to 38-year sentence. Defense counsel urged that a 38-year maximum sentence could be appropriate under the two-thirds rule set forth in People v Tanner, 387 Mich. 683, 690; 199 N.W.2d 202 (1972), and MCL 769.34(2)(b). This appeal followed.
Thornton first contends that the trial court erred by admitting text messages and testimony related to his acts of pulling the hair of his sexual partners under MRE 404(b). He asserts that the evidence was irrelevant, the prosecution failed to articulate a proper theory of admissibility, and that even if relevant, the evidence was inadmissible under MRE 403. Because the hair-pulling testimony constituted highly probative evidence of a "scheme, plan, or system in doing an act" and the prosecutor properly proposed its introduction on this ground, the admission of this evidence did not contravene MRE 404(b).
"A trial court's decision to admit or exclude evidence is reviewed for an abuse of discretion." People v Burns, 494 Mich. 104, 110; 832 N.W.2d 738 (2013). When a trial court's decision to admit or exclude evidence involves preliminary questions of law, such as "whether a rule of evidence precludes admissibility, the question is reviewed de novo." People v McDaniel, 469 Mich. 409; 412; 670 N.W.2d 659 (2003). "A preserved error in the admission of evidence does not warrant reversal unless after an examination of the entire cause, it shall affirmatively appear that it is more probable than not that the error was outcome determinative." Burns, 494 Mich. at 110 (quotation marks and citation omitted).
"The general rule under MRE 404(b) is that evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is inadmissible to prove a propensity to commit such acts." People v Denson, 500 Mich. 385, 397; 902 N.W.2d 306 (2017). However, MRE 404(b)(1) provides, in relevant part:
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts . . . may . . . be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, scheme, plan, or system in doing an act, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident when the same is material, whether such other crimes, wrongs, or acts are contemporaneous with, or prior or subsequent to the conduct at issue in the case.
"The admissibility of other-acts evidence under MRE 404(b) has long been governed by the test our Supreme Court outlined in People v VanderVliet, 444 Mich. 52; 508 N.W.2d 114 (1993), amended 445 Mich. 1205 (1994)." People v Galloway, 335 Mich.App. 629, 638; 967 N.W.2d 908 (2020). Other-acts evidence is admissible under MRE 404(b) if the prosecution establishes that it is offered for a proper purpose under the Rule, bears relevance to the issues presented in the case, and that the probative value of the evidence is not outweighed by unfair prejudice. Denson, 500 Mich. at 398. Our Supreme Court has cautioned that "merely reciting a proper purpose does not actually demonstrate the existence of a proper purpose for the particular other-acts evidence at issue and does not automatically render the evidence admissible." Denson, 500 Mich. at 400.
MRE 404(b) prohibits the admission of other-acts evidence when the evidence is probative only of a defendant's general inclination to commit crimes, and in particular crimes of the sort for which he or she is standing trial. Id. at 398. However, when relevant to a noncharacter issue, "such as one of the purposes specifically enumerated in MRE 404(b)(1)," evidence of other acts may be admitted. Id. at 399. The prosecution bears the burden of establishing a "proper noncharacter purpose for admission of the other-acts evidence." Id. at 398. This means that the prosecution must articulate a specific evidentiary purpose for the evidence by explaining how it fits directly or inferentially in proving a non-character fact at issue in the case. "The mechanical recitation of a permissible purpose, without explaining how the evidence relates to the recited purpose, is insufficient to justify admission under MRE 404(b)." Id. at 400 (quotation marks, citation, and alteration omitted).
Thornton argues that the prosecutor failed to articulate a proper purpose for the admission of the hair-pulling evidence, asserting that the prosecutor merely stated that the evidence established a common scheme or plan without explaining the relevance. The record belies this allegation. The prosecutor specifically characterized the hair-pulling evidence as indictive of Thornton's regular sexual behavior, thus supporting that the evidence demonstrated a "common scheme or plan." The trial court admitted it on that basis, concluding that the evidence established "a method of operation that [defendant] uses when he's engaging in sexual acts." Because the prosecutor articulated a proper noncharacter purpose for admission, Thornton's argument to the contrary is factually unsupported. Denson, 500 Mich. at 398.
"Logical relevance" is the "touchstone" for the admissibility of other-acts evidence. Id. at 401. Under the second prong of the other-acts admissibility test, "logical relevance is determined by the application of MRE 401 and MRE 402." Id. at 400 (citations omitted).
Trial courts must "closely scrutinize the logical relevance of the evidence under the second prong" of the admissibility test to determine whether an articulated purpose is proper. Denson, 500 Mich. at 400. "Other-acts evidence is logically relevant if two components are present: materiality and probative value." Denson, 500 Mich. at 401.
For the other-acts evidence to be material, it must be related to a fact or issue of consequence in the determination of the case. For that same evidence to have probative value, it must have a tendency to make the purported fact of consequence more or less probable than it would be without that evidence. The relationship of the elements of the charge, the theories of admissibility, and the defenses asserted governs what is relevant and material. [Galloway, 335 Mich.App. at 639; (quotation marks and citations omitted).]
The court must examine "the similarity between a defendant's other act and the charged offense" to evaluate "whether the prosecution has provided an intermediate inference other than an impermissible character inference . . . ." Denson, 500 Mich. at 402 (quotation marks and citations omitted). "The degree of similarity that is required between a defendant's other act and the charged offense depends on the manner in which the prosecution intends to use the other-acts evidence." Id. at 402-403. "If the prosecution creates a theory of relevance based on the alleged similarity between a defendant's other act and the charged offense, we require a 'striking similarity' between the two acts to find the other act admissible." Id. at 403 (citation omitted).
"[E]vidence of similar misconduct is logically relevant to show that the charged act occurred where the uncharged misconduct and the charged offense are sufficiently similar to support an inference that they are manifestations of a common plan scheme, or system." People v Sabin (After Remand), 463 Mich. 43, 63; 614 N.W.2d 888 (2000). "General similarity between the charged and uncharged acts does not, however, by itself, establish...
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