People v. Travis

• Decision Date: 07 March 1990
• Docket Number: Docket No. 99080
• Citation: 451 N.W.2d 641,182 Mich.App. 389
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Namon TRAVIS, Defendant-Appellant. 182 Mich.App. 389, 451 N.W.2d 641
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

Page 641

451 N.W.2d 641

PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Namon TRAVIS, Defendant-Appellant.

Docket No. 99080.

182 Mich.App. 389, 451 N.W.2d 641

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Submitted Dec. 12, 1989.

Decided Feb. 21, 1990.

Released for Publication March 7, 1990.

[182 MICHAPP 390] Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Louis J. Caruso, Sol. Gen., William F. Delhey, Pros. Atty., and David A. King, Asst. Pros. Atty., for the People.

Douglas Hamel, and Frank Singer, of counsel, Detroit, for defendant-appellant.

Before REILLY, P.J., and CYNAR and BURNS, ^* JJ.

PER CURIAM.

On September 15, 1987, following a jury trial, defendant, Namon Travis, was convicted of three counts of taking another hostage while a prisoner, M.C.L. Sec. 750.349a; M.S.A. Sec. 28.581(1). Defendant was subsequently sentenced to thirty to eighty years on Count I, twenty-five to eighty years on Count II, and twenty to eighty years on Count III, with all sentences to run concurrently, but consecutive to defendant's existing sentence. Defendant appeals as of right, claiming that the trial court erred in granting the prosecutor's pretrial motion to prevent defendant from asserting the defense of duress and that he did not receive effective assistance of counsel at trial.

This case arises out of a hostage taking incident which occurred at the Huron Valley Men's Prison Facility on January 15 and 16, 1986. At approximately 10:30 a.m. on the 15th defendant and Elvis Williams, both inmates at the prison, entered the prison commissary and took hostage at knifepoint Ronald Desbrough and Jack Saren, two employees [182 MICHAPP 391] of the food services department. Dennis Easley, another prison employee, was also taken hostage, but was not held at knifepoint. Defendant and Williams then barricaded themselves and the hostages inside the commissary.

At some point on January 15, defendant and Williams released Easley in exchange for a television, cigarettes and toilet paper. During negotiations with police, the desire to be transferred to a federal penitentiary was the only explanation given by defendant and Williams as to why the two took the hostages. After authorities promised to transfer defendant to a federal penitentiary and after a conversation with defendant's brother, defendant and Williams released Saren and Desbrough and surrendered at 4:30 p.m. on January 16, 1987.

By motion in limine, the prosecution moved to preclude defendant from raising the defense of duress. Defendant alleged that he acted out of duress when he learned that he was scheduled to be transferred the next day (January 16, 1986) to the Jackson prison facility, from which defendant claimed to have received death threats from both inmates and guards. Defendant asked the court to permit him to make an offer of proof on the record or, alternatively, to have the court conduct an in camera inspection of evidence in his possession which he claimed supported his position, but the court refused. The trial court ruled, as a matter of law, that duress was not a defense to the taking of hostages and granted the prosecutor's motion.

Because defendant and defense counsel were disappointed with the trial court's refusal to allow defendant to present a duress defense, defense counsel expressly refused to actively participate in the trial. Defense counsel did not voir dire a single juror, did not make an opening statement, and did [182 MICHAPP 392] not cross-examine a single prosecution witness. Defendant did not testify. In a brief closing statement, defense counsel explained only that because the trial was so unfair, defendant and defense counsel would have no part in it.

Defendant argues that the trial court erred in granting the prosecutions's motion in limine to exclude the defense of duress. We disagree.

Duress is not a defense to homicide, People v. Dittis, 157 Mich.App. 38, 40, 403 N.W.2d 94 (1987), lv. den. 428 Mich. 911 (1987). Further, we agree with the panels of this Court that have held that duress is not a defense to the crime of possession of a dangerous weapon by an inmate, M.C.L. Sec. 800.283; M.S.A. Sec. 28.1623. People v. Rau, 174 Mich.App. 339, 342-343, 436 N.W.2d 409 (1989); People v. Crooks, 151 Mich.App. 389, 390-391, 390 N.W.2d 250 (1986), lv. den. 426 Mich. 870 (1986), but see People v. Blair, 157 Mich.App. 43, 48-50 403 N.W.2d 96 (1987), lv. den. 428 Mich 902 (1987).

In Rau, supra, 174 Mich.App. at p. 342, 436 N.W.2d 409, disagreeing with Blair, supra, our Court noted:

We are aware of this Court's decision in People v. Perry, 145 Mich App 778; 377 NW2d 911 (1985), lv den 424 Mich 857 (1985). However, that decision turned on the issue of what constituted possession. People v. Blair, 157 Mich App 43; 403 NW2d 96 (1987), also reached a contrary result on facts similar to those in the matter before us. We decline, however, to follow that panel's analysis. The Blair Court based its holding on People v. Luther, 394 Mich 619; 232 NW2d 184 (1975), which allowed the defense of duress for the offense of prison escape. As a rule, there is no threat to individuals' safety by an escape. Moreover, duress has been specifically authorized by statute as a defense to prison escape. MCL 768.21b(4); MSA 28.1044(2)(4). The Legislature has not seen fit to [182 MICHAPP 393] extend such a defense to the instant offense, and we decline to do so. [Emphasis added.]

Moreover, we note that M.C.L. Sec. 768.21b(4); M.S.A. Sec. 28.1044(2)(4), which was enacted subsequent to and incorporated the factors adopted in Luther, supra, p. 623, 232 N.W.2d 184, provides in part:

In determining whether or not the defendant broke prison while under duress the jury or court may consider the following conditions if supported by competent evidence:

* * * * * *

(e) Whether force or violence was not used towards innocent persons in the prison break. [Emphasis added.]

The Rau Court also stated:

On public policy grounds, we cannot sanction the possession of deadly weapons by inmates. To do so would invite an unwarranted threat to the safety of prison personnel and other inmates. In a prison setting there would be virtually no control over such weapons. To allow such would be to leave the door wide open for possession of life-threatening objects with later fabrication of the defense. The recent deaths of prison guards adequately demonstrate the folly of this approach. A ruling by this Court to extend the defense of duress to possession of weapons will in our opinion exacerbate a constant threat in a volatile situation. Absent exceptional circumstances such as those referred to in People v. Crooks, 151 Mich App 389; 390 NW2d 250 (1986), lv den 426 Mich 870 (1986), citing Mungin v. State, 458 So2d 293, 297 (FlaApp, 1984), an inmate should not possess a weapon. [174 Mich.App. at 342-343, 436 N.W.2d 409.]

In Crooks, supra, 151 Mich.App. at pp. 390-391, 390 N.W.2d 250, our Court stated:

[182 MICHAPP 394] Defendant asks us to extend this defense [duress] to inmates carrying a concealed weapon. While we empathize with defendant's predicament, we cannot permit this defense to be used.

"To grant judicial sanction to the otherwise unlawful possession of a deadly weapon by prisoners, whatever the reason would undoubtedly result in...