People v. Trotter

• Decision Date: 23 February 2007
• Docket Number: No. 5-05-0533.,5-05-0533.
• Citation: 864 N.E.2d 281
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Felicia TROTTER, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

864 N.E.2d 281

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Felicia TROTTER, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 5-05-0533.

Appellate Court of Illinois, Fifth District.

February 23, 2007.

Daniel M. Kirwan, Deputy Defender, Lawrence J. O'Neill, Assistant Defender, Office of the State Appellate Defender, Mt. Vernon, for Appellant.

Robert Haida, State's Attorney, St. Clair County, Belleville, Norbert J. Goetten, Director, Stephen E. Norris, Deputy Director, Rebecca E. McCormick, Staff Attorney, Office of the State's Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor, Mt. Vernon, for Appellee.

Justice SPOMER delivered the opinion of the court:

The defendant, Felicia Trotter, was found not guilty by reason of insanity (NGRI) on charges of aggravated kidnaping (720 ILCS 5/10-1(a), 10-2(a)(2) (West 2004)). Subsequently, the circuit court of St. Clair County ordered the defendant committed to the Department of Human Services for a time not to exceed 25½ years. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence on the essential elements of the offense, contending that there was no aggravated kidnaping because there was no "secret confinement" of the victim. See 720 ILCS 5/10-1(a) (West 2004). As a result, the defendant argues that she should have been found not guilty of aggravated kidnaping, rather than NGRI.

Before addressing the issue raised by the defendant on appeal, we must resolve a threshold matter raised by the State regarding whether this court has jurisdiction to review this case on appeal. The State asserts that while the right to appeal a criminal conviction is fundamental and guaranteed by the Illinois Constitution (People v. Rovito, 327 Ill.App.3d 164, 168, 261 Ill.Dec. 72, 762 N.E.2d 641 (2001) (citing Ill. Const.1970, art. VI, § 6)), "there shall be no appeal from a judgment of acquittal" (Ill. Const.1970, art. VI, § 6). The State contends that a verdict of NGRI is essentially an acquittal and that this court consequently lacks jurisdiction over this appeal. In response, the defendant argues that jurisdiction is proper because a verdict of NGRI presupposes that every element of the underlying offense is proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

In support of its position, the State cites People v. Harrison, 366 Ill.App.3d 210, 214, 303 Ill.Dec. 254, 851 N.E.2d 152 (2006), appeal allowed, 221 Ill.2d 654, 306 Ill.Dec. 278, 857 N.E.2d 677 (2006), in which our colleagues in the First District ruled that they lacked jurisdiction to review the defendant's case because a verdict of NGRI is "in all form and substance" an acquittal. The Harrison court reasoned that a defendant found NGRI faces no criminal responsibility and is ultimately free. Harrison, 366 Ill.App.3d at 218, 303 Ill.Dec. 254, 851 N.E.2d 152. The court noted that while such a defendant may be held in a mental health facility, he is eventually released and discharged just as any other acquitted defendant. Harrison, 366 Ill.App.3d at 216, 303 Ill.Dec. 254, 851 N.E.2d 152. Moreover, the court did not deem confinement in a mental health facility to be punishment but, rather, treatment and protection for the defendant as well as society. Harrison, 366 Ill.App.3d at 216-17, 303 Ill.Dec. 254, 851 N.E.2d 152 (citing Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 368-69, 103 S.Ct. 3043, 3051-52, 77 L.Ed.2d 694, 708 (1983)). The Harrison court ruled that it could exercise no jurisdiction over the defendant's cause because it could bestow no greater relief upon the defendant than the freedom from guilt which he had already received. Harrison, 366 Ill.App.3d at 218, 303 Ill.Dec. 254, 851 N.E.2d 152. The Harrison court also concluded that for double jeopardy purposes, a defendant who has been found NGRI "may not be retried on the same offense." Harrison, 366 Ill.App.3d at 215, 303 Ill. Dec. 254, 851 N.E.2d 152.

Although we agree with the Harrison court that a defendant found NGRI, like a defendant acquitted generally, may not be retried on the same offense pursuant to long-settled principles of double jeopardy, we believe that the similarities between a general acquittal and a finding of NGRI end there. Accordingly, we cannot conclude that a verdict of NGRI is "in all form and substance" an acquittal. See Harrison, 366 Ill.App.3d at 214, 303 Ill.Dec. 254, 851 N.E.2d 152. To the contrary, we find that for purposes of determining the jurisdiction of this court to review a finding of NGRI, at least two fundamental differences between a general acquittal and a finding of NGRI convince us that we have jurisdiction to review a finding of NGRI. These differences raise questions related both to a substantial liberty interest and to equal protection.

The first fundamental difference between a general acquittal and a finding of NGRI is found in the statutorily prescribed procedure that follows a finding of NGRI. Following a general acquittal, a criminal case ends, and as the Harrison court noted, "a defendant who has been acquitted and declared not guilty may not be retried on the same offense." Harrison, 366 Ill.App.3d at 215, 303 Ill.Dec. 254, 851 N.E.2d 152. We note that although the Harrison court cites the language of section 104-25(c) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/104-25(c) (West 2002)) that directs courts to "enter a judgment of acquittal" when a defendant is found NGRI as evidence that a finding of NGRI is the equivalent of an acquittal, section 104-25(c) is, by its own terms, relevant only to a finding of NGRI following a discharge hearing after a determination that a defendant is not fit for a trial and will not become so within one year (see 725 ILCS 5/104-23(a), 104-25(c) (West 2004)). This section does not speak at all to an NGRI finding following a trial. Accordingly, we do not believe that the use of the term "acquittal" in section 104-25(c) is meant to imply that an NGRI finding following a trial is somehow the legal equivalent, for all purposes, of a general acquittal. Indeed, section 115-4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/115-4 (West 2004)), which does govern an NGRI finding following a trial by a jury, does not contain language directing courts to "enter a judgment of acquittal" when a defendant is found NGRI.

Following either a section 104-25(c) NGRI finding following a discharge hearing or a section 115-4 NGRI finding following a trial by a jury, the court must turn to section 5-2-4 of the Unified Code of Corrections (Code) (730 ILCS 5/5-2-4 (West 2004)), which spells out the proceedings to take place after an "Acquittal by Reason of Insanity." Although section 5-2-4 uses the term "acquittal" to encompass a finding made under either section, again we do not believe that the use of the term "acquittal" under these circumstances is meant to imply that an NGRI finding following a trial is somehow the legal equivalent, for all purposes, of a general acquittal, for the procedural requirements that follow in the section are too far removed from those that follow a general acquittal to legitimately be equated therewith. Although the Harrison court focused on section 5-2-4(a) of the Code (730 ILCS 5/5-2-4(a) (West 2002)), which details the first of those procedures—the discharge from custody of a defendant found both NGRI and "not in need of mental health services"—we believe it is more appropriate, for purposes of comparing a finding of NGRI with a general acquittal, to focus on section 5-2-4(b) of the Code (730 ILCS 5/5-2-4(b) (West 2004)), which states that a defendant found NGRI is subject to as many years in a mental health facility as the maximum potential prison sentence for a defendant found guilty of the same charged offense. In this case, the circuit court ordered the defendant committed to the custody of the Department of Human Services for a period of time not to exceed 25½ years. Contrary to the State's argument—and the Harrison court's conclusion that a defendant found NGRI is no more "aggrieved" than one who is acquitted generally (People v. Harrison, 366 Ill.App.3d 210, 218, 303 Ill.Dec. 254, 851 N.E.2d 152 (2006))— the defendant in this case certainly is more aggrieved than would be one who was acquitted generally of the charge of aggravated kidnaping: the defendant here is being detained against her will in a mental health facility and could potentially spend the rest of her life there. This striking fact highlights a key difference between a finding of NGRI and a general acquittal: whereas no liberty interest is implicated following a general acquittal, a substantial liberty interest—a potentially long-term confinement in a mental health facility— may be implicated following a finding of NGRI. See People v. Marshall, 273 Ill. App.3d 969, 974-75, 210 Ill.Dec. 318, 652 N.E.2d 1294 (1995) (a substantial liberty interest is implicated when one is detained in a mental health facility). In addition, a defendant found NGRI may continue to bear the inherent stigma associated with the underlying factual allegations—which according to the Harrison court the defendant is precluded from challenging—despite the defendant's purported "acquittal." Given this key difference, we simply cannot agree with the Harrison court that a defendant found NGRI has not been "aggrieved," and we cannot conclude that a finding of NGRI is the legal equivalent of a general acquittal.

The second fundamental difference between a general acquittal and a finding of NGRI is that before a defendant may be found NGRI, the State is required to prove the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of every element of an offense charged. People v. Wells, 294 Ill. App.3d 405, 408, 228 Ill.Dec. 886, 690 N.E.2d 645 (1998); 720 ILCS 5/6-2(e) (West 2004); see also People v. Gold, 38 Ill.2d 510, 513, 232 N.E.2d 702 (1967) (a special verdict of NGRI requires the jury to find that the defendant committed the offense charged but was insane while committing the act). As the Wells court noted, one of the prerequisites to finding a defendant...