People v. Harrison

• Decision Date: 12 May 2006
• Docket Number: No. 1-04-1266.,1-04-1266.
• Citation: 851 N.E.2d 152
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Dwight HARRISON, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

851 N.E.2d 152

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Dwight HARRISON, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 1-04-1266.

Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, Sixth Division.

May 12, 2006.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Edwin A. Burnette, Public Defender, Cook County, Chicago, Michael Davidson, Assistant Public Defender, for Appellant.

Richard A. Devine, Cook County State's Attorney, Chicago, James Fitzgerald, Alan J. Spellberg, Michelle Katz and Brian K. Hodes, Assistant State's Attorneys.

Justice FITZGERALD SMITH delivered the opinion of the court:

Following a bench trial, defendant Dwight Harrison (defendant) was found to have committed acts beyond a reasonable doubt which would constitute first degree murder. Defendant, however, was found not guilty by reason of insanity and confined to the Department of Human Services for inpatient mental health services until June 28, 2028. On appeal, defendant contends that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion to suppress his confession after he was found insane. He also contends that the State failed to "prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of first degree murder." He asks that we reverse the "findings that he caused the death of [the victim]" and "that the case be remanded." For the following reasons, we dismiss defendant's appeal.

The State presented evidence that defendant confessed to killing the victim, Theotrie Archie. Chicago police detectives Thomas Benoit and Jean Romic learned the identity of defendant from the victim's roommate, Noble Foggs, who had observed defendant "stomping" on the victim's throat. The detectives found defendant at his sister's apartment and he agreed to accompany them to the police station for questioning in connection with the victim's death. As they left, defendant's sister, Lita Dixon, handed the detectives a bottle of pills, indicating that defendant needed them to sleep and for a nervous condition. After being read his Miranda rights, defendant initially denied involvement in the victim's death. He then agreed to submit to a polygraph test, which was to be administered the next morning. That morning, defendant was again read his Miranda rights, whereupon he confessed to beating and killing the victim. After detailing the event to Assistant State's Attorney (ASA) Robert Robertson, defendant handwrote his statement indicating the same. While in custody, defendant was never given his medication; however, according to the detectives and ASA Robertson, he did not have trouble understanding or communicating and did not display any bizarre behavior.

Following defendant's not guilty plea, the trial court ordered behavioral examinations and found that defendant was fit to stand trial with medication. On October 1, 1999, defendant filed a motion to quash his arrest and suppress his statement. At the subsequent suppression hearing, the trial court heard testimony from Detectives Benoit and Romic, ASA Robertson, Lita Dixon, defendant's attorney Charles Pinkston and psychiatrist Dr. Roni Selzberg. Dr. Selzberg was ordered by the court to evaluate defendant and render opinions regarding his mental capacity. Dr. Selzberg was unable to opine whether defendant intelligently waived his Miranda rights because she could not date her impressions back to the time of his arrest. The trial court ultimately granted defendant's motion to suppress, and the State appealed. After thoroughly reviewing the underlying facts of the case, the reviewing court reversed the trial court's suppression order finding that, based on the totality of the circumstances, defendant's confession was voluntary. See People v. Harrison, No. 1-00-2279, slip op. at 7, 324 Ill.App.3d 1132, 282 Ill.Dec. 134, 805 N.E.2d 753 (September 27, 2001) (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). Specifically, that court found:

"The ultimate question is whether the absence of defendant's medication, when considered with the totality of the other circumstances, rendered defendant's confession involuntary. [Citation.]

At the time of his confession, defendant was 20 years old and of low average to average intellectual functioning. He was admonished of his Miranda rights on at least five occasions, indicating that he understood them. Each time the detectives and the ASA had contact with defendant he appeared to understand them, responded appropriately to their questions, and was coherent. Dr. Selzberg testified that defendant had no form of thought disorder and had the intellectual capacity to understand the Miranda warnings.

Defendant's behavior did not indicate that he was in need of medication, nor did he ever ask for medication. While in custody he displayed none of the symptoms Dr. Selzberg testified he would likely exhibit if he was not medicated and was having a mental decomposition. Defendant's sister stated that when she saw defendant at the police station[,] he was able to answer her questions and explain what had happened. Although defendant was in police custody for 26 hours before he confessed, he was only questioned once during that time. He was fed and when given the opportunity to speak alone with the ASA[, defendant] did not complain of mistreatment." Harrison, slip op. at 6-7, 324 Ill.App.3d 1132, 282 Ill.Dec. 134, 805 N.E.2d 753.

On January 30, 2003, defense counsel renewed his motion to suppress, and the trial court "reopened the motion" over the State's collateral estoppel objection. On July 1, 2003, however, defendant withdrew his renewed motion to suppress.

At trial, the parties stipulated to the testimony of Detective Benoit, Detective Romic and ASA Robertson, and also stipulated to defendant's handwritten statement. Noble Foggs testified that, on June 9, 1998, he was in his apartment when he heard "some struggling sounds" in the hall. Foggs opened his door and saw defendant stomping on the victim's throat as he lay motionless on the ground. Foggs said "don't kill him" and returned to his apartment. Foggs admitted that he had been drinking and using drugs that night and that he initially refused to speak to police officers during their investigation.

The parties further stipulated that the victim's cause of death was due to multiple injuries and blunt force trauma. Both parties presented stipulated testimony relating to defendant's mental capacity. Dr. Selzberg opined that, within a reasonable degree of psychiatric certainty, defendant was legally insane at the time of the offense. Dr. Markos opined that, within a reasonable degree of psychiatric certainty, defendant suffered from paranoid-type schizophrenia, which caused him to lack the "substantial capacity to appreciate the criminality of his act or to conform his behavior with the requirements of the law." Dr. Carl Wahlstrom, Jr., concluded that neither he nor any other medical professional could render an opinion as to defendant's sanity because defendant could not recall the events of the crime.

The trial court found that the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant committed acts which would constitute first degree murder. However, it also found that the defense proved by clear and convincing evidence that defendant was insane at the time of the offense and, therefore, was not guilty by reason of insanity. The trial court subsequently ordered his evaluation. At a hearing on March 19, 2004, the court found that he was in need of mental health services on an inpatient basis. Moreover, it stated that "[t]he maximum sentence the defendant would be required to serve is 60 years from June 22, 1998, the date originally taken into custody, credit for 2,097 days." The court ordered defendant to the Department of Human Services for treatment until June 28, 2028, "unless the acquittee is released early pursuant to 730 ILCS 5/5-2-4(d) or (1)." This timely appeal followed.

ANALYSIS

As a threshold matter, the State maintains that defendant's contentions on appeal are moot and that we lack jurisdiction over this cause. See In re Andrea F., 208 Ill.2d 148, 156, 280 Ill.Dec. 531, 802 N.E.2d 782 (2003) (finding that reviewing courts generally do not decide moot questions, which are those that present no actual controversy or existing issues and relief cannot be granted). More specifically, the State contends that, because defendant was found not guilty by reason of insanity, he was effectively acquitted and we cannot grant the relief which he seeks here, which is reversal and remand of the verdict. As a result, the State asserts, if we granted the relief requested, defendant would be exposed to another trial in violation of double jeopardy. See People ex rel. Daley v. Crilly, 108 Ill.2d 301, 312-13, 91 Ill.Dec. 601, 483 N.E.2d 1236 (1985). In response, defendant argues that our court has jurisdiction and double jeopardy is not involved because his not guilty by reason of insanity (NGRI) verdict does not amount to an acquittal, especially since he was not "set free." He contends that, by virtue of the trial court's finding that the State met its burden beyond a reasonable doubt, he was necessarily found guilty and he has a liberty interest that can be cured by our reversal of this cause or remand to review his counsel's actions and the sufficiency of the evidence presented. We agree with the State and conclude that we cannot address defendant's appeal.

Simply put, under our system of law, an NGRI verdict is, in all form and substance, an acquittal. An "acquittal" is defined as the "`release, absolution or discharge from an obligation, liability, or engagement.'" (Emphasis added.) People v. Thon, 319 Ill.App.3d 855, 863, 254 Ill. Dec. 177, 746 N.E.2d 1225 (2001), quoting Black's Law Dictionary 25 (6th ed.1990). Throughout our legal history, our nation's courts, as well as those of our own state, have made clear that we cannot punish or hold accountable one upon whom we cannot impose blame. See, e.g., United States v. Lyons, 739 F.2d 994 (5th Cir.1984) ...