People v. Turkenich

• Decision Date: 13 June 1988
• Citation: 137 A.D.2d 363,529 N.Y.S.2d 385
• Parties: The PEOPLE, etc., Respondent, v. Igor TURKENICH, Appellant.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

Page 385

529 N.Y.S.2d 385

137 A.D.2d 363

The PEOPLE, etc., Respondent, v. Igor TURKENICH, Appellant.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division Second Department.

June 13, 1988.

Freda S. Nisnewitz, Brooklyn, for appellant.

Elizabeth Holtzman, Dist. Atty., Brooklyn (Barbara D. Underwood, Janet M. Berk and Sally Wasserman, of counsel), for respondent.

Before THOMPSON, J.P., and BROWN, EIBER and SULLIVAN, JJ.

THOMPSON, Justice Presiding.

After a jury trial, the defendant was convicted of manslaughter in the first degree under Penal Law § 125.20(1). The defendant's conviction was largely ensured by the introduction at trial of inculpatory statements made by him to law enforcement authorities. His midtrial motion to suppress these statements was denied by Criminal Term, after a hearing. On appeal, the defendant's principal contention is that Criminal Term erred in allowing his statements to be admitted into evidence because they were procured by means of a custodial interrogation and without any prior advisement of his Miranda rights ( Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694). For the reasons which follow, we agree with the defendant that he was in custody at the time he made his incriminating statements. The failure to advise the defendant of his Miranda rights prior thereto rendered the statements inadmissible. Accordingly, Criminal Term erred in denying the defendant's suppression motion. We therefore reverse the judgment of conviction and order a new trial.

The relevant facts are as follows: On November 8, 1981, the body of 56-year-old Zinaida Turkenich, a recent Russian immigrant who was crippled from childhood from the effects of polio, was found lying face up on a couch in the apartment in Brooklyn she had shared with her son, the defendant Igor Turkenich. Her body was discovered by Daniel Devlin, a social worker employed by the New York City Department of Social Services who had been assigned to the Turkenich case after it was referred to his agency by the New York Association for New Americans (hereinafter NYANA), a group that aids Russian immigrants in making the transition to life in this country. An autopsy revealed the victim's death was caused by a skull fracture in combination with older as well as more recent contusions of the face, skull, arms, back and legs.

New York City Police Detective Pasquale Tennariello launched an investigation into the homicide. In the course of his investigation, Detective Tennariello sought to interview the defendant whom he learned had been confined in the psychiatric ward of Metropolitan Hospital after having been picked up by the police for causing a disturbance in front of the Russian Embassy. On November 14, 1981, Detective Tennariello and his partner went to Metropolitan Hospital for the purpose of questioning the defendant concerning his mother's death. The defendant, who spoke only Russian, was brought into a room at the hospital in which three doctors, Detective Tennariello and his partner, Detective Michaels, were seated. One of the doctors, Dr. Gabay, served as the translator. Detective Tennariello testified at the suppression hearing that he wanted to advise the defendant of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona (supra) because he believed the defendant might become a subject of his investigation. Upon being informed of the detective's intention, Dr. Davidson, who was present in the interview room, stated that Detective Tennariello should not "bother" to inform the defendant of his rights because he lacked the capacity to understand them. Notwithstanding the defendant's diminished mental capacity, Detective Tennariello proceeded to interrogate the defendant for about 20 to 30 minutes without first administering Miranda warnings. During this questioning, the defendant confessed that on October 30, 1981, the last time he had seen his mother, he hit her with her crutch following an argument regarding his mother's refusal to let him return to Russia. Detective Tennariello further testified that at times during the questioning the defendant denied hitting his mother. Many of the defendant's answers to the police inquiries were incoherent. The defendant was not arrested at the conclusion of the initial inquiry. He was later transferred to Manhattan Psychiatric Center, and escaped from that facility. Consequently, the defendant's arrest was not effected until November 10, 1982.

The defendant sought suppression of any statements made by him to Detective Tennariello at the hospital without the benefit of the Miranda warnings. Following a Huntley hearing held during the trial, but outside the presence of the jury ( see, People v. Huntley, 15 N.Y.2d 72, 255 N.Y.S.2d 838, 204 N.E.2d 179, on remand 46 Misc.2d 209, 259 N.Y.S.2d 369, affd. 27 A.D.2d 904, 281 N.Y.S.2d 970, affd. 21 N.Y.2d 659, 287 N.Y.S.2d 90, 234 N.E.2d 252). Criminal Term granted the motion to suppress finding that the statements were the product of an interrogation which was essentially custodial and without the benefit of Miranda warnings. The court further found that exclusion of the statements was mandated by the defendant's mental condition and the absence of any facts from which to determine the accuracy of the Russian translation of Detective Tennariello's questions and the defendant's responses. Upon those facts, Criminal Term ruled that the prosecution failed to sustain its burden of proving the voluntariness of the defendant's statements beyond a reasonable doubt.

Subsequently, the trial court permitted reargument of its suppression ruling. In a complete reversal of its prior determination, Criminal Term found that the defendant was not in custody at the time he spoke to Detective Tennariello, thereby obviating the need for the administration of the Miranda warnings.

On appeal, the defendant's position is that the conditions under which he was questioned constituted the practical equivalent of custodial interrogation and, therefore, the statements he made without being informed of his Miranda rights were inadmissible. We are compelled to conclude, contrary to Criminal Term's ruling upon reargument, that the defendant's statements were the product of a custodial interrogation and that, since he was not given Miranda warnings prior thereto, his statements must be suppressed.

Implicit in our inquiry is the principle that only statements made as a result of custodial interrogation must be preceded by Miranda warnings. Neither formal arrest nor mere investigatory focus is the hallmark of whether interrogation is custodial. Rather, an individual is deemed to be in custody when he has been "deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way" ( Miranda v. Arizona, supra, at 444). In deciding whether the accused was in custody prior to being interrogate the subjective beliefs of the accused are not determinative. The appropriate test is "what a reasonable [person], innocent of any crime, would have thought had he been in the [accused's] position" ( People v. Yukl, 25 N.Y.2d 585, 589, 307 N.Y.S.2d 857, 256 N.E.2d 172, mot. to amend remittitur denied 26 N.Y.2d 845, 883, 309 N.Y.S.2d 593, 258 N.E.2d 90, cert. denied 400 U.S. 851, 91 S.Ct. 78, 27 L.Ed.2d 89; Matter of Kwok T., 43 N.Y.2d 213, 219-220, 401 N.Y.S.2d 52, 371 N.E.2d 814). Generally, the determination of whether an interrogation is custodial is an issue of fact ( People v. Williamson, 51 N.Y.2d 801, 433 N.Y.S.2d 93, 412 N.E.2d 1319; People v. McIntyre, 138 A.D.2d 634, 526 N.Y.S.2d 217 [2d Dept., 1988] ). As such, the suppression court's findings are afforded great deference and should not be disturbed unless they are unsupported by the evidence (see, People v. McIntyre, supra; People v. Oates, 104 A.D.2d 907, 480 N.Y.S.2d 518).

Applying these principles to the case before us, we conclude that the hospital interrogation was conducted in an atmosphere and in physical surroundings which were inherently coercive. Therefore the interrogation was custodial in nature. It follows then that the defendant could not be questioned until he received pre-interrogation Miranda warnings. The defendant's confinement at Metropolitan Hospital was apparently pursuant to an involuntary commitment order (see, Mental Hygiene Law § 9.41). As Criminal Term recognized, although the defendant was not confined to a prison ward, he was not free to leave the hospital. Thus, the Miranda language defining custody as the deprivation of an accused's freedom in any significant way is...