People v. Tyler
| Decision Date | 23 January 1984 |
| Parties | The PEOPLE, etc., Respondent, v. Allen TYLER, Appellant. |
| Court | New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division |
Howard Finkelstein, New York City, for appellant.
John J. Santucci, Dist. Atty., Kew Gardens (Annette Cohen, Bellerose, of counsel), for respondent.
Before MOLLEN, P.J., and LAZER, MANGANO and BROWN, JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY THE COURT.
Appeal by defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Queens County, rendered July 3, 1979, convicting him of manslaughter in the first degree, upon his plea of guilty, and imposing sentence. The appeal brings up for review the denial, after a hearing, of defendant's motion to suppress statements.
Judgment reversed, on the law and the facts, plea vacated, plea of not guilty reinstated, and case remitted to Criminal Term for further proceedings consistent herewith.
The indictment charged the defendant and a codefendant with murder in the second degree, attempted robbery in the first degree, and criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree. The evidence adduced at the suppression hearing reveals that on August 6, 1978 at about 3:15 P.M., at the precinct squad room in the presence of Police Officer Inness, Detective Sullivan and Detective McMillan, the defendant was advised of his Miranda rights, waived those rights and agreed to make a statement. Assistant District Attorney Bly was called to the precinct in order to take the defendant's statement. At approximately 4:00 P.M., in the commanding officer's room, defendant was again advised of his Miranda rights, this time by Assistant District Attorney Bly, in the presence of Detectives Sullivan and McMillan. At this point, defendant invoked his right to counsel. Bly then ended all conversation with the defendant, who was thereupon removed to the squad room where Police Officer Inness took custody of him. Inness, who had not been present in the squad room when the defendant invoked his right to counsel and had not been advised by his fellow officers or Bly that defendant wanted to confer with counsel, testified that in the squad room the defendant initiated a conversation with him, by asking whether Inness remembered him. Inness responded in the negative. After a pause, the defendant asked Inness whether he was the police officer who had spoken to him and the codefendant the night before. Inness testified at the hearing that he said to defendant "I told you if you didn't get off the street you would get in trouble that evening * * * Look what happened", at which point the defendant said that "he really didn't mean to shoot the guy, but it was an accident". Inness then asked the defendant whether he had had a gun at the time that Inness was talking to him and the codefendant the night before, and the defendant responded in the affirmative and then went on to say that he and the codefendant intended to rob the victim, but that the "gun went off accidentally". Thereafter, Inness repeated the conversation which he had just had with the defendant to Detectives Sullivan and McMillan and told the detectives that the defendant wished to make a statement. The defendant then made a statement to Assistant District Attorney Bly which was taped. The trial court denied in its entirety the defendant's motion to suppress the statements made to Police Officer Inness and Assistant District Attorney Bly. Thereafter, the defendant pleaded guilty to manslaughter in the first degree.
It is well established that once a suspect in custody requests the assistance of counsel, he may not be questioned in the absence of an attorney (People v. Harris, 57 N.Y.2d 335, 456 N.Y.S.2d 694, 442 N.E.2d 1205, cert. den. 460 U.S. 1047, 103 S.Ct. 1448, 75 L.Ed.2d 803; People v. Cunningham, 49 N.Y.2d 203, 424 N.Y.S.2d 421, 400 N.E.2d 360; People v. Samuels, 49 N.Y.2d 218, 424 N.Y.S.2d 892, 400 N.E.2d 1344). Any subsequent waiver of the right to counsel outside the presence of counsel cannot be given legal effect and any statements made by the defendant must be suppressed unless they are in fact spontaneous (People v. Carmine A., 53 N.Y.2d 816, 439 N.Y.S.2d 915, 422 N.E.2d 575; People v. Lucas, 53 N.Y.2d 678, 439 N.Y.S.2d 99, 421 N.E.2d 494; People v. Cunningham, supra ). The trial court...
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