People v. Valdez
| Decision Date | 27 March 1986 |
| Docket Number | No. 83CA0456,83CA0456 |
| Citation | 725 P.2d 29 |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Lloyd Louis VALDEZ, Defendant-Appellant. . III |
| Court | Colorado Court of Appeals |
Duane Woodard, Atty. Gen., Charles B. Howe, Chief Deputy Atty. Gen., Richard H. Forman, Sol. Gen., David R. Little, Asst. Atty. Gen., Denver, for plaintiff-appellee.
David F. Vela, Public Defender, Michael J. Heher, Deputy Public Defender, Denver, for defendant-appellant.
Defendant, Lloyd Louis Valdez, appeals the judgment entered upon his conviction by a jury of first degree assault and of being an habitual criminal. Defendant contends that the trial court erred in: (1) allowing the use of constitutionally invalid convictions to impeach defendant and as a basis for imposing a life sentence; (2) admitting evidence that was irrelevant, improper, and grossly prejudicial; (3) denying defendant's right to a speedy trial; (4) allowing the prosecution's improper argument; (5) denying defendant's right to be present during an important part of the trial; and (6) improperly instructing the jury on defendant's prior habitual criminal convictions. Disagreeing with defendant's contentions, we affirm.
In support of the first degree assault charge, the prosecution presented evidence that on November 19, 1983, while defendant was incarcerated in the Colorado Correctional Center, he threatened to kill one guard with a pair of scissors, and when a second guard entered the room, he grabbed him and pressed the scissors against his side. Defendant testified that he had not threatened anyone with scissors.
Although contending they were constitutionally infirm, defendant admitted the following prior convictions: burglary in 1972; conspiracy to commit burglary and "little habitual criminal" in 1961; burglary and "little habitual criminal" in 1956; theft by receiving in 1950; and burglary in 1945.
In determining whether a conviction is constitutionally flawed, the defendant must make a prima facie showing that the prior conviction was obtained in violation of his constitutional rights. Only after the defendant has made such a showing does the burden shift to the People to demonstrate the conviction's constitutional validity by a preponderance of the evidence. People v. Mascarenas, 632 P.2d 1028 (Colo.1981). A prima facie showing in the context of this case means evidence which, when considered in a light most favorable to the defendant with all reasonable inferences drawn in his favor, will permit the court to conclude that the defendant's plea of guilty was not obtained in accordance with his constitutional rights to due process. People v. Shaver, 630 P.2d 600 (Colo.1981).
The sole conviction which defendant challenged by testimonial evidence was a 1972 conviction. No transcript of the hearing in that prosecution was available. Although we agree that defendant's direct testimony was adequate pursuant to Mascarenas and Shaver, supra, initially to raise a prima facie case of constitutional infirmity in the acceptance of his guilty plea in that proceeding, see People v. Buggs, 631 P.2d 1200 (Colo.App.1981), we do not agree that the trial court erred in admitting the 1972 conviction for impeachment purposes and as a predicate conviction for sentence enhancement.
Once the defendant made his prima facie case, the burden shifted to the People to demonstrate the conviction's validity by a preponderance of the evidence. The People introduced documentary evidence that, at the entry of the plea and pursuant to the applicable version of Crim.P. 11, defendant was represented by counsel. By cross-examination, the People elicited admissions that defendant was represented by very competent counsel and was satisfied with his representation, that the plea was the result of a favorable plea bargain, and that defendant had been through previous pleas and a jury trial for burglary.
Citing People v. Fordyce, 705 P.2d 8 (Colo.App.1985), the trial court stated that even though it viewed defendant's testimony in its most favorable light, the testimony was totally incredible and, therefore, defendant had failed to establish a prima facie case. People v. Fordyce, supra (). See generally J. Wigmore, Evidence §§ 2487 and 2494 (3rd ed. 1940).
Here, at the conclusion of defendant's direct testimony, viewed in its most favorable light, a prima facie case had been made, and the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence shifted to the People. However, since the trial court relied upon the evidence as a whole in finding that defendant's testimony was totally incredible, we conclude that the trial court necessarily determined that the People had sustained its burden of proof. Thus, any error in phrasing the trial court's ruling was harmless.
Defendant's challenges to the remaining prior convictions submitted to the jury are without merit. The other prior convictions charged that were fatally infirm were either excluded or withdrawn.
Defendant objects to the trial court's admission of allegedly improper, irrelevant, and grossly prejudicial evidence. Defendant's objections are not well taken.
There are two principles applicable to the admission of the challenged evidence: (1) invited error and (2) plain error.
The doctrine of invited error provides that when the court acquiesces in a course of conduct urged by the defendant, the defendant is estopped on appeal from raising as error that conduct or its result. People v. Shackelford, 182 Colo. 48, 511 P.2d 19 (1973).
There are two instances of invited error in the present case. First, defense counsel had requested that the jury be read the habitual criminal charges, and second, defense counsel participated in the redaction process of numerous exhibits. Thus, defendant cannot now raise these issues as a basis for reversal. People v. Shackelford, supra.
As to the remainder of the evidence now challenged, defendant did not object at trial to its admissibility. Hence, our inquiry on appeal is limited to whether the admission of such evidence amounts to plain error. See Ramirez v. People, 682 P.2d 1181 (Colo.1984). To meet the burden of demonstrating plain error, there must be a reasonable possibility that the alleged error contributed to the defendant's conviction. See Ramirez v. People, supra.
We agree with the People's contention that, given the overwhelming evidence of defendant's guilt, any error did not substantially influence the jury verdict or affect the fairness of the trial proceedings.
Defendant asserts he was denied a fair trial by virtue of the prosecutor's improper arguments that defendant's prior convictions demonstrated his criminal character. We disagree.
The scope of final argument rests in the sound discretion of the trial court, and its rulings thereon will not be disturbed by an appellate court in the absence of a...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
People v. Auman
...Next, we examine the absence of defendant and counsel while the jury actually viewed the videotape. We find no error. In People v. Valdez, 725 P.2d 29 (Colo.App.1986), a division of this court held that replaying for the jury an audiotape involving a defense witness did not constitute a cri......
-
People v. Valdez
...and Valdez appealed. The Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court on March 27, 1986. People v. Valdez, 725 P.2d 29 (Colo.App.1986). Valdez timely filed a petition for rehearing with the Court of Appeals, which petition was denied. Valdez, by his attorney, then file......
-
People v. Chavez
...by an appellate court in the absence of a gross abuse of discretion resulting in prejudice and a denial of justice. People v. Valdez, 725 P.2d 29, 32 (Colo.App.1986). A contention that the prosecution engaged in improper argument must be evaluated in the context of the argument as a whole a......
-
People v. Hogan, No. 02CA0396.
...the jury. Absent a contrary showing, it is presumed that the jury understood and heeded the court's instructions. People v. Valdez, 725 P.2d 29 (Colo.App.1986). While certain comments and conduct of the prosecutor were questionable and occasionally improper, considered either in isolation o......