People v. Chavez

• Decision Date: 11 August 2011
• Docket Number: No. 08CA2144.,08CA2144.
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Adrian CHAVEZ, Defendant–Appellant.
• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals

313 P.3d 594

The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff–Appellee,

v.Adrian CHAVEZ, Defendant–Appellant.

No. 08CA2144.

Colorado Court of Appeals,

Div. I.

July 21, 2011.

As Modified on Denial of Rehearing Aug. 11, 2011.^*

John W. Suthers, Attorney General, Carmen Moraleda, Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff–Appellee.

Douglas K. Wilson, Colorado State Public Defender, Rebecca R. Freyre, Deputy State Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant–Appellant.

Opinion by Judge TERRY.

Defendant, Adrian Chavez, appeals the judgment of conviction entered on jury verdicts finding him guilty of sexual assault—aided and abetted, sexual assault on a child—force, sexual assault on a child, enticement of a child, and enticement of a child—bodily injury. He also appeals his designation as a sexually violent predator (SVP).

Because we conclude the trial court should have granted challenges for cause to two prospective jurors who expressed actual bias; defendant exercised peremptory challenges to excuse those jurors; and he exhausted all of his peremptory challenges, we further conclude that under Morrison v. People, 19 P.3d 668, 671 (Colo.2000), and People v. Macrander, 828 P.2d 234, 244 (Colo.1992), his conviction must be reversed and a new trial held on remand. As a result of this disposition, we need not address the other trial issues raised by defendant or his challenge to his SVP designation.

I. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

We review a trial court's ruling on a juror challenge for cause for an abuse of discretion based on the entire voir dire at issue. People v. Young, 16 P.3d 821, 824 (Colo.2001). A trial court abuses its discretion if its ruling is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair. People v. Montoya, 141 P.3d 916, 919 (Colo.App.2006).

This is a “very high standard of review” that gives deference to the trial court's superior ability to assess a potential juror's credibility. Young, 16 P.3d at 824 (quoting Carrillo v. People, 974 P.2d 478, 485–86 (Colo.1999)). “The placing of this discretion in the trial judge does not, however, permit appellate courts to abdicate their responsibility to ensure that the requirements of fairness are fulfilled.” Morgan v. People, 624 P.2d 1331, 1332 (Colo.1981); see also People v. Hancock, 220 P.3d 1015, 1016 (Colo.App.2009).

Constitutional principles of due process guarantee a criminal defendant the right to a fair trial. Morrison, 19 P.3d at 672. An impartial jury is fundamental to that right, and “[a] defendant's right to an impartial jury is violated if the trial court fails to remove a juror biased against the defendant.” Id.; see also Nailor v. People, 200 Colo. 30, 31, 612 P.2d 79, 79 (1980). A defendant's right to challenge prospective jurors for cause is integral to his or her right to a fair trial. Carrillo, 974 P.2d at 486;Macrander, 828 P.2d at 238.

Section 16–10–103(1)(j), C.R.S.2010, codifies these precepts and states that a trial court must excuse a prospective juror for cause where “[t]he existence of a state of mind in the juror evinc[es] enmity or bias toward the defendant or the state.” However, the statute further provides:

[N]o person summoned as a juror shall be disqualified by reason of a previously formed or expressed opinion with reference to the guilt or innocence of the accused, if the court is satisfied, from the examination of the juror or from other evidence, that he will render an impartial verdict according to the law and the evidence submitted to the jury at the trial.

Id.

Where a prospective juror is challenged on grounds of actual bias, the trial court must consider whether the juror will render an impartial verdict based on the law and the evidence. Young, 16 P.3d at 824. The trial court must grant the challenge if the prospective juror is unwilling or unable to render an impartial verdict based upon the court's instructions and the evidence admitted at trial. Morrison, 19 P.3d at 672.

Several rules guide a trial court's analysis in this regard. For example, a trial court may give considerable weight to a prospective juror's statement that he or she can fairly and impartially decide the case. People v. Sandoval, 733 P.2d 319, 321 (Colo.1987); People v. Simon, 100 P.3d 487, 492 (Colo.App.2004). Further, a challenge should not be sustained if the subsequent examination of the prospective juror reveals that the alleged bias “was the product of mistake, confusion, or some other factor unrelated to the juror's ability to render a fair and impartial verdict.” People v. Blessett, 155 P.3d 388, 392 (Colo.App.2006); see also People v. Russo, 713 P.2d 356, 362 (Colo.1986). A trial court should resolve any doubts as to a prospective juror's impartiality by excusing the juror. Morrison, 19 P.3d at 672.

Reversal is required if a trial court erroneously denies a challenge for cause and the defendant exhausts his or her peremptory challenges. Id. at 671;Macrander, 828 P.2d at 244.

II. Voir Dire

Defendant contends the trial court erred in denying his challenges for cause to Jurors P., M., and R. We agree as to Jurors P. and R., and because reversal of defendant's conviction is therefore required, we need not decide whether the challenge for cause to Juror M. should have been sustained.

When viewed in context of the entire voir dire, the statements of Jurors P. and R. indicate that it was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to deny defendant's challenges for cause to them. In the early part of voir dire, these prospective jurors made fairly innocuous statements. However, toward the close of voir dire, defense counsel raised a significant issue that revealed these prospective jurors harbored a significant bias. The trial court declined to extend voir dire to conduct potentially rehabilitative questioning. Under the circumstances presented here, the trial court erred in not dismissing these jurors for cause.

Defense counsel questioned jurors early in voir dire about the prosecution's burden of proof. Near the close of voir dire, defense counsel informed the prospective jurors for the first time that evidence would be presented at trial showing that defendant had shot someone other than the alleged sexual assault victim. Defense counsel carefully questioned each prospective juror about the impact this evidence might have on him or her. The course of voir dire showed how the views of Jurors P. and R. stood in stark contrast to those of all the other jurors, except for Juror M., who was not excused for cause, and two others who were excused for cause.

Defense counsel first asked a prospective juror, “Do you think you can separate [evidence of the shooting] in your mind, even if you think [defendant] acted inappropriately? Can you still make the prosecution meet their [sic] burden with regard to the accusations?” The juror said that she could, and counsel posed the same question to three additional prospective jurors, all of whom said they could mentally separate the shooting from the sexual assault for which defendant was on trial.

Juror B. (who was later excused for cause) was the first to disagree, stating:

It would give me [a] propensity to believe there was—there was other behavior. I would try to focus on the task at hand, but just associating it with other deviant acts, I would have a hard time differentiating it.

Juror B. reiterated that the shooting would cloud her judgment and ease the prosecution's burden.

Defense counsel said to the next prospective juror, “The prosecution has the burden with regard to the accusations of the sexual assault. Do you understand that?” The juror said that he did and agreed to hold the prosecution to that burden. Defense counsel then asked five more prospective jurors for their thoughts on the matter, and all five indicated that the shooting would not influence their decision. Counsel told one of these jurors, “The judge is going to tell you [the shooting] can only be used for a limited purpose.”

When defense counsel questioned Juror H. (who was later excused for cause), he indicated that, in his mind, the shooting would shift the burden to defendant:

JUROR H.: Honestly I believe that someone that's a criminal is more likely to commit a crime. So I mean, I think that would put him at a lower level to start out with, shifted a lot more burden on your side.

DEFENSE COUNSEL: Okay. [The prosecution is] starting up a little higher than we are; is that what you are saying?

JUROR H.: That is what I'm saying because I do feel that someone that's already a proven criminal is more likely to be a criminal than somebody who is not.

Defense counsel reminded Juror H., “I told someone earlier the judge is going to tell you [that] you are not supposed to do that.” The juror responded, “I can certainly try my best,” but added, “My opinion is my opinion.”

The next three prospective jurors indicated that they would be able to separate the two acts and hold the prosecution to its burden to prove the sexual assault.

At this point, the end of the trial day was approaching, and the trial court told defense counsel that she needed to “finish up.” She then asked Juror P. whether the shooting would give the prosecution a “leg up.” He replied:

JUROR P.: To answer quite honestly, I feel lack of judgment shown in the shooting would color my opinion. I'd have a hard time getting past it. I'd have to hear evidence, of course, but the lack of judgment is a big thing.... I feel I probably would just tie those together.

DEFENSE COUNSEL: Same question to you I've been asking everyone.

JUROR P.: [Defendant] only had [a] couple points to start with, yeah, to be honest.

DEFENSE COUNSEL: [It would] give [the prosecution] a little advantage, improving the allegations in this case, in your mind?

JUROR P.: Yeah ... I'm really anti-violent, just the ability to pull a trigger to shoot someone, that shows a lot of character. To me it's a big thing.

DEFENSE COUNSEL: So more likely you would think that he is...