People v. Van Dyke

• Citation: 245 N.E.2d 324,106 Ill.App.2d 411
• Decision Date: 28 February 1969
• Docket Number: 68--90,Gen. Nos. 68--89
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. Charles VAN DYKE, Appellant.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

Page 324

245 N.E.2d 324

106 Ill.App.2d 411

PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. Charles VAN DYKE, Appellant.

Gen. Nos. 68--89, 68--90.

Appellate Court of Illinois, Second District.

Feb. 28, 1969.

John O. Vogel, Deputy Public Defender, Wheaton, for appellant.

Wm. V. Hopf, State's Atty., Helen Kenney, Asst. State's Atty., Wheaton, for appellee.

DAVIS, Justice.

The sole issue on this appeal is whether 'Under all the circumstances disclosed in the record * * * the defendant was adequately represented by counsel.'

In the latter part of July, 1967, the defendant, Charles Van Dyke, was charged with various sexual offenses. He was unable to make bail and, consequently, remained in jail. Prior to indictment, he retained Carl Kuhn (herein called Kuhn) as private counsel, to represent him. Kuhn, and attorney John Lang (herein called Lang), who filed an appearance on behalf of the defendant, filed three petitions for a writ of habeas corpus, seeking his release, and Lang acted as trial counsel on his behalf.

In Circuit Court cause number 67--1899 G, the defendant was indicted for indecent liberties with a child, Barbara Godenius. This case was tried before a jury on November 14, 1967. Lang called no witnesses on behalf of the defendant, but did attack the weaknesses of the People's case. The jury returned a not guilty verdict.

On November 21, 1967, a jury returned a verdict finding the defendant guilty in cause number 67--2526 G. The information in this cause contained two counts. Count I charged the defendant with contributing to the sexual delinquency of Rebel Rayboss, a minor; and Count II made the same charge with reference to Mary Anne Van Dyke, the minor daughter of the defendant.

The defendant was also indicted, in Circuit Court cause number 67--1898 G, for indecent liberties and aggravated incest with said Mary Anne Van Dyke. This case was heard before a jury which rendered a verdict of guilty on November 22, 1967.

Lang, who also acted as the defendant's trial counsel in the two cases wherein guilty verdicts were returned, followed the same tactical procedures therein as he had used in the jury trial wherein the not guilty verdict was returned.

In Circuit Court cause number 67--1898 G, the defendant was sentenced to serve not less than 6 nor more than 12 years at the State Penitentiary at Joliet; and in cause number 67--2526 G, he was sentenced to serve 1 year at said penitentiary, this sentence to be served concurrently with that in cause number 67--1898 G.

In each case wherein a jury verdict of guilty was returned, Lang moved for a mistrial; filed a motion for a directed verdict at the close of the People's case; submitted adequate instructions on behalf of the defendant; fully argued the case to the jury; filed a comprehensive motion in arrest of, and to vacate, the judgment; and filed motion for new trial. He fully argued the posttrial motions, offfered numerous citations in support of the motions and appeared for the defendant at the hearing in aggravation and mitigation in each case. After sentence in cause number 67--1898 G, the defendant asked for an appeal, and the court appointed Lang to represent him therein.

After the hearing in aggravation and mitigation in cause number 67--2526 G and the pronouncement of sentence, the defendant addressed the court and made a long and rambling statement wherein he stated that Kuhn, his lawyer, came to the jail to get his money but never came back; that neither Kuhn nor Lang visited him in jail to learn about his case; that the facts were not brought out during the trial; that he was innocent; that his wife and Mrs. Rayboss lied on the witness stand and told Mary Anne Van Dyke and Rebel Rayboss what to say, as witnesses; that his wife's boy-friend had coached Mary Anne; that his present wife and his first wife were both unfaithful to him, and his present wife framed him; that his attorneys would not let his mother testify, and her testimony would have helped to clear him; and that his counsel would not let him take the stand.

In reply to the defendant's statement, Lang stated that he and Kuhn brought the defendant's mother to court during the trials, but concluded not to call her as a witness; that they knew what they were doing when they 'didn't put her on the stand.'

At the hearing in aggravation and mitigation in cause number 67--1898 G, it was brought out that the defendant was indicted in Cook County in 1956 for contributing to the delinquency of a minor; that he entered a plea of guilty to such charge; and that he was granted probation.

The trial judge, before whom the two cases (wherein the jury rendered verdicts of guilty) were tried, remarked that the defendant had been well represented at the trial, and that Lang's conduct at the trials indicated that he had spent 'a lot of time' in planning his defense. Even after the defendant made the statement, Lang represented him at the aggravation and mitigation hearing and argued in mitigation of the offense. After sentence, the defendant said he would like to have Lang represent him on appeal. Lang offered to do so, and was appointed by the court to prosecute the appeal.

The common law record reflects a letter dated March 8, 1968, from the defendant, addressed to the clerk, inquiring re the status of his appeals. On March 26, 1968, the court entered an order appointing the Public Defender of DuPage County to represent the defendant. The record is silent with reference to why Lang did not perfect the appeals. In this court, the appeals were consolidated for argument and opinion, and brief and excerpts were filed on behalf of the defendant by the Public Defender.

Under the circumstances herein related, it is obvious that the written posttrial motions prepared by Lang would not specify inadequacy of counsel as a basis for posttrial relief. Section 116--1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1967, which was in effect at the time of the defendant's trial, requires that motions for a new trial in a criminal case shall be in writing and shall specify the grounds therefor. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1967, ch. 38, par. 116--1.)

Under the doctrine of the People v. Flynn, 8 Ill.2d 116, 118, 119, 133 N.E.2d 257 (1956), if the party seeking a new trial files a written motion specifying the grounds relied on therein, he is confined on review to the reasons specified in the trial court; however, if such party makes a nonspecific oral motion for new trial, which is not objected to by the State, then all issues may be raised on review. Also see: People v. Whitehead, 35 Ill.2d 501, 503, 504, 221 N.E.2d 256 (1966). However, Supreme Court Rule 615(a) provides that errors or defects affecting substantial rights may be considered on appeal although they were not brought to the attention of the trial court. Also see: People v. Burson, 11 Ill.2d 360, 371, 143 N.E.2d 239 (1957). Consequently, we will consider the issue of inadequacy of counsel.

In People v. Morris, 3 Ill.2d 437, at pages 444 and 445, 121 N.E.2d 810, at page 815 (1954), the court stated:

'Where the defendant selects his own attorney the court has held, almost without exception, that the failure of such counsel to exercise care and skill in the trial of the case does not afford a basis for reversing a judgment of conviction. (citations.)

'In People v. Pierce, 387 Ill. 608, at page 615, 57 N.E.2d 345, at page 348, it was said: 'Pierce employed his own counsel in the court below. The record does not disclose that he was either incompetent or remiss in performing his duty toward plaintiff in error. But even if it were otherwise, plaintiff in error's contention that he was poorly represented at the trial would be of no legal moment, as his attorney was of his own choosing.' To the same general effect is a recent Post-Conviction Hearing Act case, Mitchell v. People, 411 Ill. 407, 104 N.E.2d 285. In holding that the petitioner was not denied due process of law by reason of the alleged incompetency of his trial attorneys, this court said in 411 Ill. at pages 407--408, 104 N.E.2d, at page 285: 'Ordinarily, a defendant who retains counsel of his own selection is responsible if that counsel does not faithfully serve his interest. Any other rule would put a premium upon pretended incompetence of counsel; for, if the rule were otherwise, a lawyer with a desperate case would have only to neglect it in order to ensure reversal or vacation of the conviction.''

Also see: People v. Nordstrom, 73 Ill.App.2d 168, 182, 183, 219 N.E.2d 151 (1966).

In Morris, at page 443, 121 N.E.2d, at page 814, the court stated:

'The conduct of counsel in a criminal trial in a State court may be such as to amount to the defendant being deprived of due process of law in violation of the fourteenth amendment of the Federal constitution. It has been established that the assistance of counsel may, under certain circumstances, be an essential element of due process. Since Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53 S.Ct. 55, 77 L.Ed. 158, decided in 1932, this general question has been considered many times. See, for example: White v. Ragen, 324 U.S. 760, 763--764, 65 S.Ct. 978, 89 L.Ed. 1348; Wade v. Mayo, 334 U.S. 672, 68 S.Ct. 1270, 92 L.Ed. 1647; Tompsett v. Ohio, 6 Cir., 146 F.2d 95, 98; United States ex rel. Hall v. Ragen, D.C., 60 F.Supp. 820; Coates v. Lawrence, D.C., 46 F.Supp. 414, 421--422; Wilson v. State, 222 Ind. 63, 79--82, 51 N.E.2d 848.'

It is, thus, apparent that the...