People v. Van Sickle

• Decision Date: 10 July 1963
• Citation: 242 N.Y.S.2d 34,13 N.Y.2d 61,192 N.E.2d 9
• Parties: , 192 N.E.2d 9 The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Appellant, v. Helen Montague VAN SICKLE, Respondent.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 34

242 N.Y.S.2d 34

13 N.Y.2d 61, 192 N.E.2d 9

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Appellant, v. Helen Montague VAN SICKLE, Respondent.

Court of Appeals of New York.

Decided July 10, 1963.

Abraham Isseks, Dist. Atty. (Angelo J. Ingrassia, Middletown, of counsel), for appellant.

Martyn Taub, Middletown, for respondent.

DESMOND, Chief Judge.

I join in the court's negative answer to the only question presented to us on this appeal, that is: must a criminal conviction be reversed solely because the lay complaining witness was allowed to conduct the prosecution? If there was before us for decision the must broader question as to the District Attorney's rights and duties I would say that the courts as well as the District Attorney himself must obey the plain, clear mandate of subdivision 1 of section 700 of the County Law, Consol.Laws, c. 11. That statute does not necessarily mean that the District Attorney or his deputy must be physically present at every criminal hearing in the county. However, it means at least that the District Attorney, as the elected representative of the people and charged with this responsibility, must carry the responsibility and must set up a system whereby he knows of all the criminal prosecutions in his county and either appears therein in person or by assistant or consents to appearance on his behalf by other public officers or private attorneys.

I concur for reversal.

VAN VOORHIS, Judge (concurring in result).

This defendant was convicted of the misdemeanor of assault in the third degree, in the City Court of Middletown, sitting as a Court of Special Sessions. It had jurisdiction under subdivision 2 of section 56 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Her judgment of conviction was reversed, however, by the County Court, upon the ground that the prosecution was conducted by the complaining witness who was the alleged victim of the assault. She and the defendant, and another woman, fell into an altercation in the washroom of a bar and grill. Neither the District Attorney nor an assistant was present at the trial, the charge was not preferred or prosecuted by a public officer, but by the woman who claimed to have been mauled by defendant in the washroom. The defendant was represented by an attorney at the trial. The witnesses for the prosecution were examined and defendant and her witness cross-examined, not unskillfully, by the complaining witness. Was that circumstances in itself sufficient to require reversal of the judgment of conviction?

The County Court considered that subdivision 1 of section 700 of the County Law required the District Attorney 'to conduct all prosecutions for crimes and offenses cognizable by the courts of the county', that the People of the State of New York and not the complaining witness are the real party in interest (Code Crim.Proc., § 6), that no one except an attorney is allowed to act as attorney or counselor at law or to receive compensation therefor in any court in the State (Penal Law, Consol.Laws, 40, § 270, 271), that a lay prosecutor lacks the character of a 'quasi-judicial officer' for the protection of a defendant's rights and that prosecution by a complaining witness is unauthorized by statute. The opinion of the County Court recognizes that petty crimes or offenses of this nature may be prosecuted by administrative officers or attorneys other than the District Attorney (People v. Czajka, 11 N.Y.2d 253, 228 N.Y.S.2d 809, 183 N.E.2d 216), but deemed this supposed extension of the right to prosecute to depend, in theory, upon an implied power to do so granted to the particular officer by the Legislature by virtue of an imposition on him of a duty to enforce the particular law. We think that this imposes greater limitations than the Legislature intended.

Prosecution was by a Deputy Sheriff in People v. DeLeyden (10 N.Y.2d 293, 220 N.Y.S.2d 961, 177 N.E.2d 924), by a Village Attorney in People v. Leombruno (10 N.Y.2d 900, 223 N.Y.S.2d 516, 179 N.E.2d 517), by an Assistant Corporation Counsel in People v. Schildhaus (4 N.Y.2d 883, 174 N.Y.S.2d 465, 150 N.E.2d 768), and by a Deputy Town Attorney in People v. Czajka (supra). In none of those decisions, to be sure, was the prosecution by a complaining witness, but neither was it conducted by a District Attorney as would have been necessary if respondent's interpretation of subdivision 1 of section 700 of the County Law were correct. We do not doubt that the District Attorney has the right to prosecute in any criminal action pending before a Justice of the Peace if he elects to do so before it goes to trial. Instead of insisting upon this prerogative, the District Attorney in this case is contending for a ruling that the complaining witness was entitled to prosecute, and is asking on that ground that the judgment of conviction of the defendant be reinstated subject to the power of the County Court to review on the facts. The cases above cited do not hold that only a public officer may conduct a prosecution in a Court of Special Sessions, acting within the field of his jurisdiction outside of the City of New York, neither do they hold that it is essential to conviction that a public officer shall have represented the People. A Police Judge or Justice of the Peace is empowered to preside at the trial and it is his function to see that the trial be conducted fairly and according to law. He may request the District Attorney to appear or be represented, if he sees fit, although we think...