People v. Sabin
| Citation | 236 Mich. App. 1,600 N.W.2d 98 |
| Decision Date | 01 October 1999 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 187226. |
| Parties | PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. James Arthur SABIN, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Michigan (US) |
Jennifer M. Granholm, Attorney General, Thomas L. Casey, Solicitor General, James J. Gregart, Prosecuting Attorney, and Judith B. Ketchum, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for the people.
Martin J. Beres, St. Clair Shores, for the defendant on appeal. Before: RICHARD ALLEN GRIFFIN, P.J., and McDONALD and WHITBECK,1 JJ.
ON REMAND
On May 16, 1997, this Court reversed defendant's convictions and remanded for a new trial, holding that "[d]efendant was entitled to a fair trial but did not receive one." People v. Sabin, 223 Mich.App. 530, 539, 566 N.W.2d 677 (1997). Thereafter, the people timely appealed, and on August 29, 1997, the Supreme Court issued an order holding the appeal in abeyance pending the decision of People v. Starr, 457 Mich. 490, 577 N.W.2d 673 (1998). No further action was taken by the Supreme Court until December 22, 1998, at which time 459 Mich. 920, 589 N.W.2d 779 (1998).
On remand, we have reconsidered our prior decision in light of Starr and Crawford. After doing so, we reaffirm our previous opinion and again reverse and remand for a new trial.
is the most recent Supreme Court decision construing a much litigated rule of evidence, MRE 404(b). In Crawford, the defendant was convicted following a jury trial of possession with intent to deliver 50 to 225 grams of cocaine. MCL 333.7401(2)(a)(iii); MSA 14.15(7401)(2)(a)(iii). Over the defendant's objection, the people moved to admit into evidence testimony regarding the defendant's prior conviction of delivery and conspiracy to deliver 225 to 650 grams of cocaine. During a pretrial motion, the prosecutor successfully convinced the trial court to admit evidence of the prior conviction on the grounds that it was relevant to show "defendant's knowledge of the presence of cocaine and his intent to deliver it." Crawford, supra at 381, 582 N.W.2d 785.
After the defendant's conviction was affirmed by this Court, the defendant appealed to the Supreme Court, which reversed and remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. The Supreme Court held that the purposes for which the prior conviction was offered by the prosecution were not relevant and material to the issues in the case. The Supreme Court explained:
[A] common pitfall in MRE 404(b) cases is the trial courts' tendency to admit the prior misconduct evidence merely because it has been "offered" for one of the rule's enumerated proper purposes. Mechanical recitation of "knowledge, intent, absence of mistake, etc.," without explaining how the evidence relates to the recited purposes, is insufficient to justify admission under MRE 404(b). If it were, the prosecutor could routinely admit character evidence by simply calling it something else. Relevance is not an inherent characteristic, Huddleston [v. United States ] 485 U.S. [681] 689, [108 S.Ct. 1496, 99 L.Ed.2d 771 (1988) ], nor are prior bad acts intrinsically relevant to "motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan," etc. Relevance is a relationship between the evidence and a material fact at issue that must be demonstrated by reasonable inferences that make a material fact at issue more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. [Crawford, supra at 387-388
, 582 N.W.2d 785 (emphasis in original).]
After noting that all elements of a criminal offense are "in issue" when a defendant enters a plea of not guilty, the Supreme Court set forth the initial screening function of MRE 404(b):
In the context of prior acts evidence, however, MRE 404(b) stands as a sentinel at the gate: the proffered evidence truly must be probative of something other than the defendant's propensity to commit the crime. If the prosecutor fails to weave a logical thread linking the prior act to the ultimate inference, the evidence must be excluded, notwithstanding its logical relevance to character.
, 582 N.W.2d 785 (emphasis in original).]
Crawford is consistent with numerous decisions of this Court, including our prior Sabin opinion and People v. Hoffman, 225 Mich.App. 103, 570 N.W.2d 146 (1997). In Hoffman, we affirmed a ruling of the trial court that admitted other-acts evidence for the purpose of establishing the defendant's motive to commit the crime. There, the defendant's professed hatred toward women (misogyny) and his statement that "women are all sluts and bitches and deserve to die" were held to establish more than a propensity toward violence. Id. at 109-110, 570 N.W.2d 146.
Further, in Hoffman, we discussed in a footnote the confusion that has arisen with the Supreme Court's characterization of MRE 404(b) as a rule of inclusion, not exclusion:
, 570 N.W.2d 146 (emphasis added).]
The above comment is in accord with Crawford, which holds that although the categories set forth in MRE 404(b) are not exhaustive, the purpose for which the evidence is offered must relate to an issue of consequence.
In defining "relevant evidence," MRE 401 specifies that for evidence to be relevant, it must also be material:
"Relevant evidence" means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. [Emphasis added.]
Further, MRE 402 provides that irrelevant evidence is not admissible:
All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the Constitution of the United States, the Constitution of the State of Michigan, these rules, or other rules adopted by the Supreme Court. Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible. [Emphasis added.]
Finally, as noted by the Crawford Court, the proponent of proposed evidence always bears the burden of showing its relevance and materiality:
The dissent vociferously objects to the proposition that the prosecutor must bear the burden of articulating a proper noncharacter purpose for the admission of prior acts evidence under MRE 404(b). However, the principle that the proponent of evidence bears the burden of establishing relevance and admissibility is a matter of basic hornbook law. See 22 Wright & K. Graham, Federal Practice & Procedure, § 5166, pp. 65-76. Instead of fashioning an argument why the prosecutor should be relieved of this burden in MRE 404(b) cases, the dissent accuses the majority of somehow shifting or heightening the prosecutor's burden under MRE 404(b). Our requirement that the prosecutor articulate a proper noncharacter purpose comports not only with the plain language of MRE 404(b), but also with the approach utilized by the majority of federal circuits. [Crawford, supra at 386, n. 6
, 582 N.W.2d 785.]
In the present case, the trial court admitted, as other-acts evidence, testimony regarding defendant's prior alleged sexual misconduct involving the victim's stepsister. These alleged acts of abuse ended more than ten years before trial and did not result in a charge or conviction. In permitting the other-acts testimony, the trial court ruled that "the evidence tends to show that defendant has committed other wrongful acts involving a child or juvenile, who was a member of the same household, which is the exact situation we have in the allegations of this trial." Although on appeal the prosecution argues that the other-acts evidence may have been admissible to establish defendant's "common scheme, plan, or system," the other acts were substantially dissimilar from defendant's charged conduct:
There is little physical similarity between the repeated acts of oral molestation described by the victim's stepsister and the violent, forcible vaginal rape alleged by the victim. Nor does the testimony indicate that defendant committed the acts in the same room or had some unique, consistent pattern or scheme in approaching, overcoming, or treating his victims. [Sabin, supra at 536
, 566 N.W.2d 677.]
In summary, after reconsideration, we conclude that our previous decision was consistent with, and is now supported by, the precedent of Crawford.
The second case that we are asked to consider is People v. Starr, supra.
In Starr, the trial court admitted into evidence other-acts evidence regarding the defendant's sexual abuse of the victim's younger half-sist...
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People v. Sabin
...prior decision because defendant's alleged abuse of his stepdaughter was "substantially dissimilar" from the charged conduct. 236 Mich.App. at 9, 600 N.W.2d 98. On examination of Starr, supra, the Court determined that Starr merely emphasized the third prong of People v. VanderVliet, 444 Mi......