People v. Vaughn

Decision Date30 May 2019
Docket NumberB277941
PartiesTHE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. ANTWOINE VAUGHN et al., Defendants and Appellants.
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

(Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. TA138408)

APPEAL from judgments of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. Eleanor J. Hunter, Judge. Affirmed in part, remanded in part, and sentence modifications.

Alex Coolman, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant Antwoine Vaughn.

Kelly C. Martin, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant Davaughn Love.

Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews, Supervising Deputy

Attorney General, and David E. Madeo, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

* * * * * *

In 2016, defendants Davaughn Love (Love) and Antwoine Vaughn (Vaughn) appealed their convictions for attempted premediated murder, shooting at an occupied vehicle, and, as to Vaughn, also being a felon in possession. In a nonpublished opinion, we affirmed their convictions after rejecting challenges due to alleged errors in jury selection, in the jury instructions, with the admission of evidence, in the sufficiency of the evidence, and in the prosecutor's conduct of the trial. We nevertheless remanded their cases to fix one sentencing error with Vaughn's sentence and so the trial court could exercise its discretion whether to strike a previously mandatory firearm enhancement. Love petitioned the Supreme Court for review. While his petition was pending, our Legislature enacted Senate Bill No. 1437 (S.B. 1437), which "amend[s] the felony murder rule and the natural and probable consequences doctrine, as it relates to murder" (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1, subd. (f)). Our Supreme Court remanded the matter to us for further consideration in light of S.B. 1437. We solicited supplemental briefing on the issue. We conclude that the impact of S.B. 1437 on Love's convictions and sentence must be assessed by the trial court in the first instance. Accordingly, we issue this revised opinion addressing all of Love's and Vaughn's arguments (including Love's S.B. 1437-related arguments, in the newly added section VIII in the Discussion section), and adhering to our prior disposition.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

I. Facts

In August 2015, Love and Vaughn were members of the Blocc Crips, a subset of the Rolling 100's street gang. At that time, the Rolling 100's gang was in the midst of a campaign to retaliate against the Hoover Criminals gang for killing a high-ranking Rolling 100's member. Consistent with this campaign, Love and Vaughn had filmed a video in which Vaughn, holding a rosary and a semiautomatic gun, pretended to fire into a fleeing crowd and then reloaded his gun while seated in a car. The video was subsequently uploaded onto YouTube.

On a Saturday in mid-August 2015, Vaughn enlisted Love to drive him into Hoover Criminals territory, and both defendants enlisted Timothy Boykins (Boykins), a former Rolling 30's member, to follow them in a separate car and videotape them. Defendants told Boykins they were going to "beat down" a rival gang member. However, when they got to rival gang territory, Love stopped the car, and Vaughn got out and approached a man standing on the sidewalk with a woman and two children. After exchanging a few words, Vaughn pulled out a gun and opened fire on the man's back. Vaughn continued "shooting wildly" as the man tried to flee into a nearby intersection. All in all, 10 bullets hit the man (causing injuries to his head, chest, leg, and hand), and three bullets struck a nearby car that was driving through the intersection. Vaughn got back into the car, and Love drove away. When Boykins later asked about the shooting, Vaughn told him it was "Blocc business."

Video cameras facing the intersection captured the shooting, but did not provide a clear image of the shooter's face. However, the shooting victim was shown a six-person photo spread and identified Vaughn as "the bitch that shot me." Love's and Vaughn's cell phones also put them at the location of the shooting at the time of the shooting. The next day, Love sent a text message to Vaughn, reminding him that "we gotta move that gat," which is slang for "gun."

II. Procedural Background

The People charged both defendants with (1) attempted premeditated murder (Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd. (a), 664),1 and (2) shooting at an occupied vehicle (§ 246).2 The People also charged Vaughn with being a felon in possession of a firearm (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1)). The People alleged that all three crimes were "for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with" a criminal street gang. (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(4).) The People further alleged that the attempted premeditated murder involved personal use (as to Vaughn) and a principal's use (as to Love) of a firearm (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)). The People lastly alleged that Love had two prior "strike" convictions within the meaning of our Three Strikes law (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(j), 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d)); that Love had served one prior prison term (§ 667.5, subd. (b)); and that Vaughn had served two prior prison terms (ibid.).

The case proceeded to a joint trial using separate juries. Both juries were instructed on all charged offenses. Love's jury was also instructed that it could convict Love of the charged offenses either (1) as a direct aider and abettor of those offenses, and (2) as a natural and probable consequence of aiding and abetting Vaughn in the commission of an assault or a conspiracy to commit assault.

Vaughn's jury found him guilty of all offenses and found all enhancements to be true. So did Love's.

The trial court sentenced Vaughn to prison for 55 years to life plus 10 years. For the attempted premeditated murder count, the court imposed a life sentence with a minimum 15-year parole term plus 25 years for the firearm enhancement. For the shooting at an occupied vehicle count, the court imposed a consecutive life sentence with a minimum 15-year parole term. And for the felon-in-possession count, the court imposed a consecutive 10-year sentence, comprised of a three-year base term plus seven years for the gang enhancement.

The trial court sentenced Love to prison for 47 years to life. For the attempted premeditated murder count, the court imposed a life sentence with a minimum seven-year parole term plus 25 years for the firearm enhancement. For the shooting at an occupied vehicle count, the court imposed a consecutive life sentence with a minimum 15-year parole term. The court stayed the gang enhancement for the attempted premeditated murder count.

Each defendant filed a timely notice of appeal.

DISCUSSION

I. Jury Selection

Vaughn argues that the trial court erred in overruling his objection that the prosecutor's use of peremptory strikes to remove four African-American female jurors violated Batson v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 79 (Batson) and People v. Wheeler (1978) 22 Cal.3d 258 (Wheeler).

Although a prosecutor may exercise a peremptory challenge to strike a prospective juror "'for any reason, or no reason at all' [citation]" (People v. Scott (2015) 61 Cal.4th 363, 387 (Scott)), he or she may not use a peremptory challenge to "'strike prospective jurors on the basis of group bias—that is, bias against "members of an identifiable group distinguished on racial, religious, ethnic, or similar grounds."'" (People v. Bell (2007) 40 Cal.4th 582, 596.) Doing so violates a defendant's federal right to equal protection set forth in Batson, supra, 476 U.S. at page 88 and his state right to a trial by a jury drawn from a representative cross-section of the community under article I, section 16, of the California Constitution set forth in Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d at pages 276 to 277. (Accord, People v. Gutierrez (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1150, 1157 (Gutierrez).)

A defendant bears the ultimate burden of showing a constitutional violation (People v. Lenix (2008) 44 Cal.4th 602, 612-613 (Lenix), but courts employ a three-step, burden-shifting mechanism in assessing whether a Batson/Wheeler violation has occurred. The defendant must first "make out a prima facie case by showing that the totality of the relevant facts gives rise to an inference of discriminatory purpose in the exercise of peremptory challenges." (Scott, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 383.) If the trial court finds that the defendant has established this prima facie case, the prosecutor must then "explain adequately the basis for excusing the juror by offering permissible, nondiscriminatory justifications." (Ibid.) Lastly, the court must make a "'sincere and reasoned effort to evaluate the nondiscriminatory justifications'" (People v. Williams (2013) 56 Cal.4th 630, 650), and "decide whether" the prosecutor's proffered reasons are subjectively genuine or instead a pretext for discrimination. (Scott, at p. 383; People v. Duff (2014) 58 Cal.4th 527, 548; People v. Jones (2013) 57 Cal.4th 899, 917 (Jones).)

A. Pertinent Facts
1. Initial round of questioning

The trial court and counsel began voir dire by questioning 24 prospective jurors. Among those jurors were three African-American women—namely, prospective Juror Nos. 2, 8, and 19.

Juror No. 2 indicated that she had previously served on a jury in a criminal case that hung. In follow-up questioning, the prosecutor asked Juror No. 2 (and others) if she would believe a woman who was turning down a dinner invitation from a male coworker when the woman's proffered reason for declining was that she had to "wash [...

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