People v. Vaughn

• Decision Date: 18 April 2022
• Docket Number: E073346
• Citation: 77 Cal.App.5th 609,292 Cal.Rptr.3d 649
• Parties: The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Aaron James VAUGHN et al., Defendants and Appellants.
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

77 Cal.App.5th 609

292 Cal.Rptr.3d 649

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.Aaron James VAUGHN et al., Defendants and Appellants.

E073346

Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Division 2, California.

Filed April 18, 2022

Certified for Partial Publication.^*

Jennifer Peabody, Los Angeles; Helen S. Irza, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant Aaron James Vaughn.

Cara DeVito, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant Victor Wilkins.

Rob Bonta and Xavier Becerra, Attorneys General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Senior Assistant Attorney General, and Daniel Rogers, Lise Jacobson, and Christopher P. Beesley, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

OPINION

RAMIREZ, P. J.

In an exhaustive 19-day jury trial, after 17 witnesses testified and 97 exhibits were admitted, defendants Victor Wilkins and Aaron James Vaughn were found guilty of human trafficking and multiple counts of pimping and pandering; some counts involved a minor victim.

In very brief outline, a San Bernardino police officer stopped an apparent prostitute for indecent exposure. She indicated that she was 17 years old, and that she was walking the street with a second prostitute. She had a keycard to Room 112 in a nearby motel. Room 112 was rented to Wilkins; he had checked in with Vaughn, who had rented Room 109. At trial, the prostitute testified that Wilkins was her pimp, and Vaughn was the second prostitute's pimp. This was corroborated by text messages and photos from the cellphones of Wilkins, Vaughn, and the prostitute. This evidence also showed that Wilkins had pimped (or attempted to pimp) two additional prostitutes.

In this appeal, Wilkins and/or Vaughn contend:

(1) San Bernardino County was not the proper venue for some counts.

(2) The trial court erred by denying defendants' motions for severance.

(3) The trial court erred by denying Wilkins's motion to suppress the evidence obtained as a result of a warrantless entry into his motel room.

(4) The trial court erred by denying defendants' motion for a mistrial after one prospective juror said, during voir dire, that someone found guilty of the charged crimes should be publicly executed.

(5) There was insufficient evidence that Vaughn knew that the minor victim was underage to support his convictions for human trafficking of a minor and pimping a minor.

(6) The trial court abused its discretion by denying Wilkins probation and by imposing the upper term for human trafficking of a minor.

(7) The trial court violated Penal Code section 654¹ by imposing a separate and unstayed sentences for both pimping and pandering of the same victim.

We agree that the sentences violated section 654. However, we find no other error, or, at least, no other prejudicial error that has been preserved for appeal. Accordingly, we will modify the sentences and we will affirm the judgments as modified.

I^**

IISTATEMENT OF THE CASE

In a jury trial, Vaughn was found guilty:

(1) With respect to Jane, of human trafficking of a minor (§ 236.1, subd. (c)(1)), with an enhancement for a prior human trafficking conviction (§ 236.4, subd. (c)); and pimping a minor 16 or older (§ 266h, subd. (b)(1)).

(2) With respect to Molly, of pimping (§ 266h, subd. (a)) and pandering (§ 266i, subd. (a)(1)).

Wilkins was found guilty:

(1) With respect to Jane, of human trafficking of a minor, pimping of a minor 16 or older, and pandering of a minor 16 or older (§ 266i, subd. (b)(1)).

(2) With respect to Molly, of pimping and pandering.

(3) With respect to Selena, of pandering.

(4) With respect to Ebony, of attempted pimping (§§ 266h, subd. (a), 664) and pandering.

Vaughn was sentenced to a total of 19 years 8 months in prison. Wilkins was sentenced to a total of 18 years in prison.

IIIVENUE

Defendants contend that San Bernardino County was not the proper venue for some counts. The People respond that defendants forfeited this contention.

A. Additional Procedural Background.

The information alleged that all of the counts were committed in San Bernardino County.

Defendants moved to set aside the information. (§ 995.) In the motion, they argued that there was insufficient evidence of certain counts. However, they also argued, citing the general criminal venue statute (§ 777), that the prosecution had introduced insufficient evidence at the preliminary hearing that any of the crimes were committed in San Bernardino County. The prosecution did not file an opposition.

The trial court denied the motion. Its ruling did not expressly address the venue issue. Defendants did not file a writ petition seeking review of this ruling.

B. Forfeiture.

A California court has subject matter jurisdiction to try any crime committed in California. ( People v. Simon (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1082, 1096, 108 Cal.Rptr.2d 385, 25 P.3d 598.) Regrettably, some California statutes use the phrase "jurisdictional territory" to refer to venue. (E.g., § 691, subd. (b).) However, " ‘ "[v]enue is not jurisdictional in the fundamental sense ...." ’ [Citation.]" ( People v. Peoples (2016) 62 Cal.4th 718, 791, 198 Cal.Rptr.3d 365, 365 P.3d 230, italics omitted.)

As a general rule, under section 777, the proper venue for trial is the county in which the crime was committed. (See also § 691, subd. (b).) This general rule, however, is subject to assorted statutory exceptions.

One such exception applies to a prosecution for human trafficking, pimping or pandering. Section 784.7, subdivision (c) provides: "If more than one violation of Section 236.1, 266h, or 266i occurs in more than one jurisdictional territory, the jurisdiction of any of those offenses, and for any offenses properly joinable with that offense, is in any jurisdiction where at least one of the offenses occurred, subject to a hearing pursuant to Section 954 .... At the Section 954 hearing, the prosecution shall present written evidence that all district attorneys in counties with jurisdiction of the offenses agree to the venue. Charged offenses from jurisdictions where there is not a written agreement from the district attorney shall be returned to that jurisdiction."

" ‘[A] defendant ... forfeits a claim of improper venue when he or she fails specifically to raise such an objection prior to the commencement of trial.’ [Citation.]" ( People v. Posey (2004) 32 Cal.4th 193, 200, 8 Cal.Rptr.3d 551, 82 P.3d 755.)

"[I]n felony proceedings a claim of improper venue properly may be raised by demurrer (if the defect in venue appears on the face of the accusatory pleading), by a challenge to venue specifically raised before the magistrate at the preliminary hearing, or by a motion under section 995 challenging the validity of an indictment or information. [Citations.]" ( People v. Simon, supra , 25 Cal.4th at pp. 1106-1107, 108 Cal.Rptr.2d 385, 25 P.3d 598.)

Here, defendants specifically raised an improper venue claim in their section 995 motion. The People fault the motion because it cited only section 777; it did not cite section 784.7, and it did not argue that section 784.7 did not apply. The information, however, alleged — evidently pursuant to section 777 — that each crime was committed in San Bernardino County. Defendants quite properly argued that the evidence at the preliminary hearing did not support these allegations. "The prosecution has the burden of proving the facts supporting venue by a preponderance of the evidence .... [Citation.]" ( People v. Thomas (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1276, 1283, 140 Cal.Rptr.3d 184, 274 P.3d 1170.) Defendants had no burden other than to raise the issue and put the prosecution to its proof.

The People also argue that defendants forfeited the issue by failing to file a prompt writ petition.

Certainly defendants could have filed a writ petition. They could readily have shown that an appeal would not be an adequate remedy, because it would bring them relief, if at all, only after the anxiety, effort, and expense of a trial that would then have to be repeated elsewhere. However, this does not mean that they had to file a writ petition.

As a general rule, the erroneous denial of a section 995 motion can be raised by way of a writ petition. (§ 999a.) As here, an appeal is not an adequate remedy, because it is available only after the defendant has endured a potentially improper trial. Nevertheless, the issue can also be raised on appeal. ( People v. Flores (1974) 12 Cal.3d 85, 89, fn. 2, 115 Cal.Rptr. 225, 524 P.2d 353.)

Similarly, an order denying a change of venue can be challenged in either a pretrial writ proceeding or a posttrial appeal, at the defendant's option. ( People v. Tidwell (1970) 3 Cal.3d 62, 68, 89 Cal.Rptr. 44, 473 P.2d 748 ["defendant's failure to seek review by mandate prior to his trial in no way limits his right to relief" on appeal].) This is true even though a writ petition is the only way to prevent the trial from occurring in the wrong place.

The People cite People v. Betts (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1039, 23 Cal.Rptr.3d 138, 103 P.3d 883, which held that whether a California court has subject matter jurisdiction to try a crime committed, at least in part, in another state must be raised before trial. ( Id. at pp. 1046-1054, 23 Cal.Rptr.3d 138, 103 P.3d 883.) As relevant here, it said: " ‘ ... If only a jury could determine subject matter jurisdiction, a defendant would always be put through the expense, anxiety, and uncertainty of a trial and the only mechanism to challenge jurisdiction would be an appeal after the conclusion of trial.’ By contrast, if the issue can be resolved by the court before trial, the defendant will have the opportunity to seek immediate review through a writ proceeding. " ( Id. at pp. 1051-1052, 23 Cal.Rptr.3d 138, 103 P.3d 883, italics added.)

Betts does not apply here directly, because it involved subject matter jurisdiction rather than venue (although it recognized that the two can be analogous, People v. Betts, supra , 34 Cal.4th at p. 1051, 23 Cal.Rptr.3d 138, 103 P.3d 883 ). More to...