People v. Vilardi

• Decision Date: 10 May 1990
• Citation: 556 N.Y.S.2d 518,76 N.Y.2d 67,555 N.E.2d 915
• Parties: , 555 N.E.2d 915, 58 USLW 2695 The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Appellant, v. Antonio VILARDI, Respondent.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 518

556 N.Y.S.2d 518

76 N.Y.2d 67, 555 N.E.2d 915, 58 USLW 2695

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Appellant, v. Antonio VILARDI, Respondent.

Court of Appeals of New York.

May 10, 1990.

[76 N.Y.2d 68] Charles J. Hynes, Dist. Atty. (Seth M. Lieberman and Jay M. Cohen, Brooklyn, of counsel), for appellant.

[76 N.Y.2d 69] Alan Scribner and Larry Bronson, New York City, for respondent.

OPINION OF THE COURT

KAYE, Judge.

This appeal calls upon us to determine the effect to be given to the People's failure, in an arson prosecution, to disclose a report prepared by its explosives expert that had been specifically sought by defendant in his discovery request. More particularly, we must decide whether the standard of United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 87 L.Ed.2d 481 should be adopted as a matter of State law.

Defendant was convicted of arson in the first degree, attempted arson in the first degree and conspiracy, for having conspired with Ronnie and William Bernacet, Ephraim Flores and Gino Romano to plant and set off one pipe bomb below a pizzeria on Nostrand Avenue in Brooklyn, and a second below a nearby laundromat. The first bomb did not explode. It was the People's theory, however, that the bomb planted in the laundromat basement had exploded as planned, and thus the defendants were charged with arson in the first degree, as well as attempt. Damage caused by an explosion is an element of arson in the first degree (Penal Law § 150.20[1].

The Bernacet brothers--who unlike defendant had made fairly extensive inculpatory statements--were tried first, on the same charges on which defendant was later tried. Among the prosecution witnesses was Officer Daniel Kiely, a member of the Bomb Squad, who had inspected the laundromat basement the day after the alleged explosion. At the Bernacets' trial, Kiely was cross-examined at length about a report he wrote the day after the incident, in which he stated that a thorough inspection of the basement revealed no evidence that there had been an explosion, but asked that the case be kept open. Although Kiely testified that he ultimately concluded (in light of reinspection of the premises a year later) that there had been an explosion, defense counsel in summation argued that there was insufficient proof of the explosion element of first degree arson, based on Kiely's first report. The Bernacet brothers were acquitted of the completed arson (see, People v. Bernacet, 108 A.D.2d 921, 485 N.Y.S.2d 810, lv. denied 65 N.Y.2d 813, 493 N.Y.S.2d 1032, 482 N.E.2d 928; People v. Bernacet, 112 A.D.2d 942, 492 N.Y.S.2d 463, lv. denied 66 N.Y.2d 1037, 499 N.Y.S.2d 1034, 489 N.E.2d 1306).

Before defendant's trial, counsel made a pretrial request for all reports "by ballistics, firearm and explosive experts" concerning the laundromat explosion. The prosecutor--not the same Assistant District Attorney who tried the Bernacets--sent him 12 reports, not including Officer Kiely's first report. At trial, no questions about that first report were asked during the brief cross-examination of Kiely, and no effort was made to argue that the People had failed to establish the explosion element of the top count. The sole defense was that the police informant who provided much of the evidence against defendant was too unsavory to be credited. Police officers and the informant Francisco Martinez--who was hired by the defendant and the Bernacets to help carry out the bombings--testified that Martinez was reporting to the police from the outset, and a taped conversation between defendant and Martinez concerning the bombings was introduced into evidence. Defendant was convicted on all counts.

While preparing defendant's appeal, appellate counsel reviewed the transcript of the Bernacets' trial, and realized that there was an undisclosed explosives report. Defendant made a motion to vacate the judgment of conviction, pursuant to CPL 440.10, arguing both that the undisclosed report was Brady material (and failure to disclose violated his due process rights under the State and Federal Constitutions) and that his trial counsel had been ineffective. The People responded that nondisclosure did not require reversal, as there was overwhelming evidence of defendant's guilt, including Officer Kiely's ultimate conclusion that the laundromat bomb had indeed caused an explosion and testimony by residents of the building that there had been a "bang" and that the building had shaken. The District Attorney also noted that there was an issue as to whether the substance of the report, even if exculpatory, had been withheld.

The trial court summarily denied defendant's motion, holding that the Brady claim should have been raised on direct appeal and that defendant had received the effective assistance of counsel. The Appellate Division modified. Although it too found no merit in the ineffective assistance claim, the court rejected the District Attorney's remaining contentions, as do we.

The Appellate Division concluded that defendant's Brady claim was properly raised pursuant to CPL 440.10, and granted defendant's motion to the extent of vacating his conviction of arson in the first degree. Distinguishing this case--in which counsel had specifically sought the undisclosed report--from a case in which no specific request had been made, the Appellate Division held that the report was exculpatory, that the prosecution violated the defendant's constitutional right to be informed of exculpatory information known to the State, and that reversal was required "if there is a reasonable possibility that [the undisclosed material] contributed to the defendant's conviction." (150 A.D.2d 819, 820, 542 N.Y.S.2d 238.) Concluding that the People had not met that standard, the Appellate Division ordered a new trial on the completed arson charge to which the exculpatory material was relevant. We now affirm.

Analysis

On appeal, the People contend that the standard applied by the Appellate Division was erroneous. Noting that the Supreme Court has recently articulated a single standard for determination of when a prosecutor's failure to disclose evidence favorable to the defendant requires reversal (see, United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 87 L.Ed.2d 481, supra ), the People argue that this court adopted that standard in People v. Chin, 67 N.Y.2d 22, 499 N.Y.S.2d 638, 490 N.E.2d 505. Thus, the People reason, the Appellate Division should have applied the Bagley standard: that failure to disclose favorable evidence is "constitutional error * * * only if the evidence [was] material in the sense that * * * there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different" (United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 678, 682, 105 S.Ct. at 3381, 3383, supra [emphasis added]. The Appellate Division's assessment, according to the People, was improperly based on a "reasonable possibility" standard more favorable to defendant, as there is no longer any distinction between cases in which a specific request has been made for undisclosed Brady material and those in which it has not.

Contrary to the People's claim, this court has not yet had occasion to consider, under State law, whether to adopt Bagley's broad formulation of the materiality standard in the context of a case where the prosecutor has failed to turn over particular exculpatory evidence, despite the fact that defendant has requested disclosure of that very evidence. People v. Chin was not such a case. As is made plain in the Chin opinion, the claimed Brady material was not exculpatory evidence; no demand had been made for it; and the People had no knowledge of it before trial (People v. Chin, 67 N.Y.2d, at 33, 499 N.Y.S.2d 638, 490 N.E.2d 505, supra; see also, People v. Brown, 67 N.Y.2d 555, 559, 505 N.Y.S.2d 574, 496 N.E.2d 663, cert. denied 479 U.S. 1093, 107 S.Ct. 1307, 94 L.Ed.2d 161). In this case, by contrast, the withheld report is plainly exculpatory, as it suggests there was no evidence of a crucial element of the first degree arson charge; there is no dispute that the report was in the People's possession; and defendant specifically sought discovery of the very material involved here--reports of explosives experts.

Thus, unlike Chin, this case does require us to decide whether Bagley should be adopted as a matter of State law. ¹

I.

Federal constitutional law concerning the People's failure to disclose exculpatory evidence originated in a series of cases involving the prosecution's knowing use of perjured testimony (see, United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S., at 679, n. 8, 105 S.Ct. at 3382, n. 8, supra [discussing cases].

In Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215, decided nearly 30 years ago, the Supreme Court established, as a matter of Federal constitutional law, that the prosecution's failure to disclose to the defense evidence in its possession both favorable and material to the defense entitles the defendant to a new trial. Brady itself involved failure to disclose evidence that had been specifically requested by the defense, and the court noted that the nondisclosure was constitutional error if the evidence would "tend to exculpate" the defendant (373 U.S., at 88, 83 S.Ct. at 1197, supra ).

Following the Brady decision, there was considerable doubt as to whether a specific request for the exculpatory evidence might not be an indispensable element of a Brady claim (see, Comment, Brady v. Maryland and the Prosecutor's Duty to Disclose, 40 U.Chi.L.Rev. 112, 115-117 [1972]. It was in response to this doubt that in United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 96 S.Ct. 2392, 49 L.Ed.2d 342, the court created a two-tiered framework for determining whether favorable evidence was "material," so that the failure to disclose it required a new trial. Evidence specifically requested by the defense was material if it "might have affected the...