People v. Von Staich

• Decision Date: 18 January 1980
• Docket Number: Cr. 10243
• Citation: 161 Cal.Rptr. 448,101 Cal.App.3d 172
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of California, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Ivan Von STAICH, Defendant and Appellant.

Page 448

161 Cal.Rptr. 448

101 Cal.App.3d 172

PEOPLE of the State of California, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Ivan Von STAICH, Defendant and Appellant.

Cr. 10243.

Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Division 2, California.

Jan. 18, 1980.

Quin Denvir, State Public Defender, and Edward H. Schulman, Deputy State Public Defender, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for defendant and appellant.

OPINION

GARDNER, Presiding Justice.

In this case we remonstrate, undoubtedly with complete futility although with considerable sincerity, against the indefensible position in which the Courts of Appeal are placed by People v. Wende, 25 Cal.3d 436, 158 Cal.Rptr. 839, 600 P.2d 1071, in its current impression of Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493. We respectfully suggest a reexamination of Wende and at the same time a rewriting of some of the language of People v. Feggans, 67 Cal.2d 444, 62 Cal.Rptr. 419, 432 P.2d 21.

In this case, the defendant was convicted of escape. We appointed counsel, the State Public Defender, to represent him. Counsel filed a brief which contains a statement of the case, a statement of facts, and a statement of the "principal issue at trial" which contention is set forth as follows, "Were the findings of the jury supported by substantial evidence?" Under the admonition of Wende, counsel then requested this court to conduct an independent review of the entire appellate record in order to determine for itself whether the appeal contained any arguable appellate issues. Counsel did not withdraw from the case. He has not described the appeal as frivolous. He advises that he has been unable to ascertain from the record any arguable appellate issue and that he has written to the appellant informing him of his right to file a supplemental brief. No such brief has been filed.

Consistent with the admonition of Wende, we have undertaken a review of the "entire record" to determine whether arguable issues exist. We find none but in the process we feel constrained to register some protest against the mandate of Wende and incidentally with some of the language of Feggans. We agree with the dissent in Wende that the procedures we have just undertaken in this case are not mandated by Anders.

Let's take this problem step by step.

First, we state that "we" have examined the record. In this case the author of this opinion has read the entire record. This involves a reporter's transcript in excess of 500 pages and a clerk's transcript in the neighborhood of 80 pages. This took a considerable amount of time and we are sure that the State Public Defender was involved in as much or more consumption of time in looking for an arguable issue. We will discuss the details later in this opinion. The point is that when we state that "we" have read this record, this is not a completely honest statement. Obviously, the other two members of this panel did not undertake any such study. They relied upon the author of the opinion. As in Wende, when the author of that opinion said, "We have undertaken a review of the entire record," no one is naive enough to believe that all seven members of the Supreme Court read that record. It meant that the author of the opinion or a research attorney under his direction had done so. Thus, rather obviously, the statement that "the court" has examined the record is hardly accurate. On the other hand, when an attorney appointed by the court has examined the record and reports to us that he or she has done so, that statement means exactly what it says.

Second, in reviewing such a record a judge is put in an awkward position. Judges are disciplined to approach all matters with complete objectivity. Combing a record for error strains this objectivity. Unconsciously, one becomes an advocate. One discovers that which may develop into an arguable issue and instinctively the hunt is on. The line between advocacy and decision making should never be blurred. It is in this type of proceeding. ¹

Third, this involves an unconscionable amount of time which could be better spent in more productive judicial pursuits. In the average case, counsel have presented some well defined and well argued issues. It is a comparatively simple task to resolve these issues by reference to the briefs, to such portions of the record as may become necessary and such independent research as is necessary. However, in the time involved in going through this transcript and checking the Use Notes in CALJIC to be sure there were no instructional errors, several "normal" opinions could have been written.

Four, Feggans says that counsel should present any "arguable" issues. To us an arguable issue means an issue of sufficient substance that it is going to result either in a reversal or a modification of the judgment or is going to make new law. ² This whole process of appellate review is not some kind of a WPA project for the continued employment of judges, lawyers, secretaries, clerks, book sellers and office equipment salesmen. Hopefully, we do not engage in a process of setting up straw men and then knocking them down in a search for "arguable" issues. We think Feggans should be rewritten in order to clarify this concept.

Fifth, this procedure puts the Attorney General in an awkward position. If a member of this court finds an issue to be arguable, that means it is arguable from the standpoint that if it has merit he or she thinks we are involved in a prejudicial error situation. This must put the Attorney General in something of a quandary since it would appear that at least two strikes have already been called upon him. He must wonder if perhaps the hypothetical conversation suggested by Ed Lascher has not taken place. He is called upon to respond to an issue that the court has already found to be of such merit that, if sustained, modification or reversal will result. We say this with all due respect to the sentence in Wende which suggests that if a contention is reasonably arguable, the court must appoint another counsel to argue the appeal "no matter how the court feels it will probably be resolved." That latter sentence involves a practice in mental gymnastics almost beyond comprehension.

Sixth, as the dissent in Wende pointed out, the Supreme Court in Anders did not impose any duty on the appellate court to examine the "record" if counsel has already done so and submitted a brief similar to the brief filed in this case. Anders required that the appellate court make a full examination of the "proceedings" in determining the merit, if any, of the appeal. When counsel, in whom we repose faith, has filed a brief stating that he or she has examined this record and found no arguable...