People v. Wakefield

• Decision Date: 15 August 2019
• Docket Number: 107724
• Citation: 175 A.D.3d 158,107 N.Y.S.3d 487
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. John WAKEFIELD, Appellant.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

175 A.D.3d 158

107 N.Y.S.3d 487

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent,

v.John WAKEFIELD, Appellant.

107724

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Department, New York.

Calendar Date: May 2, 2019

Decided and Entered: August 15, 2019

OPINION AND ORDER

Pritzker, J. Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court (Coccoma, J.), rendered May 27, 2015 in Schenectady County, upon a verdict convicting defendant of the crimes of murder in the first degree and robbery in the first degree.

A caseworker from an organization that assists individuals with mental health issues, such as the victim, performed a welfare check at the victim's apartment after he failed to attend a scheduled appointment and could not be contacted. The victim was discovered dead in his apartment with a guitar amplifier cord wrapped around his neck. There was no indication of forced entry into the apartment or that a struggle had taken place. There was also no indication that his death was a suicide. An investigation ensued, during which several items owned by the victim, including a laptop, a PlayStation and an orange duffle bag, were discovered to be missing from his apartment. After a reward was offered for information about the victim's death, a friend of defendant came forth and advised law enforcement officials that defendant had admitted to him that he had killed the victim.

Defendant was subsequently charged in a multicount indictment in connection with the victim's death. Law enforcement collected a buccal swab from defendant to compare his DNA to that found at the crime scene. The data was eventually sent to Cybergenetics, a private company that used a software program called TrueAllele Casework System (hereinafter TrueAllele), for further testing.¹ The DNA analysis by TrueAllele revealed, to a high degree of probability, that defendant's DNA was found on the amplifier cord, on parts of the victim's T-shirt and on the victim's forearm. Prior to trial, defendant moved to preclude admission of evidence derived from TrueAllele, or alternatively, for a hearing under Frye v. United States , 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923) to test the technology's general acceptance within the relevant scientific community. Supreme Court granted the motion to the extent of permitting a Frye hearing. At the Frye hearing, Supreme Court heard the testimony of Mark Perlin, the founder, chief scientist and chief executive officer of Cybergenetics, among others. Following the Frye hearing, the court rendered a decision concluding that TrueAllele was generally accepted within the relevant scientific community ( 47 Misc.3d 850, 859, 9 N.Y.S.3d 540 [Sup. Ct., Schenectady County 2015] ). A jury trial was held, after which defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree and robbery in the first degree. Defendant was sentenced, as a second felony offender, to concurrent prison terms, the greatest of which was life in prison without the possibility of parole. Defendant appeals. We affirm.

Defendant initially challenges Supreme Court's Frye ruling that TrueAllele was generally accepted by the relevant scientific community and not novel. The introduction of novel scientific evidence requires a determination as to its reliability consistent with the protocol articulated in Frye v. United States (supra ). "That protocol requires that expert testimony be based on a scientific principle or procedure which has been sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs" ( People v. Wernick, 89 N.Y.2d 111, 115, 651 N.Y.S.2d 392, 674 N.E.2d 322 [1996] [internal quotation marks, emphasis and citations omitted] ). "It emphasizes counting scientists' votes, rather than on verifying the soundness of a scientific conclusion" ( Parker v. Mobil Oil Corp., 7 N.Y.3d 434, 447, 824 N.Y.S.2d 584, 857 N.E.2d 1114 [2006] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted] ).

At the Frye hearing, Perlin explained that TrueAllele "automates the interpretation of the data signals that have already been generated by a laboratory." Perlin testified that DNA electropherograms are commonly analyzed by a person with some computer assistance. TrueAllele, however, takes the data that is entered and "proposes possibilities for what different genotypes can be." TrueAllele employs the Markov Chain Monte Carlo algorithm (hereinafter MCMC), which, according to Perlin, is "basically a way of solving integration problems" and "gives the probabilities of all the different possibilities, not just finding what might be a maximum possibility." Perlin also testified that TrueAllele is designed to have a certain degree of artificial intelligence to make additional inferences as more information becomes available. Perlin explained that, after objectively generating all genotype possibilities, TrueAllele answers the question of "how much more the suspect matches the evidence [than] a random person would," and the answer takes the form of a likelihood ratio.

The record reflects that articles evaluating TrueAllele have been published in six separate forensics journals. In addition, at the time of the Frye hearing, TrueAllele had undergone approximately 25 validation studies, some of which appeared in peer-reviewed publications.² One peer-reviewed publication noted that, when a victim reference was available, "the computer was [4½] orders of magnitude more efficacious than human review on the same data" and that, when a victim reference was unavailable, "the average efficacy of the computer increased to six orders of magnitude." Another publication stated that, "[w]hile [TrueAllele] does find more matches and computes stronger statistics on average, it examines DNA evidence objectively without introducing bias that may favor the prosecution or defense," further noting that TrueAllele "maintains excellent specificity" and "calculates DNA match statistics with precision." The DNA Subcommittee of the New York State Forensic Science Commission offered a binding recommendation that TrueAllele be used by the State Police for its forensic casework. Approximately one month after the Subcommittee issued its recommendation, the full Commission approved TrueAllele for forensic casework. Perlin testified that TrueAllele was used to deconvolute the remains of victims from the September 11, 2001 World Trade Center attacks upon the request from the New York City Chief Medical Examiner's office. The National Institute of Standards and Technology, a division of the United States Department of Commerce, purchased TrueAllele, and its representatives have given presentations regarding TrueAllele's effectiveness. At the time of the Frye hearing, TrueAllele had also been used in various states and had been deemed admissible in Virginia, Pennsylvania and California.

Supreme Court found that "there [was] a plethora of evidence in favor of [TrueAllele], and there [was] no significant evidence to the contrary " ( 47 Misc.3d at 859, 9 N.Y.S.3d 540 ). In view of the evidence adduced at the Frye hearing, we find that the court's ruling was proper (see People v. Hamilton, 255 A.D.2d 693, 694, 681 N.Y.S.2d 117 [1998], lv denied 92 N.Y.2d 1032, 684 N.Y.S.2d 497, 707 N.E.2d 452 [1998] ; see generally People v. Wesley, 83 N.Y.2d 417, 426–427, 611 N.Y.S.2d 97, 633 N.E.2d 451 [1994] ). To the extent that defendant claims that the Frye hearing was a "farce" because he did not have the opportunity to review TrueAllele's source code,³ such claim is waived inasmuch as he proceeded with the Frye hearing in the absence of the source code and did not object in doing so. We further note that defendant did not argue in his post- Frye submission that the hearing was a farce because he did not have the source code.

Defendant also argues that the verdict was not supported by legally sufficient evidence and was against the weight of the evidence. As relevant here, a person is guilty of murder in the first degree when, "[w]ith intent to cause the death of another person, he [or she] causes the death of such person" and "the victim was killed while the defendant was in the course of committing ... and in furtherance of robbery" ( Penal Law § 125.27[1][a][vii] ). As also relevant here, "[a] person is guilty of robbery in the first degree when he [or she] forcibly steals property and when, in the course of the commission of the crime ..., he [or she] ... [u]ses ... a dangerous instrument" ( Penal Law § 160.15[3] ).

In particular, defendant argues that the evidence did not establish that he stole anything from the victim. We disagree. The victim's stepsister testified at trial that, shortly after the incident in question, she was allowed to go back to the victim's apartment and clean it out and, as she was doing so, she noticed that the victim's laptop and PlayStation were missing. Kevin Allen, an inmate who was incarcerated with defendant pending trial, testified that defendant admitted to him that he took from the victim's apartment cash, crack cocaine, a laptop and a PlayStation, as well as other items that he thought that he could sell. The People adduced evidence that defendant was known to sell or trade electronics for drugs and that, on one occasion, defendant went to a drug house and said that he had a PlayStation and a laptop to trade and was seen in possession of a bag nearly identical to a unique duffle bag known to belong to the victim. Viewing the foregoing evidence in the light most favorable to the People, as we must, we find that it was legally sufficient to establish that defendant stole property belonging to the victim (see People v. Jiminez, 36 A.D.3d 962, 963, 826 N.Y.S.2d 837 [2007], lv denied 8 N.Y.3d 947, 836 N.Y.S.2d 557, 868 N.E.2d 240 [2007] ; People v. Hutcherson, 25 A.D.3d 912, 914, 808 N.Y.S.2d 813 [2006], lv denied 6 N.Y.3d 849, 816 N.Y.S.2d 755, 849 N.E.2d 978 [2006] ; People v. Rouse, 4 A.D.3d 553, 555, 771 N.Y.S.2d 579 [2004], lv denied 2 N.Y.3d 805, 781 N.Y.S.2d 305, 814 N.E.2d 477 [2004] ...