People v. Walter
Decision Date | 01 December 1994 |
Docket Number | No. 93CA1166,93CA1166 |
Citation | 890 P.2d 240 |
Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Daniel Joseph WALTER, Defendant-Appellant. . II |
Court | Colorado Court of Appeals |
Gale A. Norton, Atty. Gen., Stephen K. ErkenBrack, Chief Deputy Atty. Gen., Timothy M. Tymkovich, Sol. Gen., Roger G. Billotte, Asst. Atty. Gen., Denver, for plaintiff-appellee.
Mary Kane & Associates, P.C., Margaret L. Olnek, Denver, for defendant-appellant.
Opinion by Judge ROY.
Defendant, Daniel Joseph Walter, appeals a judgment of conviction entered after the trial court found him guilty of possession of marijuana with intent to distribute. The sole issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred in denying the defendant's motion to suppress evidence seized from his residence. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.
Defendant and his wife hired a 15-year-old girl as a daytime babysitter to care for their three children during spring vacation. Defendant's 12-year-old son showed the babysitter some marijuana and drug paraphernalia in defendant's bedroom. The babysitter telephoned her mother who came to defendant's residence and telephoned the police.
Upon arrival, a police officer was admitted into the residence by the babysitter's mother. After entering, the officer ascertained that the babysitter and her mother did not live at the premises. It is undisputed that the babysitter, her mother, and defendant's two small daughters were the only persons present at the residence. Defendant's son had left the residence in the interim.
The babysitter and her mother took the officer upstairs to defendant's bedroom. The door to the bedroom was partially open, and the officer could see a lock box on the bed, but could not see its contents. Upon entering the bedroom with the babysitter, the officer probed the lock box containing plastic bags of material, and the babysitter showed the officer a vial of pills on the bureau and a scale and other items in the closet. The babysitter began to rummage around in the closet until the officer instructed her not to disturb anything.
The officer then contacted the station which dispatched a detective. The detective was also granted access to the bedroom without any further consent. Upon defendant's arrival, the officer escorted him to his bedroom where the detective was waiting. The marijuana and related items were plainly visible in the bedroom.
The defendant testified that the officers asked him if he knew the "implications" of the items discovered, and thereafter a detective read defendant his Miranda rights without placing him under arrest or restraining him. The detective then asked the defendant for permission to conduct a search, and defendant signed a consent to search on a form provided by the officers.
The defendant testified that he consented to the search because the police had already found all of the contraband and because it would have been futile to refuse. After receiving defendant's consent, the detective conducted a further search of the bedroom, discovered nothing further, seized the marijuana and related items, and arrested defendant.
The trial court denied defendant's motion to suppress concluding that the warrantless entry into defendant's residence and the subsequent search and seizure were constitutionally valid because: (1) the babysitter and her mother had the authority to consent to the officer's initial entry into defendant's residence; (2) once the officer was inside, he had probable cause to believe a crime had been committed based on information revealed by the babysitter and could then conduct a "protective sweep" of the residence to secure it; and (3) the police did not seize the contraband until defendant voluntarily consented to the search.
In reviewing a trial court's grant or denial of a motion to suppress, we defer to the trial court's findings of historical fact. However, if the trial court's ultimate conclusion of constitutional law is unsupported by evidentiary findings, or if the trial court applies an erroneous legal standard, the error is subject to correction by the reviewing court. People v. Weston, 869 P.2d 1293 (Colo.1994). Here, in our view, the trial court's ultimate conclusions of constitutional law are not supported by the record.
The initial inquiry here is whether the babysitter had authority to consent to a search of the bedroom of the defendant's residence. We conclude the babysitter did not have such authority.
The babysitter had been hired by defendant's wife, was hired only on an occasional basis, and had been hired on only four or five previous occasions. The record is silent as to any specific authority given, or limitations placed upon, the babysitter by either the defendant or his wife. It is also silent as to any representations made to the officer or the detective by the babysitter as to her authority.
A valid consent for a search "may be obtained either from the individual whose property is searched, or from a third party who possesses common authority over the property." People v. Hopkins, 870 P.2d 478, 480 (Colo.1994).
The "common authority" test was first articulated in United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171, 94 S.Ct. 988, 993, 39 L.Ed.2d 242, 250 (1974) (fn. 7), in which the court stated:
Common authority is, of course, not to be implied from the mere property interest a third party has in the property. The authority which justifies the third-party consent ... rests ... on mutual use of the property by persons generally having joint access or control for most purposes, so that it is reasonable to recognize that any of the co-inhabitants has the right to permit the inspection in his own right and that the others have assumed the risk that one of their number might permit the common area to be searched.
In Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 110 S.Ct. 2793, 111 L.Ed.2d 148 (1990), the United States Supreme Court expanded the "common authority" inquiry to include those instances in which a police officer reasonably believes, under an objective test, that a third party had the authority to consent to a search. The Colorado Supreme Court adopted the "apparent authority" test in People v. McKinstrey, 852 P.2d 467 (Colo.1993), and has since applied it in People v. Hopkins, supra, and People v. Breidenbach, 875 P.2d 879 (Colo.1994).
Under the rationale of Rodriguez, "police officers ... should make reasonable inquiries when they find themselves in ambiguous circumstances regarding the authority of the third party to consent to the search." People v. McKinstrey, supra, at 473. The prosecution bears the burden of proving that a third party had common authority over the premises to be searched. People v. McKinstrey, supra. The prosecution may do so by proving that the party consenting to the search had either "actual" or "apparent" authority over the premises to be searched. See generally People v. Hopkins, supra.
Whether a babysitter may consent to a search of his or her employer's residence has not previously been addressed by Colorado appellate courts. Courts in other jurisdictions have not uniformly resolved that issue. See United States v. Dearing, 9 F.3d 1428 (9th Cir.1993); People v. Keith M., 255 Ill.App.3d 1071, 192 Ill.Dec. 825, 625 N.E.2d 980 (1993); Cook v. State, 531 So.2d 1369 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1084, 109 S.Ct. 1542, 103 L.Ed.2d 846 (1989).
In our view the determinative factor is whether there is evidence indicating that the defendant delegated authority over the premises (or certain portions of the premises) to the babysitter or, alternatively, whether there is evidence indicating that the searching officer had a reasonable belief that the babysitter had such authority. See United States v. Dearing, supra ( ); People v. Keith M., supra ( ); Cook v. State, supra ( ).
Here, the trial court determined that the babysitter and her mother had the authority, or apparent authority, initially to admit the officer into defendant's residence. Indeed, the defendant concedes that the officer's initial entry into the home was lawful because at the time the babysitter's mother opened the door, the officer believed, or could reasonably have believed, that she was the occupant of the residence. See People v. McKinstrey, supra; see also People v. Breidenbach, supra.
The initial entry into the residence does not, however, complete the analysis. The trial court made no determination as to whether the babysitter or her mother had the authority, or apparent authority, to consent to a search of defendant's bedroom or the remainder of the residence.
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