People v. Ward

• Decision Date: 16 June 1994
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Daniel H. WARD, Appellant.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

Page 490

613 N.Y.S.2d 490

205 A.D.2d 876

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Daniel H. WARD, Appellant.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division,

Third Department.

June 16, 1994.

Adam G. Parisi, Schenectady, for appellant.

Robert M. Carney, Dist. Atty. (Philip W. Mueller, of counsel), Schenectady, for respondent.

Before MERCURE, J.P., and CREW, WHITE, CASEY and YESAWICH, JJ. YESAWICH, Justice.

Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of Schenectady County (Reilly Jr., J.), rendered December 23, 1991, upon a verdict convicting defendant of the crimes of robbery in the first degree and assault in the first degree (two counts).

The only point that needs to be considered on this appeal is whether County Court erred in permitting defendant to proceed pro se at the trial of these serious offenses, for which, after conviction, he received three concurrent indeterminate prison sentences of 25 years to life. Defendant contends that the court did not inquire sufficiently to determine whether he fully understood the dangers of conducting his own defense and whether his waiver of the right to counsel was the product of duress. We find these contentions baseless.

A criminal defendant's right to conduct his or her own defense is guaranteed by both the Federal and New York Constitutions (see, Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819-820, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562; NY Const, art I, § 6) and, with limited exceptions, may be exercised by any defendant who makes an unequivocal and timely request to do so (see, People v. McIntyre, 36 N.Y.2d 10, 17, 364 N.Y.S.2d 837, 324 N.E.2d 322). Because a necessary consequence of asserting this right is a relinquishment of the right to counsel, a trial court faced with such a request must conduct a thorough inquiry to determine if the defendant's decision has been made voluntarily and with full knowledge of the possible dangers and disadvantages of proceeding pro se (see, id.; see also, Faretta v. California, supra, 422 U.S. at 835, 95 S.Ct. at 2541); once the defendant has been appropriately warned, however, and the trial court is satisfied that the defendant fully understands the risks attendant in waiving the right to counsel, but nonetheless elects to do so, the request must be honored (see, People v. Vivenzio, 62 N.Y.2d 775, 776, 477 N.Y.S.2d 318, 465 N.E.2d 1254; People v. Schoolfield, 196 A.D.2d 111, 608 N.Y.S.2d 413).

Here, County Court informed defendant of the dangers inherent in conducting his own defense and repeatedly advised against it. County Court also explained that defendant would not be permitted to "testify" in the guise of examining witnesses, that he would be held to the same standards of conduct and procedure as an attorney, and that he would not be allowed to change his mind once the trial had begun. Additionally, the court inquired of, and received satisfactory responses with respect to, defendant's education, his reasons for desiring to proceed pro se, his previous experience with the legal system, whether he had received psychiatric treatment in the past and...