People v. Watford

• Decision Date: 25 April 2012
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Plaintiff, v. Dalana J. WATFORD, Defendant.
• Court: New York County Court

943 N.Y.S.2d 740

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Plaintiff,
v.
Dalana J. WATFORD, Defendant.

County Court, Monroe County, New York.

April 25, 2012.

943 N.Y.S.2d 741

James Egan, Esq., Assistant District Attorney, Sandra Doorley, Esq., District Attorney, Monroe County District Attorney's office, Rochester, for the People.

Bronwen Vanhooft, Esq., Assistant Public Defender, Timothy Donaher, Esq., Public Defender, Monroe County Public Defender's Office, Rochester, for the Defendant.

JOHN L. DeMARCO, J.

Defendant is charged by indictment with four counts of Falsifying Business Records (class E felonies) and four counts of Identity Theft (three class E felonies, one class A misdemeanor). She seeks the Court's permission to participate in the judicial diversion program that is codified in Article 216 of the Criminal Procedure Law. The People oppose, for two reasons: first, they contend that defendant is not statutorily "eligible" to participate, and second, that there is no evidence that alcohol or substance abuse was a contributing factor to defendant's alleged criminal behavior. The Court took oral argument on the matter, and invited written submissions from the parties as well. After having reviewed those submissions and considered the oral arguments made, the Court will permit defendant to participate in the program for the reasons that follow.

Statutory Eligibility

"Eligible defendant" is defined in CPL 216.00(1). The definition found in the statute appears to contemplate two classes of eligible defendants: those charged with certain drug crimes specified in 216.00(1), and those charged with certain crimes specified in CPL 410.91(5). The Court acknowledges that defendant does not appear to fit into either of these two categories. Thus the People's argument regarding defendant's statutory (in)eligibility quite obviously has some

943 N.Y.S.2d 742

weight. But the Court chooses to consider the nature and purpose of the entire statute—and the judicial diversion program itself—as well as what appears to be the plain language of 216.00(1), in determining whether defendant should be permitted to participate.

The Court notes that the drug crimes specified in 216.00(1) include class B, C and D, as well as E, felonies. The crimes specified in 410.91(5) include several class D, as well as E, felonies. The crimes defendant is charged with committing are all class E felonies (with the exception of one misdemeanor). Furthermore, and very important in the Court's view, is the fact that the "eligible" crimes specified in 410.91(5) are—on their face—at least as serious, if not more so, than the crimes defendant is charged with committing. Additionally, the crimes specified in 410.91(5) are not—on their face—any more likely to have been committed because of drug addiction than the crimes charged here. In short, the Court can discern no rational basis for permitting someone charged with Burglary or Criminal Mischief the opportunity to be considered for the program when someone charged with Falsifying Business Records or Identity Theft is precluded, regardless of his or her therapeutic needs. If anything, the Court is of the opinion that defendant's crimes here are more likely the product of drug addiction than, for example, burglaries typically are.

The Court has undertaken a review of Penal Law crimes currently on the books. Even by a conservative estimate, there are over five hundred Penal Law offenses, including dozens of class E felonies—many of which might very likely be committed because of drug addiction, such as "absconding from a community treatment program," "criminal diversion of prescription medications," and "criminal use of a public benefit card," among many, many others. And that is just the Penal Law—of course many other felony crimes are littered throughout the statute books. It is inconceivable that the legislature intended to restrict the judicial diversion program to those very few offenders who are fortunate enough to be charged with a particular crime, and not others who are similarly situated—that is, accused of low level, non-violent criminal behavior and found by well-trained and conscientious professional therapists and clinicians to be in serious need of drug addiction treatment.

The People argue, with some force, that the legislature could have written a statute that simply permits any defendant accused of a non-violent offense the opportunity for diversion. But...